fascination, however, frequently leads him to the use of statistics drawn from the Chinese press that, because they are almost invariably only partial in their coverage, contribute little to his argument and, in some instance, serve more to mislead than to inform. On the other hand, Dr. Chu has overlooked certain pieces of available statistical information which would usefully supplement his argument. For example, when he cites industrial income figures from 1957, he states that “current data on factory wages are not available”. In fact, reports from visitors to the People’s Republic of China in recent years contain considerable statistical material on factory wages.

Surprisingly, it is in his use of Chinese names and terms where the majority of the book’s errors occur. To cite the most frequently encountered example, the term, pen-wei chu-ji (“own unit-ism” or “groupism”) consistently appears here as the “peng wei principle”.

It is not clear for what audience Dr. Chu has written this book. Specialists in the field of the study of contemporary Chinese politics will find little here that is new. On the other hand, those primarily concerned with the application of communications theories to the process of political development will find Dr. Chu’s book a not wholly satisfactory vehicle for introducing themselves to the Chinese case because of its uneven historical and institutional coverage. Finally, the book seems to this reviewer to be ill-suited for classroom use. The structure of the argument renders the book unsuitable for inclusion on the syllabi of courses on contemporary China. Moreover, so many of the achievements of the “radical change” of Dr. Chu’s title having themselves become subject to further radical change since the post-Mao leadership has secured its position and launched its own development plan, the book, like so much of our work in the field, has become prematurely outdated.

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As Dr. Hsiao notes in his preface, Western historians have paid considerable attention to the army of Cinggis Qan, but have neglected the military institutions of the Yuan dynasty. In this book he begins the process of rectifying that neglect. The text of the book is in two basic parts, a long introductory essay, and a translation of two chapters from the military treatise of the Yuan History. This text, totalling 124 pages, is followed by 120 pages of notes. The essay is divided into sections covering the military system in general, the imperial guard, and the garrison system. In the first of these sections Dr. Hsiao discusses the general problem of the military systems of Sino-barbarian states, with their merging of Chinese and inner Asian elements. He provides a brief history of the formation of the Mongolian army under Cinggis, and its transformation into the Sino-barbarian army of the Yuan. The process by which non-Mongol elements were inducted into the armies during the wars in north China is described in institutional terms. In particular this section focuses on attempts to centralize control over the armies, and bureaucratize their administration, attempts which were not wholly successful. Such reforms made administrative sense, and were in the political interest of the central authorities, but they collided with both the interests and social values of the Mongol military elite.

Dr. Hsiao also discusses what he calls the military service system, i.e., the systems of induction and support of soldiers. The conquest of north China and the consequent settling of Mongols on the land transformed a steppe system, in which all adult males were presumptively soldiers into one in which Mongol families were called upon to provide soldiers though not every adult male was subject to service. For their Han subjects the Mongols devised a policy under which soldiers were drafted, and households were designated as military households to provide support.

Like the service system of the soldiery the support and induction systems of the officer corps were also transformed by the conquest of China. The noyad who had been dependent on their followers were transformed into a salaried military aristocracy. As had been the pattern under previous conquest dynasties the Mongol officers could pass their positions on hereditarily, usually to their eldest sons. (Primogeniture was violated only when there was no direct line of descent). Perhaps inevitably, this politically reliable officer class over time became incompetent and parasitical. This degeneration was certainly one major factor in the weakening of the Yuan armed forces.

The impoverishment of the military families was, in Dr. Hsiao’s opinion, an even more important factor in the Yuan decline. The financial burdens placed on the responsible households were too great to be borne by them out of the return on their properties, and so over time their holdings themselves were eaten away. Many became destitute, and we early hear of Mongols as vagrants and even Mongols as slaves. The non-Mongol soldiers and their supporters suffered a similar fate.

This degeneration of the armies was paralleled by the degeneration of the elite imperial guard. Dr. Hsiao discusses at some length the nature of the kesig under Cinggis Qan, and the changes introduced after the founding of the Yuan. Under the early Mongol rulers the kesig had been a multifunctional body, providing not only military services but also playing other political roles. Under the Yuan, despite attempts to maintain as much as possible of the old spirit of the institution, its various functions were often shared by if not wholly given over to new Chinese style organs.

One of the reforms which contributed to a weakening of the functional position of the kesig was the creation under Qubilai of imperial guard corps patterned after the traditional Chinese model. Chosen from Chinese as well as Mongols and se-mu these guards served as the basic military units charged with protection of the capital. As such they were key units in the rash of coups which marked the fourteenth century. Unfortunately for the Mongols although the guards were strong enough to make the position of any emperor insecure, they also degenerated and proved incapable of suppressing the Chinese uprisings of the late Yuan.

The final section of the introductory essay deals with the system of Yuan garrisons, both those in interior China and those in inner Asia. As with the other sections the approach is primarily institutional, and closes with an analysis of the deterioration of the system.

The translation section is preceded by a brief introduction which describes the Treatise on the Military, and the place within it of the two translated chapters. The sources of the chapters, in particular the Ching-shih Ta-tien, are described in some detail. The translation itself is of high quality, as is to be expected of a student of Professor Cleaves. The text is divided, like Dr. Hsiao’s introduction, into a general preface, a section on the military system, and sections on the imperial guard and the garrisons.

Physically the book has been well produced, and although the binding is not all that it might be, the typeface is pleasing to read, and the placing of characters in the