NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE, or rather textual scholars\textsuperscript{1} intent on discovering the historical foundations of non-European civilizations,\textsuperscript{2} created Ibn Khaldun. Nineteenth century Europe, or rather dynamic statesmen delineating a profile empire which merged commercial interests with concepts of territoriality and brotherhood,\textsuperscript{3} created Islamic reform. Of course, these are deliberate overstatements of the usual judgments on both Ibn Khaldun and Islamic reform. Ibn Khaldun was a 14th century Maghribi jurist-statesman-historian, and hence European scholars only rediscovered him; they did not invent or create him. Islamic reform was attempted before the 19th century and in response to crises inspired by other, non-European actors. It, too, was neither initiated nor created by Europeans.

Yet the 19th century European context looms so large in any endeavor to understand either Ibn Khaldun or Islamic reform that one is compelled to wonder whether both subjects are not distorted unless attention is first directed to the radical shift in European and then world history which elicited and shaped them. Apart from 19th century European scholarship, would Ibn Khaldun have become more than another footnote to Islamic historiography, inferior to such Muslim writers as at-Tabari and Abul-Fazl and incomparable with seminal intellectual figures of the Western world, whether Hegel, Engels, Marx, Durkheim or Toynbee?\textsuperscript{4} Ibn Khaldun's importance today was created by 19th century Europe. As the foremost Muslim historian of Ibn Khaldun, M. Talbi, has remarked, "It was in Europe that Ibn Khaldun was discovered and the importance of his \textit{Mukaddima} realized."\textsuperscript{5}

Other articles in this volume address the ramifications of understanding Ibn Khaldun as an oddity, if not an isolate, within the intellectual history of Islam. It will be the purpose of this article to demonstrate that Islamic reform is uprooted and deprived of its motivational elan unless it, like Ibn Khaldun, is first set within the context of 19th century European developments. The Muslim environment which nurtured reformers is secondary to that other, non-Muslim, European intrusion which motivated them. Only when Islamic reform has been properly reassessed will it be of value to examine how Islamic reformers perceived and reacted to Ibn Khaldun.

To Muslim purists, whether labeled traditionalists or fundamentalists, the very term Islamic reform is a misnomer. As an eminent Muslim apologist and propagandist has explained, "Islam was created to give direction to the world,
human society, and civilization.” Islam was understood to be as universalist in scope as it was particularist in origin: Muhammad was the last prophet to ALL mankind (not just Arabs or Muslims). The message contained in the Quran represented the final divine plan for the entire world. Neither the success of Muslim arms nor the emergence of Muslim empires represented the perfection of the divine plan; it was ongoing, in constant need of further reflection, deeper examination, and wider application. The history of Islamic thought may be seen as a ceaseless pursuit of divine objectives ... but always within a framework that was Muslim. There is a much-cited Tradition (hadith) which ascribes to the Prophet Muhammad acknowledgement of the periodic need for regeneration (tajdid), and for men who will appear as regenerators or renovators (mujaddidun) in the Prophetic mold, albeit without the Prophetic label or authority. Yet this Tradition, too, presupposes that the reference point for accommodation will occur within the boundaries of the Muslim community.

B. Lewis may have overstated the case but only slightly when he observed:

The medieval Muslim ... (by which he meant a member of the educated, socially mobile, politically powerful medieval Muslim elite) was profoundly convinced of the finality, completeness, and essential self-sufficiency of his civilization. Islam was the one true faith, beyond which there were only unbelievers ... The Islamic state was the one divinely ordained order, beyond which there were only tyranny and anarchy. Universal history was the history of the Islamic community, outside which were lands and peoples whose only interest was as the settings and objects of Muslim action.

Nothing in the preceding annals of Muslim history could have prepared Muslims for what happened to their community in the 19th century—neither the political-religious schisms of the early centuries, nor the onslaught of Greek philosophy in the early medieval periods, nor the military adventurism of the Crusaders, nor the inexorable, marauding conquests of the Mongols and Timurids in the later period. How were Muslims to respond to an event, a series of events, an epoch which at first seemed beyond their imaginations to absorb and yet which in time compelled their accommodation to its demands? One answer, of course, is to deconstruct the question and deny its validity. Not all Muslims did feel compelled to respond. If one sharply differentiates and dichotomizes masses and elites, then it is possible to minimize the impact of European colonialism and downgrade the urgency for seeking responses to its perceived threat. It has become part of the argument of those who advocate political economy as the governing rubric for Middle Eastern/Islamic history that so-called Islamic reformers are but a small, isolated elite among the Muslim societies of their days, and hence one should not trouble to examine their ‘unrepresentative’ views. However, the role of these reformers within the intellectually dominant, ruling groups of their day has been significant enough to warrant continued attention to them both in this essay and elsewhere. At the same time, one must be careful not to exaggerate their influence, as has too often been done by those who discuss Islamic reform, as if the term had self-evident meaning, in part because it evoked parallels with notions of reform in continental Europe. It is a major dilemma of Islamic reform