their policy environment and the roles played by both the state and private sector. Finally, he presents a balanced assessment of the potential of industrial policy for specific high technology industries. A recurring theme, and also one of the particular strengths of Okimoto’s work, is his genuine attempt and apparent success to deal effectively with the “politics” of high technology industrial policy, particularly at the bureaucratic, domestic, and to some degree, at the international level. It is precisely here where Okimoto’s capable analysis distinguishes itself from much of the other findings available on the subject.

Okimoto also demonstrates why and how functional change over time has greatly affected the political and economic environment in which industrial policy must operate. For example, he contends that the motivational basis for MITI’s high-technology industrial policy is quite complex and goes well beyond concerns for industrial efficiency, structural coherence and effectiveness. Okimoto argues that industrial policy for high technology clearly must be seen in its political dimension as a lever of MITI’s power vis-a-vis rival ministries, the LDP, and the private sector. Still more important perhaps is Okimoto’s observation that industrial policy cannot be easily discarded, even in a mature Japanese economy, because industrial policy plays such a central role in Japan’s political economy as a means for consensus building and communication between the government and business.

Throughout the volume Okimoto engages frequently in comparison, which is commendable. Okimoto makes a plausible argument that Japan’s industrial policy instruments for high technology are not different from those in other AICs, where Japan really differs is in the industrial policy environment, i.e. regime characteristics. Okimoto is most effective in USA-Japan comparisons. Several of Okimoto’s observations comparing Japan with Advanced Industrial Countries of Europe are lacking much of the profound insights and the systematic approach he masters for Japan and the United States, and as such, many comparisons are somewhat lacking explanatory power. This shortcoming may be led back to the general conceptual difficulty surrounding “industrial policy”, and also the perennial difficulty of functional equivalence in cross-national comparison. This may serve as a reminder that industrial policy remains an imperfectly defined concept around which an entire literature has been growing.

These caveats notwithstanding, Okimoto has produced yet another solid study of an important aspect of Japan’s political economy. Above all, he must be commended for his sophisticated and illuminating explanations of the much neglected political dimensions of Japan’s industrial policy.

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The purpose of this highly informative volume is “to provide the American public a deeper understanding of recent events in China than could be obtained from the mass media.” (p. ix) Written by a Chinese “working journalist” named Yi Mu with an American collaborator, the book examines the antecedents to the massive spring 1989 demonstrations in Beijing and many other Chinese cities, and the military crackdown on
June 3-4. A section on the role of the press and the issue of press freedom in China is also included, along with two large appendices containing important official and unofficial documentation, including dramatic eyewitness accounts of the massacre.

Part One, “The Awakening of an Old Nation,” offers a sophisticated analysis of the various social, economic, and political forces which propelled the largest, genuinely popular movement in China since 1949. Like many other recent works on the 1989 democratic movement in China, the authors describe the litany of growing problems which brought students, and then the "common people" (laobaixing), out onto Beijing’s streets. Inflation, official corruption and profiteering, growing unemployment, and a general dissatisfaction with the isolation of China’s political leaders, fueled the fire of popular discontent. The authors emphasize, as have others, that many of these ills were a direct result of the success of the reforms. Since Deng Xiaoping’s return to power in 1978, China has become a more relaxed, open society, with a collective sense of self-confidence and a desire to extend the reforms to fundamental political changes.

Much of the material here has been covered in other works, including the American media which the authors criticize throughout the book, sometimes unfairly. But this work also emphasizes that most, if not all, popular demands called for China’s leaders to deliver on the political reforms which they had promised over the past decade. Indeed, Deng himself had argued for sweeping political changes in 1980, which were also promoted by Zhao Ziyang, the relatively liberal, but since deposed, CCP General Secretary. These included multi-candidate elections to China’s nominal parliament, a relatively independent legal system, and more openness or “transparency” (toumingdu) in the Chinese press, similar to Gorbachev’s glasnost.

Yet, unlike their Soviet counterpart, China’s leaders were unable (or unwilling) to put political reform into practice. As the authors note, this was clearly demonstrated when the Communist Party vetoed the results of relatively open local elections in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was this fundamental contradiction between “reform and reality” that alienated increasing numbers of Chinese and, along with economic ills, produced popular protests in reaction to the April 15, 1989, death of Hu Yaobang, a former general secretary and major advocate of political reform. Many Chinese saw Hu’s death as insuring a return to political and ideological orthodoxy as his exit from the ruling Politburo shifted the political balance to more conservative leaders, such as Li Peng.

Part Two then describes the military crackdown on June 3-4 in all its fury. Eyewitness accounts document the indiscriminate use of lethal force against Beijing residents and the absurdity of a government deploying modern weapons against unarmed people. Despite their obvious disgust for the crackdown, the authors note that a massacre did not probably take place in Tian’anmen Square itself, but in the various streets leading to it. Most casualties were, in fact, not students, but the common people who had come out on the night of June 3 to stop the government’s insane action. While noting that the exact number of casualties is still unknown, the authors correctly argue that wrangling over numbers is irrelevant. What mattered was the Chinese government’s “homicidal policy.” (p. 97)

In attempting to explain just why China’s leaders unleashed such a force, the authors correctly dismiss potentially apologetic notions, propounded by some in the West, that Deng was acting out of fear of another Cultural Revolution and hence “had no choice” but to crackdown. Instead, it was government “ineptitude” and the lack of “creative ability” among Chinese leaders (except for Zhao Ziyang who called for a moderate policy) which produced the catastrophe. The authors single out Deng Xiao-