these different views of courage would allow us to appreciate the divergent Chinese and Western reactions to situations such as the Persian Gulf.

Yearley makes a case for comparative cultural studies as a rigorous, universal discipline. He sets up straw men of the ‘‘univocal’’ approach (looking for similarities) and the ‘‘equivocal’’ approach (looking for similarities) and the ‘‘equivocal’’ approach (pointing out differences: the ‘‘Gee whiz! Look at that!’’ point of view), then presents himself as the provider of a Golden Mean. This construct seems artificially Platonic. If we accept that we are based in one society, then we can fruitfully benefit by observing differences in another society, without the benefit of philosophical posturing. If we are used to seeing John Wayne-style heroes in Western literature, we are likely to view as wimpish the intellectual protagonists of Chinese novels and plays.

Yearley’s treatment of his subject occasionally seems dry, less than compelling, bloodless. In his own words, the similarities between Mencius and Aquinas appear ‘‘real but thin’’ (page 171). Perhaps the arguments are like Aquinas’: intellectually flawless but leaning toward the irrelevant. Yearley’s task of evaluating very different world views is not unlike Aquinas’ undertaken of harmonizing Aristotle with Christianity. But Aquinas was at least secure in the knowledge that Aristotle and the Greek-influenced New Testament were first cousins of Hellenic thought; furthermore, Arabic interpretations of Aristotle had entered Europe via Spain, and eventually had to be dealt with by the Church. Mencius and Aquinas, on the other hand, have no common reference points whatsoever, and even if we demonstrate that they agree 58% of the time, the nagging question ‘‘So what?’’ still dogs us. We are not Darwin discovering globally-based scientific principles. The real value of such a comparative exercise remains in highlighting differences in cultural values.

In summary, Yearley’s comparison between Aquinas and Mencius is an ambitious, ground-breaking attempt at cross-cultural analysis. It is of interest primarily to scholars already grounded in both medieval Europe and classical Chinese tradition. The discussion of Aquinas’ view of courage is particularly apt in light of current interest in his concept of ‘‘just war’’. The scope of the bibliography is impressive and the glossary of Chinese terms and characters at the end is useful. A few minor annoyances like excessive use of parentheses and spelling and proofreading errors can be found. But the stated goal of cross-cultural understanding is a worthy and valuable one.

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Both before and after independence Filipinos from all walks of life as well as Americans and other foreigners have sought to better conditions for Filipinos who were and remain poor, landless, jobless, hungry and who have little power to remedy their own plight.

More than a century of such concerns has passsed. Several constitutions mandating better lives for the poor have been written. Occasionally laws implementing these imperatives were passed. Colonialism, colonial democracy, Philippine congres-
sional democracy, martial law authoritarianism and now the New Democracy have, in their own way, sought to deliver social justice to the poor. Numerous failed Millenarian movements and two communist rebellions separated in time and by ideology have also sought power for themselves in the name of social justice. The first rebellion failed and the second seems unlikely to succeed.

All this and the Filipino poor are still with us. Indeed their numbers like those of the society as a whole are increasing at a lamentable rate and some would argue their lot already bad is worsening. The question before all of us who try to understand the Philippines is: Why have all these efforts failed?

Professor Youngblood's thoroughly researched and well documented study of the Marcos regime's failure to find social justice for the poor attempts to answer this question.

He argues that though he recognizes the policies of the Marcos regime were "flawed and poorly implemented" (p. 202) and that they had a "need to maintain national security" (p. 186) these only partially explain the failure. His real cause is that the martial law regime adopted the theory that modernity, democracy and social justice depends upon (1) "the establishment of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the Third World" (p. 14) and (2) that bureaucratic authoritarianism's tool for accomplishing this was classical economics with its emphasis on internationalism "accumulating external debts—the elimination of import and exchange controls—the devaluation of the peso, the liberalization of the regulations for foreign investors and a constriction of domestic credit" (p. 17).

All this Youngblood contends brought the Marcos regime into conflict with Philippine churches. Drawing heavily on dependency theory these sought to politically empower the poor. Given power the poor could establish a pluralist democracy, and a "small is beautiful" economy, excluding rapacious foreigners, providing a thorough land reform and more jobs and higher wages for labor through a return to import substitution. They could then claim social justice for themselves. Though not specifically saying so Youngblood makes it clear throughout that he believes the Church's approach is the right way to obtain the desired goal.

Youngblood is incorrect when he says that the Marcos approach to social justice put the regime in conflict with the Roman Catholic Church. All his data indicate that the conflict was really between the government and the Church left; particularly the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) and the whole range of organizations spawned by this group. As Youngblood notes the Philippine Catholic Church is not monolithic. Its center and right, though critical, continued to support the Marcos regime until Ninoy Aquino’s assassination. After that the center withdrew its support but it could hardly be said that it moved into active opposition until the election of 1986. In fact Cardinal Sin did not wholly commit himself until Enrile and Ramos defected from the Marcos' ranks. His active opposition gained for the church a constitution that prohibits birth control and sanctions government support of church schools.

Youngblood is also wrong both in ascribing Marcos' failure to his choice of development model and his belief that the Church's model might succeed. We know that bureaucratic authoritarianism combined with an export oriented economy has succeeded elsewhere in bringing growth and a modicum of social justice. However, nowhere in the developing world have political and economic nationalism, land reform and economic leveling brought real political power or social justice to the poor regardless of whether these countries have been authoritarian or pluralist democracies.