to set and maintain the quality of teaching and the standards of achievement essential to a university if its degree is to be freely acceptable to universities overseas. (ii) We failed to devise, and to persuade Indians to accept, a content of higher education suited to India's social and economic needs. (iii) We failed to establish patterns of academic government and relations between universities and the state, which would accord to universities that degree of autonomy without which they cannot serve society properly."

In the years that followed the evaluation of the Indian experience, and with the recommendations of various commissions and reports dealing with African education, such as the Asquith plan, the African universities were successful in implanting in non-European societies the "rigorous discipline of learning, the high standards of teaching, and the commitment to research characteristic of English academic life." With the further development of new and independent nations the African universities have been under pressure to change in response to national needs and aspirations. In these latter years the evolution of the African university has taken another turn. Africans have responded to American concepts of higher education which seem to have a greater relevance to Africa. In 1955 the legislature of the Eastern Region of Nigeria passed a bill establishing the University of Nigeria. It was made quite clear at the time that the model for this university would be the American land grant college concept. The resulting university, which opened its doors in October of 1960, was a compromise between American and British patterns, being implemented through a joint operation involving Michigan State University and the University of London.

This book goes far beyond a descriptive presentation of the facts. Ashby's interpretations of the role of the university in the western society, and, from this viewpoint, assessing the role of the university in Indian and African society, has no counterpart. It is to be hoped that the pattern of scholarship thus established will be continued by Ashby and others.

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Katanga is the hinge to the Congo Republic's future, just as the Congo's future is the hinge to the security and development of that part of the continent lying along the 'Mason-Dixon Line' which divides black-dominated from white-ruled Africa. Significantly, it is along this line that white mercenaries have become a contemporary phenomenon: they were spawned in Katanga by M. Moise Tshombe, temporarily adopted by General Joseph Mobutu to help put down the Congo rebellion of 1964/65; then, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice, they began to operate on their own, mindlessly unregarding of the dangers of their activities to deepening racial cleavages.

It is most unlikely that we have yet seen the last of the white mercenaries as a factor in African power-struggles; and it is equally unlikely that we have
seen the last of the efforts to rest a power-base on the wealth of Katanga. Therefore a proper understanding of the realities of Katanga is essential. Fortunately, M. Jules Libois-Gerard offers us a book of rare quality, combining scholarship with astute political perception. In an area that draws partisans like an apostolic religion attracts neophytes, it is all the more remarkable to find a writer so coolly objective and lucidly penetrating as Libois-Gerard.

It must be expected that an objective study of Katanga will find favour neither in the eyes of those who dote on Tshombe, nor on those who see him – as does Dr. Connor Cruise O’Brien – as ‘the best African ... that money can buy’. The popular view of Moise Tshombe as a catspaw for the neo-colonialists, or the agents of Belgian big-business interests is a dangerous fallacy – dangerous because it provides a superficial explanation for much of what has happened in the Congo in the last ten years. While the explanation has, at some periods in Tshombe’s career, had a superficial ring of truth about it, the reality is that the former Katanga leader has operated as the manipulator of foreign interests in support of his own ethnocentric interests, and not the other way around. This is something that the Belgian settlers, the Belgian Government and the Union Minière have all come to realize in their dealings with him. So long as their interests coincided with Tshombe’s, there was room for an alliance; the moment they pursued objectives different from him, Tshombe turned vehemently against them. So far from being ‘a stooge’, Tshombe has, in fact, operated very cunningly as an independent African.

The charge against him is not that he was a neo-colonialist pawn but that he was first and foremost a Katanga nationalist, exploiting the tribal interests of the southern Katangese and the wealth of the region in favour of his particularist nationalist interests. Nor did he substantially change his course when he returned to the Congo for a brief period as Prime Minister for, having failed to achieve his ends through secessionism, he only sought to attack the problem of establishing Katangese hegemony over the Congo from a different base of power. So long as Tshombe is alive and kicking – and able to lay his hands on the odd couple of million pounds – one suspects that his role will not change.

This has always been my thesis, and I am naturally delighted to be able to invoke strong support for it from the mass of evidence presented by Libois-Gerard. Admittedly, as he points out in a valuable historical essay, the concept of Katangese nationalism was originally white-inspired. It thrived in the struggle of the local financial and settler interests against the Belgian colonial authorities, and created a strong climate of political opinion favourable to secessionist sentiments. Tshombe came to share these sentiments – and because he shared them he was a convenient black ally for the settlers’ lobby. Tshombe’s own support in southern Katanga was considerable because his appeal is of the kind of regional nationalism which one finds everywhere in Africa. The settlers, however, misjudged their man; they thought they had ‘bought’ him. But they got their first shock on March 10, 1960, when Tshombe exploded at the Conakat Executive Council meeting:

“...that he no longer intended to be for sale to the settlers. These gentlemen have collected much money in Conakat’s name. They have made themselves the keepers of our money... The financial situation is in the hands of the settlers; the breach much be clear and even brusque.”