science, education, and the professions; novels, film, music, visual art, fashion, food; or historiographic works on how to use them.

Still another major omission amounts to dereliction. The recently matured field of Asian Americans and Asians in America is almost ignored. To some extent, the role of European immigrants and European Americans is built into the coverage of other fields in American history, but Asianists and Asian-Americanists have shown that this is not enough. The vibrant field of Asian-American studies has forced a rethinking of what we mean by both “Asian” and “American,” and has made profitable use of cultural theory to challenge the disproportionate focus on the nation-state in inter-national relations. Asian-American Studies has been exemplary in producing bibliographies and critical historiography, and at the very least there should be reference to these bibliographies and historiographical works, as listed in (ahem!) the Journal of American–East Asian Relations Draft Bibliography.

Finally, bringing up the rear, are the indexes. The index for authors and editors is fine, but the index for subjects, events, places, and areas is virtually useless. This index is an un-analytic compilation, presumably by computer, of the appearances of a limited number of key words, mostly proper nouns, with few events and no concepts or themes. In the case of “United Kingdom,” for instance, the list of naked page numbers runs for almost four columns, with no sorting or subsections. To be fair, the promised Guide online will presumably be searchable, though this is still not nearly as helpful to students as a proper analytical index. The index of individuals is the most useful of the three in gaining access to the treasures. Many of the entries contain cross references.

In short, 2.75 cheers.

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As Volkswagen was making headway in the United States market back in the 1960s, rumor had it that a Madison Avenue firm proposed advertising the car as “built by the same people who brought you World War II.” Apocryphal or not, the story reminds us of the tortuous path German big business navigated in mid-twentieth century. At once complicit with the wartime regime, yet essential to the rebuilding of a defeated Germany, firms like Volkswagen survived and prospered in the postwar world. The same could be said, of course, of Nissan, a firm that collaborated with the Japanese military/civilian coalition governments of the 1930s. Yet no one ever suggested that the first Datsuns imported to the United States be promoted as built by the “same people who brought you Pearl Harbor.” As Haruo Iguchi suggests in this painstakingly researched study of Ayukawa Yoshisuke (often referred to as Aikawa Yoshisuke), the founder of the Nissan industrial conglomerate, they would have been wrong.
The business strategies Ayukawa pursued in the 1930s, according to Iguchi, were pro-American, albeit inherently self-contradictory. On the one hand, he tells us how Ayukawa, facing financial difficulties at home, readily accepted the invitation of Japanese army leaders to manage the Manchukuo Development Company (Mangyō), a quasi-governmental corporation to develop heavy industry, including automobiles and aircraft, in the new state of Manchukuo, clearly a project that contributed to building the New Order in East Asia, a semi-autarkic Japanese economic bloc. On the other hand, he portrays Ayukawa as an internationalist who believed in the benefits of a Ricardian (or alternatively Wilsonian) world of free trade. Unlike the mainstream economists and “new bureaucrats” who dominated economic policy discourse and policy formation in the 1930s, Ayukawa championed a worldwide elimination of tariffs and an end to the building of bloc economies.

Ayukawa, Iguchi argues, understood that access to foreign capital and technology, especially American capital and technology, was critical to Japan’s economic success. In practical terms, he proposed joint automobile production to Ford and General Motors during the early 1930s, and after moving his base of operations to Manchuria he urged the importation of American capital there. He even suggested using American heavy farming machinery and Japanese Americans to develop large-scale farming operations on the Manchurian frontier.

These visionary schemes, Iguchi suggests, were not entirely quixotic. American businessmen, struggling to emerge from a prolonged depression, were eager to cultivate foreign markets, and Ayukawa had no difficulty in finding interlocutors in the United States. Indeed, much of the book is devoted to a detailed narrative of his negotiations with them. But contrary to Ayukawa’s faith—perhaps Cobdenite rather than Ricardian—that economics was more important than politics, politics ultimately trumped his efforts. It was difficult, for example, to convince Japanese military and civilian officials intent on protecting a fledgling domestic automobile industry to open the door to American automobile manufacturers. And as the Japanese army sank deeper and deeper into the China quagmire, American businessmen became increasingly reluctant to do business with Japan, a potentially hostile country in a politically and economically region.

In the final months before Pearl Harbor, Ayukawa worked behind the scenes to bring about a rapprochement between Japan and the United States, seeking as go-betweens Joseph Grew, Eugene Dooman, and business colleagues in Dillon, Read and Company. He backed the initiatives of the “John Doe Associates,” and in November 1941 he helped draft a proposal to avoid war by offering the United States access to the China market and promising ultimate independence for the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and the other European colonies in Southeast Asia in return for American recognition of Japanese dominance in Manchukuo and Mongolia. But as even Iguchi admits, this “naïve and unrealistic” proposal was the product of desperation.

None of this saved Ayukawa from arrest and imprisonment as a suspected war criminal in 1945 or from a ban on business activity. After release from Sugamo, he launched another quixotic campaign to change mainstream eco-