Original and thought-provoking, this article offers forceful objections to prevailing theories on rights. Kamm compels the reader to reconsider, amongst other things, the relationship between rights and duties, the purported centrality of interests to the existence of rights, and the role played by stringency in resolving conflicts of rights. In this way, Kamm makes a useful contribution to discussions not only in the philosophy of law, but also in moral and political philosophy.

‘Law and Obligations’ by Green explores both the grounds for scepticism about political obligation and the implications that this scepticism has for legal theory. This essay covers familiar territory in focusing upon, first, the key voluntarist arguments for political obligation including fairness, consent or promise-keeping, and gratitude, and then the key non-voluntarist arguments for political obligation including associative obligations and necessary institutions. Green offers some fresh reasons to doubt these arguments, which fuel his claim that we should turn our focus away from the obligation of obedience. One advantage of scepticism about political obligation, says Green, is that it may free our thinking and allow us to redirect our attention to other little-considered obligations, such as (1) the obligation to facilitate the rule of law, (2) the obligation to know the law, and (3) the obligation to develop the law.

However, to these obligations proposed by Green, some objections come to mind. First, these obligations seem to demand much more from citizens by way of active political engagement than political obligation does; for example, there are, as Green acknowledges, ‘many more occasions on which we can further or hinder the rule of law than there are occasions when we can obey’ (p. 545). And, therefore, given what it would demand of people to require them to facilitate, develop and know the law, weighty arguments are needed to justify the claim that there is an obligation to be thus politically involved. But, all three considerations—facilitation, development and knowledge of the law—seem to reflect, not general and universal obligations, but ordinary reasons for action. The point to bear in mind, though, is that Green offers these obligations undefended for our consideration merely to demonstrate that the excessive attention given to an obligation of obedience has caused us to overlook important possibilities that lie in other directions.

These articles, a representative sample from this collection, combine extensive analysis of well-known arguments with original and thought-provoking points of view. Given the generous word limit set for contributors, greater breadth and depth of analysis is possible in these essays than in most journal articles. With its blend of exposition, critique and original argument, this handbook is an invaluable resource for legal scholars and students alike.

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During the last decade the theory of recognition has emerged as a new paradigm in both Continental and Anglo-American debates. Its attractiveness stems from its
promise to provide a conceptual framework that allows us to see how basic issues in anthropology, ethics, moral philosophy, critical social theory and political analysis are intimately tied up and in fact cannot be adequately understood separately. While the theory of recognition made its first steps as a reconstruction of the young Hegel’s idea of the struggle for recognition (Axel Honneth, *Kampf um Anerkennung* [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992], trans. The Struggle for Recognition [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995]) and as an analysis of the growing importance of demands for recognition by political, cultural and social groups (Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992]), it is only in recent years that its full systematic implications have come to the fore. This is especially due to the work of Axel Honneth who has recently published a debate with Nancy Fraser (*Redistribution or Recognition?* [London: Verso, 2003]) and a new postscript for a re-edition of *Kampf um Anerkennung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003, which also appeared in Inquiry 45 [2002], pp. 499-520), in which he answers a range of criticisms by further elaborating his approach of differentiating various spheres of recognition (love, legal respect, social esteem). In a nutshell the most basic claims of the theory seem to be (1) that recognition by others is a condition of being a person who can lead his or her own life (anthropology and ethics), (2) that reciprocal recognition of the equal value of each person is what we owe to each other (moral philosophy), (3) that socio-economic conditions which make this kind of moral relationship impossible are pathological and illegitimate (critical social theory), and (4) that recognition has been the central claim of many recent political and social movements (political analysis).

Honneth’s newest book, whose title could be translated as *Invisibility: Stages of a Theory of Intersubjectivity*, takes a step back and brings together six essays written during the last three years. Their common purpose is to outline answers to three questions from the areas of epistemology and action-theory, which the author poses himself in the preface: (1) Is the act of recognition an act of attribution or perception? (2) Is recognition the byproduct of other acts or an act of its own? (3) Is recognition only partially or exclusively constitutive of the autonomy of persons? In five of the essays, Honneth elaborates his approach indirectly by engaging with past and present contributions to an understanding of intersubjectivity. These include Fichte’s still tentative analysis of intersubjectivity as a transcendental condition of an autonomous practical self-relation, a critique of Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s exclusion of the third person and the perspective of the generalized other, and a re-evaluation of psychoanalytic object-relations theory in the face of postmodern celebrations of decentered identities. The two most interesting of these essays, however, deal with Sartre’s negativistic account of intersubjectivity and John McDowell’s moral realism. Whereas the latter poses the challenge of reconciling the idea of a perceptive, potentially particularist, component in recognition with Honneth’s claim to universalism, the former points to the possible pathological, objectifying consequences of the primacy of intersubjectivity for individuals. Before turning to the piece on Sartre, to which I will limit my discussion for reasons of space, it makes sense to outline the first, most systematic, essay, from which the whole volume takes its title (an earlier version appeared in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 75 [2001], pp. 111-26).

According to Honneth, the key to a better understanding of recognition lies in marking it off from (value-neutral) perception. What he calls a ‘moral epistemology’