Integrity, it seems, is a matter of remaining true to oneself, or rather, it is a matter of remaining true to what one reasonably judges to be the best of oneself. In *Integrity and the Virtues of Reason*, Greg Scherkoske seeks to overturn this piece of conventional wisdom. It is a fine book and I learned a lot from it.

Scherkoske elaborates and defends the idea that integrity is an epistemic virtue; that it is not fundamentally a matter of being true to oneself but of being a good and responsible epistemic agent. What is wrong with the conventional picture, Scherkoske thinks, is that it invites moral danger. The moral danger Scherkoske has in mind takes two forms. One is self-indulgence. When faced with demands from others, fidelity to one's own commitments just because they are one's own can easily lead to a promotion of one's own interests over the interests of others. The second danger is one of blind allegiance. “Even if a person's commitments cannot be construed as self-indulgent or egoistic, an individual's belief that something is a matter of integrity might be taken to foreclose the possibility of challenge and revision. In extreme cases, it could be thought to displace critical reflection entirely.” (p. 47). One way to deal with this moral danger is to incorporate a moral constraint in one's theory of integrity. Scherkoske finds these responses *ad hoc* and unconvincing.

Instead of being a virtue of self-loyalty, Scherkoske proposes an account of integrity as an epistemic virtue, an excellence of reason. This is how Scherkoske summarizes his theory (p. 26).

Having integrity requires being a certain kind of person. Specifically, having integrity requires:

(i) being the sort of person who seeks to have justifiable and correct convictions;

(ii) being the sort of person who has the appropriate regard for her own capacity to identify justifiable and correct convictions;

(iii) being reliably disposed to act on one's convictions on the basis of the reasons that ground one's convictions (this requires the disposition to be practically rational);

(iv) being the sort of person who is reliably disposed to take challenges to one's convictions seriously;

(v) being the sort of person who takes seriously the discursive responsibilities that one undertakes in the course of giving others reasons to believe or act on the basis of what one asserts to another.
The first thing to note about this specification is that it under-describes the excellence involved in possession of integrity. Consider a person of little insight, who fails to form convictions because he fails to discover sufficient reason for them and so fails to ever act from conviction. Such a person would satisfy this specification of integrity, but a person who is incapable of acting from conviction is not a person of integrity. So there is need of an additional clause. There must be a success condition of some kind added to the mix. Scherkoske seems to have in mind the sort of person who is not only aware of when her reasons suffice, but who is also genuinely skillful in the business of identifying and interrogating reasons. If a person of integrity is the sort of person we seek out for advice, as Scherkoske insists (e.g. p. 8), then they must also be wise, not merely epistemically self-aware and cooperative.

The second thing to note about this specification of integrity is that it doesn’t describe a purely epistemic virtue. Clause iii) is a practical virtue, not an epistemic virtue. If I fail to act on a conviction out of cowardice or laziness or because I succumb to the temptations of appetite, my failure is not fundamentally epistemic. It needn’t be that I have failed to fully attend to my convictions or that I have failed to form them reasonably. I may fail because I lack the temperament needed to act on my conviction. It is not an epistemic feature of our convictions that we are disposed reliably to act upon them. It is a practical feature. Scherkoske is thus offering a hybrid theory of integrity: one that is partly epistemic and partly a matter of practical agency; partly a matter of forming convictions well and reasonably and partly a matter of having the temperament to reliably act upon them. This reduces the distance between his theory of integrity and others in the literature, which also emphasize the dual epistemic and practical nature of integrity.

Where Scherkoske does offer a distinct picture of integrity is in his insistence on a certain kind of impartiality. Clause iii) has it that people of integrity are reliably disposed to act on their convictions on the basis of the reasons that ground their convictions. The reasons that ground their convictions will be reasons they have to believe their conviction is correct or appropriate. A person of integrity always does what they understand themselves to have best reason to do. That a conviction is their own, that a commitment has been made by them, is not among these reasons. We have a natural tendency to stick with our opinions and this is compatible with integrity only so long as we are trustworthy sources of opinion. According to Scherkoske, a person of integrity sticks by their opinions only to the extent of their well-placed self-trust. A person without integrity either trusts themselves and their capacity to form justified opinions inordinately or not enough. Scherkoske develops this account of well-placed self-trust with considerable skill in chapters 4 and