Michael J. Zimmerman

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In 2006, Michael Zimmerman published an underappreciated paper on the nature of moral obligation in which he argued that our moral obligations depend, not on the facts or our beliefs, but on the evidence available to us (see “Is Moral Obligation Objective or Subjective?” _Utilitas_ 18, 2006, pp. 329–361). Two years later, he published a lengthy book in which he argued more thoroughly for the same conclusion (see _Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)). In _Ignorance and Moral Obligation_, Zimmerman returns to the central question of those works to respond to objections that have been brought against the views he presented therein. Though not without its weaknesses, Zimmerman’s new book is the most thorough defense of what has come to be known as the _Prospective View_ of moral obligation and as such is a must-read for those working in normative ethics narrowly construed.

_Ignorance and Moral Obligation_ is composed of five chapters. In the first, Zimmerman poses the book’s central question, “What ought one to do when one doesn’t know which of one’s options is best?” (p. 10), where ‘ought’ is supposed to express the concept of moral obligation and by ‘best’ Zimmerman means best with respect to what matters morally (so as not to assume consequentialism). Zimmerman then presents the four leading answers to that question. According to the _Objective View_, one ought to do what is best, even if one doesn’t know what that is. According to the _Subjective View_, one ought to do what one believes is best. According to the _Prospective View_, which is Zimmerman’s view, one ought to do what the evidence suggests is best. Finally, according to the _Ambiguity View_, there are multiple senses of ‘ought,’ even when ‘ought’ expresses moral obligation. On this view, although there are facts about what agents _objectively_ ought to do, _subjectively_ ought to do, and _prospectively_ ought to do, there is no fact about what agents ought to do _simpliciter_, because there is simply no such notion. At the end of chapter one, Zimmerman sets the Ambiguity View aside. Although he (hesitantly) admits that there might be multiple senses of moral obligation, he indicates that he is interested in the sense of moral obligation with which normative ethicists have traditionally been interested, which he claims is the sense of moral obligation that is “of ultimate concern to the conscientious person” (p. 33).

In chapter two, Zimmerman argues that there are two constraints that the correct theory of moral obligation must meet, that neither the Objective nor
the Subjective View can meet them, and that the Prospective View, which can meet them, is therefore superior. In particular, Zimmerman argues that the Subjective View fails because it rules out the possibility that agents could be wrong about what they are morally obligated to do. Then he argues that the Objective View fails because it entails that one who believes that it is the correct theory of moral obligation will sometimes have to violate its dictates (i.e., do what the theory entails is wrong) in order to act conscientiously.

As evidence for this latter claim, Zimmerman presents a case based on a well-known example conceived by Frank Jackson (see “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics 101, 1991, pp. 462–463). A doctor, Jill, must decide how to treat the skin condition of her patient, John. She has three drugs available. She knows that one will completely cure his condition, that one will partially cure his condition, and that one will kill him. Unfortunately, however, although she knows which of the three drugs will partially cure John’s condition, she does not know, for either of the remaining two drugs, whether it will cure him or kill him. Assuming that it is best to completely cure John’s condition and that Jill knows this, then if Jill believes the Objective View, she will believe that prescribing the drug that will only partially cure John’s condition is wrong. But, intuitively, if she is to act conscientiously, then she must prescribe the drug that will only partially cure John’s condition since prescribing either of the others would be too risky. Thus, those who believe the Objective View will sometimes have to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously.

In chapter three, Zimmerman clarifies the Prospective View and responds to objections to it, the most notable of which was raised by Holly Smith (see “The ‘Prospective View’ of Obligation,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Discussion Note, 2011, pp. 5–8). According to Smith’s objection, the Prospective View is no different from the Objective View in that it entails that agents who believe it will sometimes have to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously.

To illustrate this, Smith presents a case similar to Jackson’s. But whereas Jackson’s example reveals that acting conscientiously sometimes requires one to do what one knows is suboptimal, Smith’s example reveals that acting conscientiously sometimes requires one to do what one knows the evidence available to one suggests is suboptimal. Therefore, if Zimmerman is correct that those who believe the correct theory of moral obligation will never have to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously, then the Prospective View, as Zimmerman formulated it in his earlier works on moral obligation, must be false.