I have it on good authority that publishers hate Festschrifts. The reason for their aversion is not difficult to imagine: the typical Festschrift is seen as lacking in novel ideas and arguments, and filled with flattering displays of praise and an absence of critical depth. When viewed in another light, though, the Festschrift presents a unique opportunity to reflect on the work of an eminent scholar, and to raise questions about where a particular field of scholarship has been and is going. The present Festschrift honouring the work of Michael Bratman is nearly perfect in this regard. Without flattery or superficiality, this impressive collection of essays both broadens and refines the extraordinary work that has been devoted to attaining a critical understanding of Bratman’s corpus. The collection contains ten essays bookended by a useful introduction by the editors and incisive replies by Bratman. The first four essays, by Richard Holton, Al Mele, Kieran Setiya, and David Velleman, discuss Bratman’s planning theory of intention. The next four, by Jay Wallace, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Michael Smith, Elijah Millgram, and Christine Korsgaard, examine Bratman’s accounts of rational self-governance, autonomy, and identification. The final two, by Margaret Gilbert and Scott Shapiro, focus on Bratman’s account of shared agency. In my opinion, none of the essays directly challenges the foundational assumptions that provide the reductive framework within which Bratman operates, but one essay in particular, by Elijah Millgram, comes very close. Hence, in what follows, I begin by sketching two important presuppositions of Bratman’s work and then I discuss Millgram’s essay and Bratman’s response, which struck me as among the most fruitful combination of the bunch.

Like many Anglophone philosophers of action working over the past four decades or so, Bratman is interested in differentiating between those attitudes and actions with which you identify as agent and those that you legitimately disown. For Bratman, intentions play a central role in discriminating between the two. On his influential model, intentions are *sui generis* mental states that function as persisting and stable plans whose normative content specifies which other attitudes you should treat as reasons when deliberating about what to do. Crucially, for Bratman, when you act on the basis of deliberation guided by the relevant intentions, and when the structure of the relevant intentions is consistent and coherent, the intentions are rationally self-governing. That is, your rational self-governance consists in the proper functioning of this system of mental states: when this system causes your behaviour in the appropriate manner, *you* can be said to govern what is taking place.
Equally as important, Bratman’s account of rational self-governance rejects homuncular models of the agent. Typical homuncular models assume that as a conscious agent you exist in a manner that differs from your system of mental states, stepping back from and reflecting upon that system much like the notorious Cartesian spectre existing as a thinking substance in addition to the parts of which that system is composed. In rejecting homuncular models of the agent, Bratman makes a controversial metaphysical assumption of his own. He assumes that you are identical with a system of mental states unified across time by relations of psychological continuity, which he describes in terms of a broadly Lockean approach to personal identity. That is, you are not a persisting physical object of any kind, e.g., a particular living animal, but a temporally fragmented collection of mental states stitched together by psychologically continuous relations. Together, these assumptions form the core of Bratman’s reductive model of rational self-governed action. On the one hand, Bratman assumes that when your action is appropriately caused by the correctly structured intentions, this system of mental states governs what is taking place. On the other hand, Bratman rejects homuncular models of the agent and assumes that you are identical with the relevant system of mental states standing in relations of psychological continuity. Together, these assumptions depict you not as a physical object of any kind, but as a collection of mental states held together by relations of psychological continuity.

In one of the most challenging essays of the collection, Elijah Millgram’s “Segmented Agency” (pp. 152–89) targets the reductive model of rational self-governed agency endorsed by Bratman. Using an evocative example of a Jewish academic living in Germany during the 1930s, Millgram argues that there are times in your life when you experience genuinely unanticipated circumstances that require immediate action, where you must abandon your environment and act in novel ways that cannot be guided by the kinds of persisting and stable intentions that are of interest to Bratman. According to Millgram, intentions make sense only for agents who reside in static environments that are largely predictable, but you are not such an agent. Rather, because you inhabit and experience a world that is deeply surprising, there are many circumstances in which you must move on, exiting one niche while searching for another. In this way, you are a segmented agent whose life is normally divided into parts and who often moves from place to place.

If Millgram is correct and we are segmented agents, an important question arises. When you exit one niche and move to another, can this be a rational self-governed action? According to the model defended by Bratman, when you act on the basis of deliberation guided by the relevant intentions, and when the structure of the intentions is consistent and coherent, your intentions