Darwall, for example) thus provide us with an entirely different answer to the recommendatory question ‘why be moral?’ Intuitionists attempt to answer this question by pointing to the truth of our moral judgements; Humean naturalists tell us that the question can be answered by pointing to the fact of morality (that is, morality recommends itself to us because it is in our human nature). In narrowing the definition of metaethics to (1) and (2) above, Miller effectively cuts certain persuasive and currently hotly disputed questions concerning practical reason out of metaethics, but to do so is to pass over a central arm of contemporary cognitivist metaethics and to gloss over issues regarding the underpinnings of the normative force of moral claims.

*An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* is an accomplished book and combines illuminating discussions of difficult issues with original contributions that will be of interest to a wide philosophical audience.

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We cannot neatly distinguish between ethnicity and race by stipulating that ethnicity is a matter of culture and race a matter of hereditary biology. Ideas of ethnicity are often biological and ideas of race are often cultural. Moreover, people tend to derive their ethnic identities from those of their parents, which makes ethnicity hereditary in some sense, and human racial taxonomies do not have the foundations in biology that they are assumed to have in common sense (see my *Philosophy of Science and Race* [New York: Routledge, 2000] for explication and additional sources behind this claim). However, one conceptual difference between ethnicity and race is that ethnic identities are directly attached to existing groups of people, whereas racial identities require assignment to abstract categories. Polish Americans, for example, can be all listed by name based on the families they belong to and their history. Blacks or whites, by contrast, are neither cohesive historical groups, nor fully identifiable as particular individuals. Being a certain ethnicity is like having a specific address, because there is no mediating category to determine a person’s ethnicity, whereas being a member of a particular race is like having the attribute of tallness that requires mediating criteria. In this sense, what we know about ethnicity depends on our knowledge of history as the actual human past, whereas what we know about race depends on what science can impart about human traits and typologies (not much that supports ideas of race). Thus, the epistemologies of racial and ethnic identification are different. Given a prior commitment to the existence of biological races, a person can be identified racially based on her physical traits, whereas to identify a person ethnically, it is necessary to know
something about the historical circumstances of the ethnic group to which she belongs. The meaning of the biological racial identification will derive from one’s beliefs about the taxonomy of human races, overall; the meaning of ethnic identification will derive from one’s knowledge of events and conditions in specific places.

Concepts of biological race may come and go and eventually be rejected as mere historical curiosities, but concepts of ethnicity will endure as long as some groups of people from some places experience distinct circumstance in comparison to others. Mind you, in practice people may use the term ‘race’ to include meanings of the term ‘ethnicity’, and sometimes, especially euphemistically in racist societies, the reverse occurs. However, I am advancing these considerations and distinctions on a meta-level, here, to enable some degree of clarity and comparison in discussion of the two books under review.

It is important that, in *Philosophies of Race and Ethnicity*, Peter Osborne and Stella Sandford include studies of both race and ethnicity in one volume, although neither the editors nor any of their contributors are concerned with the theoretical distinction between them. In their introduction, Osborne and Sanford note postmodern shifts from talk of race to talk of ethnicity as part of a general turn from ontology to representation (pp. 5-6), i.e., what others have called ‘the linguistic turn’. While Osborne and Sanford take pains to note an unresolved tension between increasingly widespread understanding of the biological emptiness of race versus the salience of race for historical analyses, phenomenological understanding, political strategy and anti-racist efforts generally, they offer no new thoughts on how that tension might be resolved (pp. 1-9). Neither is this a primary concern of most of the contributors. However, postmodern and post-colonial analyses of race are analyses of social mechanisms and institutions, which maintain power differentials that appear to be naturalistically based, or racial in a biological way. Such discussions of race can be understood as discussions of ethnicity, on the meta-level proposed above, and some of the critiques of existing scholarly work and post-colonial culture in *Philosophies of Race and Ethnicity* are as good as power studies of ethnicity get, in any discipline or multi/inter/trans discipline.

The lead article, Linda Alcoff’s ‘Philosophy and Racial Identity’, is an attempt to overcome the tension between the falseness of race and its social importance, by shoring up the latter philosophically. Alcoff claims that the combination of the universality of liberal modernism and the existence of ranked phenotypical differences is echoed in the neglect of race as a central philosophical topic. She attempts to make a case that race is an ontological category in the classic sense, because of its deep personal effects, and then calls for a new notion of non-essentialist identity given in the ways nonwhites are assumed to lack key components of personhood. Bill Schwartz, in ‘Unspeakable Histories’, offers an example of the conditions for such non-essentialist identities in his description of the diasporic experiences of West Indian blacks in post-World War II England. Schwarz thinks that whites also could benefit by imagining their identities in alienated and unstable ways, given the historical facts of their post-colonial dislocations.

This theme of fundamental non-essentialist identities is brilliantly developed in another context by Rey Chow in ‘On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem’. Chow criticizes both the recalcitrant Orientalist scholarly tradition and the reinscription of being Chinese by the opponents of that tradition. Diasporic identities take another form in Francois Verges’s ‘Race and Slavery’, when she argues that the spatially