there are all sorts of moral dilemma, their mere existence does not pose an eminent threat to moral realism (‘Pluralism, Dilemma, and the Expression of Moral Conflict’). And he shows that a Lockean view on property rights has serious problems handling issues surrounding pollution, concluding that a utilitarian approach might be more suitable here (‘Locke, Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk’).

Railton also takes on the question of whether there are ‘non-hypothetical’ reasons for action (‘On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action’). He shows that, as far as normativity is concerned, Hume and Kant are not so different as many have thought (‘Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but not Hume Versus Kant’). And he demonstrates ethics to be remarkably resistant to ideological critique, not least due to the fact that much ideological critique appears to assume a morality (‘Morality, Ideology, and Reflection: or, the Duck Sits Yet’).

Unlike many collections of ‘greatest hits’ by prominent philosophers, this one has an admirable unity of focus. The essays hang together in such a way that they can be read almost as one long argument. This demonstrates not only Railton’s care in selecting the essays to be included, but also that he has continued to gnaw at and around the same tough issues for the past twenty-some-odd years. Moral theory has never been easy, and Railton shows how theory-building is a multifaceted process requiring clarity and rigor as well as ingenuity.

Railton’s modesty and care might leave some with the feeling that these essays, in the end, amount only to a prolegomena to ethics. They are correct. It is a sign of his depth as a philosopher that Railton does not think we can solve the big problems or settle major disputes quickly. As Wittgenstein noted, we rarely philosophize as slowly as we should. Such a concerted effort itself exhibits a seriousness about morality, and taking morality seriously itself constitutes a moral act. And someone must lay the groundwork.

This text is recommended to anyone interested in state-of-the-art philosophical discourse on ethical theory, moral realism, ethical naturalism, and the other subjects above mentioned, and it could easily serve as a core text in an advanced seminar on these topics. Railton is an admirably clear writer on frequently difficult and often muddled topics. He also provides precise arguments and insightful examples in essays that reward close reading and rereading. For those of us already leaning towards ethical naturalism, Railton makes a quite welcome advocate. For moral skeptics and non-factualists, he makes a quite worthy adversary.

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This collection promises to ‘bring together in translation the finest post-war German-language scholarship on Hegel’s social and political philosophy’ (p. i). Most
of these essays are appearing in English for the first time, so the collection should prove particularly useful to students with no German, slow German, as well as those who otherwise have difficulty in accessing the source materials.

There is a helpful introduction by Robert Pippin which describes the re-orientation of Hegel studies following an astonishing period when commentators believed their savage criticisms of Hegel to be a contribution to the war effort. Pippin also summarizes the essays which follow. (It is fair to note that with respect to some of the papers in the collection Pippin’s summary is a good deal clearer than the original.) There is one curious typographical feature of this introduction which I suspect is an editorial blunder: Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* is given the short reference *PhG*, an abbreviation which is customarily, and in the list of works by Hegel given in this anthology, used for the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the rest of the text, including the list of works, the *Philosophy of Right* is referred to as *Rph*.

The papers that follow roughly reproduce the structure of the *Philosophy of Right* (henceforth in this review *PR*). The first couple of papers address broadly methodological issues. Hans Friedrich Fulda’s essay, ‘The Rights of Philosophy’, is a wide-ranging and stimulating enquiry into the place of philosophy within the system of Objective Mind described in *PR*. Fulda’s question is very sharp, engaging all the difficult, not to say embarrassing, problems raised in Hegel’s combative ‘Preface’. At bottom, this resolves to the difficulty of seeing how properly critical Hegel’s approach can be of the institutional structures it purports to explain or rationalize. Karl-Otto Apel’s essay introduces his own ‘new form of transcendental philosophy as a counterfactual anticipation of the discursive conditions of an ideal community of communication’ (p. 71)—and perhaps, for the reader, Habermas’s project, too—as a mediation or reconciliation of the familiar confrontation between Kant and Hegel.

The next batch of papers is concerned with the topic of ‘Absolute Right’. Why ‘Absolute Right’ rather than the familiar term ‘Abstract Right’? If there is an implication that the essayists all insist on the contextualization of the norms and structures of Abstract Right within the wider forms of Ethical Life as described later in *PR*, that would be quite fair, but the editors do not flag up what looks to be either idiosyncratic or another blunder.

Michael Quante’s essay is a dense exploration of Hegel’s difficult concepts of ‘personality’ and ‘person’ as modalities of will discussed in *PR* §§34—40. There is a lot to learn here, for these concepts are crucial to the understanding of Hegel’s account of rights, property, contract, punishment and much else beyond the frontiers of Abstract Right. But I don’t believe that Quante’s essay, for all its merits, shows how the form of normative principles, specifically paradigmatic rights claims, can be derived from the concept of the will of a person when that is explicated as a technical philosophical instrument.

Joachim Ritter’s (1961) essay, ‘Persons and Property in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ (§§34—81) is deservedly well known and merits reprinting. It is a pity that the editorial apparatus has not been brought up to date alongside the new translation. As Pippin remarked in his introduction, critical editions of the lecture transcripts have been published in the interim (see note 1, pp. 116-17).

To this reader, Manfred Baum’s essay is oddly located since it offers (as Quante’s piece also implies) a reading of the whole of *PR* as a working through of the doctrine of the will as ‘the free will that wills the free will’ which is articulated in the ‘Introduction’ to *PR*. 