fashion, re-organizing familiar sources into a strong argument which serves as an effective internal critique of Hegel’s position. This is Hegel interpretation at its very best.

Finally, let me register an odd feature of this generally first-rate collection. In PR, the second part, ‘Morality’, contains, *inter alia*: Hegel’s discussion of central problems in the philosophy of action, Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s moral psychology and his judgement of the emptiness of Kant’s moral formalism, a review of the ethics of conscience and severe criticism of several varieties of moral subjectivism. Although some of this material surfaces in several of the essays, including the Siep paper mentioned above, none of them have it as their primary focus. It is true that the Kant—Hegel contretemps has been very well worked over, but I am surprised that, for reasons of completeness, no papers were found that would cover this ground.

Since I don’t want my review of this fine volume to end on a carping note, let me conclude by commending it to all Hegel scholars as an excellent consolidation of the literature on Hegel in English, and thank the editors and the translator for their services.

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Scarre addresses several important topics in this work. He refers frequently and approvingly to the ideas of Desmond Tutu about the importance of forgiveness in politics and is mostly supportive of Tutu’s ideas. Nevertheless, Scarre maintains that forgiveness does not make sense as applied to groups; in this crucial respect, his position is incompatible with that of Tutu. There is some awkwardness of fit between Scarre’s mostly individualistic and invented examples and the concerns of Tutu to avoid cycles of violence and revenge in political relationships between groups. Those have been the primary focus of Tutu’s reflections and practical work.

Scarre’s discussions are sometimes flawed by a tangle of references to other views, followed by dismissive comments and overly compact statements of his own views (pp. 19, 24, 36, 106). He notes interestingly that some questions philosophers pose about forgiveness are normative, while others are conceptual; in some instances, it is not easy to distinguish the conceptual from the normative. He seems to endorse a broadly Wittgensteinian approach. Forgiveness, Scarre says, is a multi-form phenomenon, a ‘broad and varied family of practices’—but not one that is ‘elastic without limit’ (p. 31). Considering whether forgiveness might be a moral duty, a virtue, or a response justified primarily by its utility, Scarre argues for the third view on the following grounds. He states that the cases of forgiveness are too complex and various to be subjected to a set of rules but that generally forgiving will improve relationships. Nevertheless, it is not always to be recommended and should not be a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction whenever a wrong is committed. Forgiveness is morally optional and should be regarded as a matter of personal discretion—like gift-giving, to which it is etymologically related.
Against a number of other writers, Scarre maintains that the words ‘I forgive you’ can sometimes function as a performative; he leaves open the question of which are the contexts in which that might happen. Nor does he address the counter-argument that if a person continues to seem angry, or resentful after she says ‘I forgive you’, there is evidence against the claim that she has forgiven; for that reason, her words, even sincerely expressed, do not seem to constitute, or be sufficient for, her forgiveness.

Scarre notes that what others have called unilateral or personal forgiveness (forgiveness without repentance on the part of the offender) can invite and motivate repentance. This sort of forgiveness need not remain purely self-focused—a victim forgiving solely to set aright her own feelings and move forward in her own life. It can, in addition, involve some reaching out in the hope of eliciting repentance on the part of the offender.

According to Scarre, a major reason for being liberal and generous with our forgiveness of others is that we ourselves are prone to wrongdoing. Against Margaret Holmgren and others, he claims that the potential of persons to repent and transform themselves does not provide a reason to be generous in forgiving them. Alluding sarcastically to the human capacity for moral change as wondrous, he substitutes his own argument, based on our need, as fallible human beings, to have our own failings tolerantly regarded. The dispute here seems extremely interesting; however, Scarre states his view too skimpily to make it convincing.

With regard to the victim’s prerogative—the belief that it is the victim of an injury, and that person only, who is entitled to forgive the offender—Scarre suggests that this claim may be understood either as conceptual or as normative. He resists suggestions that secondary and tertiary victims of wrongs who have been harmed as a result of harm to the direct or primary victim may forgive the wrongdoer for what he did to the primary victim. He considers another argument against the primary victim’s prerogative: if only the primary victim is entitled to forgive, and that person is dead, it will then follow that no one is entitled to forgive. The wrong committed will become unforgivable in an absolute sense of that term. To this argument Scarre replies (plausibly) that there is no a priori guarantee that for all wrongs there will exist somebody somewhere with the proper authority to forgive them (p. 69). The matter should not be taken lightly, however. If we think back to Tutu’s focus on peace politics, in such circumstances there are often thousands of persons who have wrongly killed. Are they all unforgivable? If so, the consequences for policy and politics would seem dire indeed. What are the implications of concluding that someone is unforgivable? As an avowed utilitarian, Scarre should be taking consequences seriously at this point. The question of the primary victim’s prerogative to forgive is by no means purely theoretical. Yet Scarre holds strongly to the idea that only the primary victim is entitled to forgive; if God exists, he says, even God would not be entitled to forgive on behalf of the primary victim: ‘God may forgive us for our offences against others, but that does not mean that he forgives us on their behalf’ (p. 70).

The discussion of institutional and collective forgiveness is flawed because Scarre strangely shifts the topic to that of institutional apologies, alluding to recent apologies of the Pope. There is a fundamental error here: apology and forgiveness are clearly distinct matters. The question as to whether an institution or collective can meaningfully apologize is quite distinct from the question as to whether it can