Though *Dworkin and his Critics* will be of the greatest interest to those who already know the ins-and-outs of Dworkin’s work best, the calibre of its arguments and the breadth of its subject-matter mark it out for a much wider readership. All of the contributions are full of suggestive insights and probing questions, including those that have not been discussed here, such as Miriam Christofidis’s essay on the envy test, P. Van Parijs’s work on compensation for talent shortfalls, Lesley Jacobs’ piece on justice in health care, Paula Casal and Andrew Williams’ enquiry into procreative justice, Seana Shiffrin’s piece on euthanasia, Leslie Green’s essay on political obligation, Joseph Raz’s extract on coherence in law, and Gerald Postema’s essay on legal integrity. Especially valuable are the pieces that explore the relationship between different motifs in Dworkin’s work, such as Matthew Clayton’s investigation of detached values and liberal neutrality and Justine Burley’s look at genetics and liberal egalitarianism. Not only do these bring out the range of Dworkin’s work but they also highlight its interconnected character. Together with the other contributions, they offer a fitting tribute to one of our most important and prolific thinkers and a state-of-the-art conspectus of the current ethical and jurisprudential scene.

For anyone with a serious interest in moral, legal, or political theory, *Dworkin and his Critics* is a first-rate buy; for any student of Dworkin, it is indispensable.

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The question of whether the idea of value pluralism and the demands of liberalism are compatible has served as the focus for a noteworthy volume of recent scholarship produced by a number of eminent political philosophers including George Crowder, Richard Bellamy, John Gray, John Kekes, Charles Larmore, Bernard Williams, and, of course, the late Isaiah Berlin—to name only a few. It is also a topic that for some time has secured the attention of William Galston, a prolific and engaging scholar and dedicated political activist who has devoted significant energy and passion to developing a practical and reasonable response to the concerns of diversity and individual liberty in contemporary pluralistic polities.

*The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* is Galston’s most recent contribution to the discourse surrounding the relationship between liberalism and value pluralism. It is a sequel to his *Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), which presented an argument in favour of using the idea of value pluralism as the foundation for a political framework to govern constitutional liberal democracies. For Galston, value pluralism begins with the idea—most famously associated with Berlin—that fundamental human values are heterogeneous, incommensurable, and often conflict irresolvably with each other (e.g. pp. 11, 173). According to Galston, aside from its normative and intuitive appeal, value pluralism best reflects the moral environment encountered by actual persons. The tension often experienced between various interests and goods is a consequence of a genuine plurality of beliefs, which precludes the
possibility of a single theory or ranking ever voluntarily emerging ‘victorious’ over all competitors. That reality and other normative and empirical ‘facts’ provide convincing reasons to accept value pluralism as true.

In turn, if value pluralism is an accurate representation and ineliminable feature of our ‘ordinary moral experience’ (p. 11), then securing and preserving the conditions essential to the establishment and maintenance of an acceptably just and stable polity becomes dependent upon instituting a political framework that provides for and protects expressive liberty and political pluralism. By ‘expressive liberty’ Galston means the freedom of individuals and groups to live their lives ‘as they see fit, within the broad range of legitimate variation defined by value pluralism, in accordance with their own understandings of what gives life meaning and value’ (p. 2; see also, for example, p. 45). Such liberty is, Galston argues, ‘a precondition for leading a complete and satisfying life’ (2002, p. 101). ‘Political pluralism’ refers to the presence of multiple, independent sources of legitimate authority—‘individuals, parents, civil associations, faith-based institutions, and the state, among others’ (pp. 1-2)—denying any claim that political power is, or ever can be, plenipotentiary.

A reasonable and viable governance framework must therefore not only be liberal, but also respect, above all else, legitimate difference about ‘the nature of the good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like’ (2002, p. 21). In other words, when the practice of individual autonomy and the protection of reasonable diversity conflict, it is the latter that must be accorded primacy. Galston contends that only by adopting such a framework can we hope to provide maximal opportunity for individuals and groups to live their lives ‘as they see fit’.

Criticisms of the above argument motivated Galston to write *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism*, in which he seeks to respond, in particular, to those who have suggested that he failed in his previous attempt to offer either an ‘adequate philosophical justification’ for his theory of liberal pluralism or a sufficiently thorough exploration of its ‘practical implications…for key aspects of public action and public life’ (p. 5). In responding to those complaints, Galston engages a variety of concerns regarding the character and consequences of liberal pluralism. Constraints of space make it impossible to herein reiterate the numerous concerns noted by Galston and his response to them. Instead, I will seek only to identify the general content of the book and the nature of the concerns addressed by Galston.

Galston devotes the first half of the book to addressing the issue of the philosophical justification for his theory, which he does by (re)examining the three conceptual ‘pillars’ supporting it—i.e. value pluralism, expressive liberty, and political pluralism—and then extending his gaze to matters of political behaviour and civic unity. More specifically, he begins his response by identifying and analyzing ‘a range of philosophically significant objections’ to value pluralism (p. 11), such as the claims that values that are incommensurable need not be incomparable and the conflict between certain values is not typically irresolvable but merely seems to be so. Next, he examines the pervasive contemporary ‘understanding of politics…that tacitly views public institutions as plenipotentiary and civil society as a political construction possessing only those liberties that the polity chooses to grant and modify or revoke at will’ (p. 23)—what he labels ‘civic totalism’ (p. 24). Turning his attention to the concept of expressive liberty, he confronts the question of whether it is ‘anything more than a political construction, subject to alteration through normal political processes?’ (p. 45). He then reviews what is generally considered a