so being motivated. Practical rules, as R.M. Hare carefully observed, have to be general in form if they are to be of any practical use, and one’s identification with one’s character traits has much in common with adopting such rules as part of the way one sets out to live one’s life—as part of what Doris calls ‘narrative integration’.

Doris himself seems to think that it is possible to have narrative integration without ‘characterology’ (pp. 125-26, 142), but he accepts that ‘the empirical evidence is sparse’ (p. 126). The issue is, in part, to do with moral education, and in this respect it is of the greatest importance. My own view is that a ‘characterological’ education is integral to a good moral upbringing, and that this kind of education can only appeal to general rules. The adoption of such general rules (such as ‘Don’t cheat’ and ‘Be considerate to others’) is consistent both with a sensible particularism and with acceptance that character is fragmentary and, accordingly, that one will on occasions (and sometimes for surprisingly trivial reasons) fail to have the kinds of motives that you set yourself to have.

If this line of defence is accepted, then Doris’s ‘conservative revisionism’ begins to seem rather more conservative and not quite so revisionary, so that virtue theory ends up rather closer to where it started than one might have at first thought. But the sensible virtue theorist will think that it was worth the journey, and will thank Doris for ridding the theory of some of its unnecessary excess baggage.

Peter Goldie
University of Manchester
peter.goldie@manchester.ac.uk


This volume, which has its origin in a conference held at the University of Exeter in 2002, presents twelve new papers from a distinguished group of scholars of ancient philosophy. Most of the papers concentrate on the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, but later ancient ethics also receives some attention, as does recent virtue theory.

In ‘In What Sense are Ancient Ethical Norms Universal?’, Christopher Gill asks how the notion of universality enters into ancient and modern ethical thought, and examines the connection between the notions of universality and objectivity. Ludwig Siep, in his ‘Virtues, Values, and Moral Objectivity’, discusses the ways in which the virtues might be thought to be objective. Sabina Lovibond’s paper (‘Virtues, Nature, and Providence’) assesses Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian take on the claim that it pays to be virtuous, focusing in particular on the social conditions that must obtain in order for this claim to be true. In ‘Hybrid Theories of Normativity’, Wolfgang Detel attempts first to reconstruct, and then to commend, a Platonic theory of normativity.

One of the highlights of the volume is Sarah Broadie’s contribution, ‘On the Idea of the *summum bonum*.’ The notion of ‘the highest good’ does not play a major role in modern ethics (not under this description, at least), but in ancient ethics its role is central. Broadie begins by asking how we should explain the decline in philosophers’ interest in the notion. She then distinguishes three ancient views of what it means
to say of something—e.g. pleasure or happiness—that it is the highest good. On one view, the highest good is that which, on being added to any good thing, makes that thing even better. This idea can be found in Eudoxus of Cnidus, who uses it in an argument for hedonism. On a second view, the highest good is that which is chosen for its own sake, and for the sake of which the other goods are chosen (see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.1094a1–b7 and 1.1097a15–b21). On a third view, the highest good is the thing whose presence in our lives is the essential condition of its being worth our pursuing other goods. Broadie gives the example of an agent so committed to the good of friendship that she considers no other good to be worth pursuing in its absence. The point is not that this agent pursues all other goods *for the sake of friendship*. Rather, the point is that she pursues all other goods—including those which she may pursue for their own sake—*only once she has a secure grip on friendship*.

An interesting feature of Broadie’s account is her attribution of both of the latter two views of the highest good to Aristotle. She suggests that the third view is encapsulated in his remark that happiness, his favoured candidate for the highest good, is ‘the origin and cause of the goods’ (*NE* 1.1102a3-4). Yet there seems to be an alternative way of understanding this remark: happiness is the origin and cause of the goods, not because its presence in our lives is the essential condition of its being worth our pursuing other goods, but because it is that for the sake of which everything else is pursued (see 1102a2-3; cf. 1097a34–b6). Accordingly, I think that a question remains as to whether Aristotle really does endorse the third view of the highest good.

In ‘The Look and Feel of Virtue’, Nancy Sherman argues for the ethical significance of emotional demeanour, e.g. displays of gratitude, and expressions of concern. These aspects of our ethical lives, Sherman thinks, are often disregarded by moral philosophers. She sees this as a mistake; in many situations, a virtue such as kindness will require that we *appear* in a certain way, that we make our concern for others *visible*. Sherman elaborates her position by reference to the Stoic Seneca’s *De Beneficiis*, a work of practical ethics in which the importance of emotional demeanour is recognized and emphasized. Sherman also asks whether Seneca’s emphasis on emotional demeanour can be reconciled with the orthodox Stoic claim that ethical progress involves the eradication of the emotions. In light of this claim, one might have thought that the good Stoic student would be working to rid herself of her emotional responses—instead of trying, with Seneca, to put them on public display. But Sherman argues that Seneca is not departing from Stoic orthodoxy here. While the Stoics did conceive of ethical progress as involving the eradication of ordinary emotions (*pathê*), they also left room for a set of acceptable emotions (*eupatheiai*). As a result, we can understand Seneca as encouraging the readers of *De Beneficiis* to develop and exhibit the *eupatheiai*, or at least the imperfect approximations to the *eupatheiai* of which most of us are capable.

In ‘Socratic Ethics: Ultra-Realism, Determinism, and Ethical Truth’, Terry Penner investigates the foundations of the ethical theory he finds in Plato’s early dialogues. Penner’s main contention is that this theory emerges from a counter-intuitive view of desire set out by Socrates at *Gorgias* 468cd. According to that view, if an agent’s action turns out well for her, then it follows that she desired to do it, whereas if it turns out badly for her, it follows that she did not desire to do it. So when Helen runs away to Troy—in the mistaken belief that she is acting in her best interests—she does not in fact do what she desires to do. It certainly seems