lines for individual or unit activities, which will be produced as required.

**III. Personnel**

The Training Unit has currently 5 officers on loan from different member states. They serve the UN from 6 months up to 3 years. Most of them have long experience in various UN peacekeeping missions. The Head of the Training Unit is a retired military officer and employee of the UN. He has the lead responsibility and reports to the Assistant Secretary-General Planning and Support through the Director of the Planning Division. Each of the three components of the Training Unit has its Officer-in-Charge (OIC). The OIC is responsible for the planning, performance and the output of the component. He reports to the head of the unit. The OIC of the Research and Coordination Component is the Deputy Head of Training Unit. The Training Unit can host UN Interns for an three-month internship.

**IV. Output of the Training Unit**

The DPKO and its Training Unit have developed training material that covers a range of subjects, from standard operating procedures to training election monitors. In the following paragraphs, some of the publications are described. The Training Unit has published a ‘UN Peacekeeping Training Manual’ It provides guidelines for actual or prospective troop-contributing governments in the preparation and training of their personnel before deployment to missions.

The ‘UN Peacekeeping Handbook for Junior Ranks’ describes the requirement for those junior ranks assigned to UN peacekeeping operations.

An ‘English Language Course for UN Civilian Police’ has been developed to ensure that members of the UN civilian police possess adequate language skills in relevant subjects.

The ‘Peacekeeping Bibliography’ provides information on written materials useful as background information on the preparation of troops for UN peacekeeping operations.

A second draft of the ‘UN Military Observer Course’ has been completed. It provides guidelines for training courses for actual or prospective military observers.

The aim of the ‘UN Civilian Police Course’ is to provide contributing governments with guidelines for training civilian police to be used in the preparation of personnel for assignment to UN peacekeeping operations.

The Training Unit is working on ‘UN Guidelines for Peacekeeping’ and a ‘UN Code of Conduct’ for the DPKO. The Unit prepares material for infantry, medical, engineer, signal and logistic units and guidelines for stress management.

**5. Summary**

Despite being only three years old, the Training Unit of the DPKO is quite efficient in publishing a number of material for standardization of training for peacekeeping missions. The DPKO itself established very high goals for its Training Unit. It is perhaps too early to judge, whether its output has met these goals. So far, it is even too early to determine whether the United Nations are closer to a substantial change in the training or the preparation for missions or if it has truly begun to create a new type of peacekeeper ‘with comparable skills, knowledge, discipline and code of conduct, able to work together effectively at short notice’.

Capt. Torsten Sevecke*

**Notes**

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5. The following remarks are based on an unpublished internal paper of the Training Unit, 3rd draft, 9 February 1994.

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**UNPROFOR - Mission impossible**

It is the Bosnian Serbs’ questionable merit, by having detained hundreds of UN peacekeepers in retaliation for NATO bombardments, to have brought the ongoing tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina out of the darkness and back to the international agenda, and to have caused a feverish and confusing discussion of how to react to the latest escalation in the Bosnian war.

The background

The agreement of 31 December 1994 on the cessation of hostilities virtually collapsed in March 1995. Fighting spread from the Bihac area to central Bosnia and Tuzla and then to Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb forces increased pressure on the city of Sarajevo as well as on UNPROFOR, while Bosnian government forces were also responsible for a number of incidents.

With the expiration of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement on 1 May 1995, the renewal of which could not be achieved, fighting around Sarajevo further intensified and, on 8 May 1995, reached a level comparable to that of February 1994. Following international pressure - especially by the US - to use air power against the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR on 24 May 1995 issued a warning that an attack from the air was to be expected if all heavy weapons did not cease firing by 1200 hours the next day. In addition, it was demanded that four heavy weapons that had previously been removed from weapons collection points by the Serbs were to be returned by the same time. A second deadline, 24 hours later, was set for the removal out of range, or the placement in weapons collection
Articles

points, of all heavy weapons that had been introduced into the area by both the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serb side. According to a very detailed report of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the events of the end of May 1995 (the most relevant parts of which are reproduced below: S/1995/444 of 30 May 1995, paras. 6-15), UNPROFOR issued the warning conscious that non-compliance would require a strong response, which was likely to cause a significant risk to exposed UNPROFOR personnel. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR had no alternative but to continue its mandated tasks because of the overriding requirement to maintain its observation tasks. Moreover, it would have made little sense to demand the return of heavy weapons if there was no one at the weapons collection points to monitor their return.

As the Bosnian Serbs did not respect the deadline for the weapons' return, the first air strike took place on 25 May 1995. It was limited to target two bunkers within an ammunition dump near Pale. Afterwards, realizing UNPROFOR's fears, Bosnian Serb forces surrounded a number of weapons collection points and shelled five of six safe areas, resulting in particularly heavy casualties in Tuzla, where some 70 civilians were killed. A second attack on the six remaining bunkers in the Pale ammunition dump was conducted the following day. Additional weapons collection points then were surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces, taking UN military observers into custody and using a number of them as human shields to deter further air attacks on potential targets. The number of UN personnel taken hostage or confined in their positions in the end exceeded 400. The Bosnian Serbian forces demanded NATO guarantees not to launch further air strikes in return for their release. The last 26 peacekeepers taken hostage were released on 18 June 1995. The use of air power has not been considered since.

On 2 June 1995, Bosnian Serb forces shot down an American F-16 fighter on a routine NATO monitoring mission over northern Bosnia with a surface-to-air missile. The pilot was found and rescued by US forces after 6 days of hiding near Bihac.

Both incidents, most of all the pictures of humiliated UNPROFOR force members, taken hostage by a 'terrorist organization' and abused as human shields, handcuffed on potential bombardment sites, raised international anger and provoked hectic activities and reproaches. The public discussion in most Western countries focused mostly on military questions, with positions extending from demanding a explicit military intervention through NATO to a 'robust peacekeeping option' that is concentrating on the strengthening and empowering of UNPROFOR. Finally, a 'withdrawal option' seems to be prevailing in the US public opinion and may be summarized as 'Let's get out of there, let's lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, and let them fight it out'.

A lot of metaphors have been used to describe the situation and perspectives of UNPROFOR and the emerging risk that it may turn from a peacekeeping to a combat mission: 'mission creep', 'quagmire', 'Vietnam or Munich', 'Mogadishu line', 'Somalia Syndrome'. The description chosen by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his latest report on the events in Bosnia (S/1995/444 of 30 May 1995) is 'mission impossible' and stands for a quite different approach to the crisis. In his report, he concludes that UNPROFOR due to a contradictory mandate given to the force and the particular situation in Bosnia, is hardly able to fulfil its mandate and to meet the public expectations raised by it. In other words: the Bosnian Serbs' failure to cooperate with UNPROFOR has led to 'the gradual addition to its mandate of tasks that are incompatible with its peacekeeping and humanitarian roles' (S/1995/444 of 30 May 1995 para. 77). In consequence, the more enforcement elements were included in the mandate, the less the UN force would have the ability to implement it. This conclusion corresponds with recent experiences, that for instance means are of little help in performing a peacekeeping operation; they may, in contrast, even prevent positive outcomes. Since the UN publicly has been charged to be primarily responsible for the dilemma in Bosnia and was widely reproached for being too cautious, too passive and for not adopting a tougher stance towards the Bosnian Serbs, his intention to defend UNPROFOR becomes evident from the report.

The Secretary-General's review
Starting point of the Secretary-General's analysis is a thorough examination of the development of the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia and of the mandated tasks of UNPROFOR as well as its ability to implement them.

It should be remembered that it was not 'the UN' who initiated the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the UN Security Council under pressure by the majority of its permanent members. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as well as the Secretary-General initially opposed the idea of establishing the operation. The Secretary-General in a report of 12 May 1992 concluded that the 'conflict was not susceptible to the UN peacekeeping treatment' because of a lack of agreement between the parties and added that the disrespect for UN peacekeepers manifested by the warring factions was already at such a level that 'these are not conditions which permit a UN peacekeeping operation to make an effective contribution' (see report of 30 May 1995, S/1995/444 para. 17). The Council, however, by resolution 761 (1992) authorized the deployment of UNPROFOR at Sarajevo airport.

The second point to be made is that UNPROFOR is not a peace-enforcement operation. This becomes apparent by analysing the tasks entrusted to UNPROFOR by the Council and by literally reading the relevant resolutions, particularly as regards references to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the use of force. The force originally was entrusted with a pure peacekeeping mandate based on the will of the parties and their consent and cooperation, which indisputably is required to perform such a mandate. But the unwillingness of the parties - not only, but more evidently the Bosnian Serbs - to abide by and fulfill existing agreements and com-