tion ... that means that in our legal view the underlying resolution which authorized the use of force, all necessary measures, at the end of November in 1990, the famous resolution 678, still applies'. 

In this argumentation the use of force option under resolution 678 'revives' the moment Iraq violates its obligations under resolution 687. There would in that case be constituted a violation of an international agreement. Following the adoption of resolution 1154 US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, declared: 'We have had full latitude, legal authority from previous Security Council resolutions. We believe this resolution simply reinforces that. ... No, we don't feel we have to go back to the Security Council. ... Now we have the teeth in this unanimous Security Council resolution with the language on severest consequences'.

A significant complication in the debate on the legal basis for military action against Iraq is the repeated appeal in the American argumentation to its own 'national interest'. That came to the fore in the following statement by Bill Richardson: 'If the Iraqis fail to allow the inspectors into the sensitive or presidential sites, if they block access to documents, to people, to the activities of the UN inspection team, that is going to constitute a violation. And any member state, in our view, can take any unilateral action not just to protect their national interests, but to enforce Security Council resolutions.' This position is fully in line with the traditional American policy, i.e., to act preferably in the multilateral framework, but if needed be unilaterally.

At this juncture we depart from the American argumentation. After all, the ultimate consequence of this position would be that as things are 'each Member State' might operate unilaterally, according to its own perception, every time national interests are at stake. Any military action, in our view, should be legitimized by a Security Council resolution.

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What Follows the Current NATO Involvement in Bosnia? – Options for a Policy Debate

Introduction

The Program on Peacekeeping Policy at George Mason University and the Project on Peacekeeping and the UN of the Council for a Liveable World Education Fund launched the Bosnia Force Options Project in August of 1997 to answer the question of what follows the current NATO involvement in Bosnia. The intent of the Bosnia Force Options Project was to present a short definitive document outlining force options not currently in the public domain to policy makers, the press, and the public, in the US and internationally, so that an informed public debate can occur before the mandate of the current NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) expires in June of 1998.

Independent experts, with direct military and political experience on the ground in Bosnia and in peace operations, were commissioned to write a series of force options. Those options were then presented to a Review Panel comprised of individuals with direct experience in US military operations, UN peacekeeping operations, refugee and humanitarian affairs, and US diplomatic affairs. A list of participants follows.

The findings presented here are a result of the deliberations of the Review Panel. The five force options in this report address the numerous issues of the international intervention in Bosnia. These options range from a minimal observer force to a full-sized force based in Bosnia and reflect ongoing discussions in decision-making bodies concerning future force deployment options in Bosnia. A November 1997 Armed Forces Journal International editorial said '... anyone with an interest in this issue [post-SFOR], but particularly those who will play a role in determining the post-June force structure, would benefit from reviewing a recent report prepared by a Bosnia Force Options Review Panel.'

It is now up to the decision makers to chart the future course of the international community’s involvement in Bosnia. This report is presented as a modest contribution to that decision making process.

The Findings

A pull-out of forces would result in a renewal of hostilities. The parties to the conflict are ready and willing to go back to war if the international forces departed in June of 1998.

A reduced troop presence on the ground would maintain current stability and cessation of hostilities. A reduction in troops by as much as 50% is considered to be acceptable to maintain peace in Bosnia. All troops do not need to be based in Bosnia: a majority of troops could be based over the horizon in a neighbouring country. A number of troops could be based over the horizon with frequent rotations, show of force within country and a rapid reaction capability to respond to situations should the need arise.

US forces could be reduced significantly. A reduction of US forces by as much as 50-90% in Bosnia could be achieved without jeopardizing the peacekeeping mission. The follow-on mission to SFOR must remain under NATO.

NATO should continue to lead the mission and make decisions regarding command of the troops. The mission can not be handed back to the UN at this time. The UN is not the appropriate body to handle the military mission in Bosnia at this point in time: it is the responsibility of NATO.
Future stability in Bosnia could be ensured at a lower cost for the peacekeeping operation. The likely reductions in troop numbers overall would result in lower expenditures. Successful implementation of the Dayton Accords provides the only exit strategy for troops based in Bosnia. Arbitrary termination dates are counter-productive and do not lead to progress on the ground. An intensified economic development program for Bosnia is the critical building block for successful implementation of the Dayton Accords. The current economic development effort is underfunded, piecemeal and unlikely to produce results which afford a lasting peace in Bosnia without the presence of foreign troops. A partition along ethnic lines in Bosnia would not provide lasting peace and security in the region. Partition would be difficult to achieve, even if it was desirable, and there would be significant costs attached to such a strategy. Iran would remain if NATO pulled out and would continue to view Bosnia as an opportunity to have a base in Europe. The Iranian presence is considered to be a significant factor in recommending a continued NATO troop presence in Bosnia. The US has a direct national interest in the preservation of stability and security in Europe. Stability in the southern rim of Europe – including Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Macedonia - is in the national interest of the United States and renewed hostilities in Bosnia would threaten a fragile peace between neighbouring countries in the region.

**Force Options**

**Zero Force (ZFOR)**

Summary: ZFOR would consist of a small, 1,000 member unarmed observer force that would recognize the current partition of the entities. ZFOR would be administered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or some other European-based civilian agency. ZFOR’s goals and scope of operations are designed to: recognize and supervise the current de facto partition of the entities; place the majority of the remaining effort on the civil police of the United Nations and the civil affairs personnel of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the OSCE; move the intervention (the observers) entirely from military to civilian control; cease all activities to force minority returns or capture indicted war criminals; allow humanitarian activities to continue and be supported according to donor interest and capability; canton the Bosniac’s newly acquired weapons under the US-led train and equip program; have NATO or the US guarantee the security of the Bosniacs.

The ZFOR option represents a total pull out of US, European and other troop contributing nations and the absence of any United Nations follow-on force. ZFOR represents an acceptance of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the three entities. It would require a delineation of the Muslim sector and a joining of the Sarajevo Canton with the Bihac Canton. The current Republika Srpska and the Herzog Bosna entities would either become self-governing or join with Yugoslavia and Croatia respectively.

The primary purpose of the intervention would then be to assist the remaining Bosniac portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina gain independence and viability. Its borders would be monitored by the small observer force, and its government would be assisted by the international civil affairs and police forces in building a long-term infrastructure.

**Transition Force (TFOR)**

Summary: TFOR is a large, 30,000 member NATO-led force that will be designed to ramp down to much lower numbers over the period of its mandate. US ground forces in Bosnia would be cut in half in June 1998, resulting in a US force of 3500 troops. All NATO forces would depart by June 1999. A significant change to the Dayton Accord would be seen as a major component of this force. A de facto partition would be recognized.

A transition force (TFOR) would go into Bosnia with a new mandate based on a Dayton II Accord. The goals of a Dayton II and TFOR would be to: confirm the Article IA provisions of Dayton to separate the former warring factions, monitor the cantonment of heavy weapons, provide a secure environment, and mediate disputes on the ground; confirm the world’s impatience with the failure of the three factions to resolve their political differences and set a deadline for repatriation of Bosnia by June 1999; terminate any activities to force minority returns or arrest war criminals; carry out the arms control conditions of Article 1B of the Dayton Accord, including restrictions on the Muslim Army’s US-supplied equipment; confirm the departure of all NATO forces by June 1999; accept the continuing role of other forces which might stay in Bosnia, to include the Turks, Egyptians, Moroccans, Malaysians, or Russians; appoint a British three-star general as the TFOR commander with an American two-star deputy; appoint an American as the new High Representative for the first time.

TFOR would consist of a small force in country (a combat unit with a support base) supported by a large force based outside the country (over the horizon). The larger force would support the ground forces in Bosnia through a schedule of regular exercises in country. The US would provide airlift, command and control, intelligence and other elements unique to its capabilities.

A Dayton II conference would be held in December 1997. It would provide the basis for an exit strategy and withdrawal of all NATO troops by June 1999.

TFOR envisions a unitary Bosnia state where the Federation transfers Herzog Bosna to Croatia and the military threat from Republika Srpska is