
A scholar's delight, this edition presents, in two volumes, the two parts of Husserl's second, revised, edition of the second volume of his Logische Untersuchungen (with appropriate corrections of printing mistakes in accordance with the third, unrevised, edition). Part I of Volume II, containing an Introduction and the first five investigations, originally appeared in its second edition in 1913; Part II, containing the sixth investigation and an appendix, in 1921. The second edition of the first volume, the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, has already been published in Husserliana XVIII.

This edition also presents in footnotes the passages from the first edition of 1901 that vary from the second edition, so that scholars find here the best of both worlds. Husserl's second edition, containing alterations necessitated by the development of his reflections on the issues and methods involved, is of course Husserl's last published word in those regards. But the first edition is historically important in its own right as a record of Husserl's breakthrough to a phenomenology of cognitive experience (according to Malvine Husserl's recollection, Dilthey had regarded it so highly as the introduction to a new epoch in philosophy that he had urged that it be preserved unchanged as a historical monument).¹

Further, this edition presents the author's note [Selbstanzeige] of 1901, introducing the first edition of the second volume to the public. Finally, it contains one hundred and thirty pages of annotations and inserted pages found in Husserl's copy of the first edition of the Investigations, as a record of the progression of Husserl's reflections over the years. However, the annotations and extra pages referring to the sixth investigation are so extensive that a separate volume (Husserliana XX) has been set aside for them.

An extensive Editor's Introduction presents a chronological overview of Husserl's efforts towards revising the Investigations, discusses the plan of the revision and the extent of its execution, and offers some remarks on the differences between the two editions.

All in all, this edition provides a valuable resource for scholars interested, not only in Husserl's insights concerning basic epistemological issues, but also in the development of his critical reflections about them.

¹"Editor's Introduction," p. xxvii, n.2.
Since those reflections concern, among other things, the nature of intentional lived experience, the appropriate method for describing lived experiences accurately, and the relationships of phenomenology to psychology as well as to epistemology, psychologists interested in fundamental questions of their discipline might well find helpful guidance in following some of the paths traced by Husserl here.

Husserl's own first modest overview of what he had accomplished in these systematically unfinished but phenomenologically insightful studies, is presented here in translation.

**AUTHOR'S NOTE**

This volume contains six interconnected essays devoted to the phenomenological clarification of the unities of thought and knowledge that originate in logical acts. They are preceded by an introduction in which the author attempts to give some account of the aims of these investigations, and more generally, of the peculiarities of phenomenological clarification of knowledge, in contrast to its genetic-psychological explanation.

Theoretical thought and knowledge is accomplished in assertions, hence in certain expressions and in acts intimately bound up with them, which are usually dealt with under the unclear title, "meaning" [Bedeutung], or "sense" [Sinn]. The effort to clarify knowledge naturally directs itself first of all to the analysis of the distinctions pertaining to the essence of "expression." That is the theme of the first investigation, which encounters more profound phenomenological difficulties at every step and hence has on the whole only a preparatory character.

Beginning with the ideality of meanings (or of the unities of knowledge connected with meanings) mentioned in this investigation, the second investigation, and especially its first chapter, deals with the more general question of the ideality of species (of "universal objects") and then, in a series of chapters, discusses modern theories of abstraction. The second chapter treats Locke's psychological hypostatization of universals; the third, the attention-theory of abstraction; the fourth, the theory of universal representation; the fifth, Hume's doctrine of a distinctio rationis. The final chapter gives a summary of the various concepts of abstraction and the abstract.

One of the concepts of abstraction concerns abstract moments — Stumpf's "partial contents" or "non-independent" contents. Beginning there, the third investigation discusses the general distinction of independent and non-independent contents. It attempts to show that a law of connection grounded in the specific nature of the respective contents corresponds to every case of non-independence, whereby the distinction between these material laws and the "analytic" or categorial laws is already shown. In the further pursuit of the thoughts which obtrude upon one in this connection, the investigation develops into a sketch of a systematic theory of the doctrine of real wholes and parts according to their pure types (that is, types to be characterized purely categorically). As a result, a rather neglected but very important area of epistemology is allotted clarification.

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