"of the animate body of the other" [des fremden Leibes] though this is rendered in the book as the "other's alien body." Mistakes of this caliber are not infrequent but perhaps are venial. On the other hand, it is more grievous to translate by word-order instead of by sense and grammatical case, as is done more than once, for example, in "The motivational basis of mediation forms a similarity between . . ." (p. 60). The translator's choice of terms is for the most part unexceptionable, although he unhappily renders Husserl's Weltverlorenheit as "absence of the world." Natural science for Husserl, is not, of course, a science practiced in the absence of the world but a science so caught up in the world that it is "lost in it." Perhaps a careful reader of the English will be able to sense and correct these errors on his own, just as he might easily realize what is amiss here:

The sentence, "You are beautiful, my love," has, even grammatically, a completely different meaning from the judgment about my girl friend expressed by persons unknown to me, "You are beautiful" (p. 320).

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The title of the book under review is an interesting one: *Dare We Develop A Human Science?* The question, of course, implies that a human science has not been developed yet and that its development is a challenge the meeting of which will require courage on the part of human scientists. According to George S. Howard, although scholars such as Amedeo Giorgi and Carl Rogers have provided us with glimpses of their visions of the approach and methodology of human scientific psychology of the future, the concrete characteristics of such an approach and method have not been delineated yet. Humanistic psychologists have leveled potent criticisms against natural scientific psychology, but they have failed to offer a concrete human scientific psychology as an alternative.

Psychology as an autonomous science has been in existence for approximately one hundred years. Yet, it has failed to evolve as a human science. The reason behind this failure (Howard here is in agreement with Amedeo Giorgi, Sigmund Koch, and others) is that from the beginning of its emergence as an independent science, psychology has modeled itself after the natural sciences. Without taking into account the nature of its subject
matter and its radical difference from the subject matter of the natural sciences, psychology appropriated the natural scientific experimental method as its method par excellence. Psychology's method preceded its content (subject matter). To use Howard's terms, the methodological tail waved the content dog in psychology. In other words, the method dictated what the content (subject matter) of psychology will be. The method may be well-suited for studying and discovering the causal links (laws) between internal or external stimuli and behavioral regularities in humans. However, these mechanical behavioral regularities do not capture essential human characteristics. The result was "a lopsided prevalence of method over meaning . . . , manipulation over understanding . . ., certainty over authenticity . . ., and narrow quantification over broad qualitative inquiry" (p. 49).

Even though Howard realizes that psychology not only accepted the natural scientific method, but also the natural scientific approach (under which are subsumed ontological and epistemological assumptions, theoretical perspectives, attitudes, biases, presuppositions, other assumptive stances, implicit or explicit, and so on), he does not quite fully appreciate the significance of the dialectical dynamics involved in the triangular relationship between approach-and-method-and-content (subject matter). In other words, it was not only that the methodological tail waved the content dog, but also that the methodological tail has been set in motion by the approach dog in psychology. Here I believe lies the weakness in Howard's unfolding thesis. Not appreciating fully the dialectical relationship between approach, method, and subject matter, he searches separately for an approach that will be true to the subject matter of psychology — the essential characteristics of human behavior and experience, and he finds it in Rom Harre and Paul Secord's model of active human agency. But when he searches separately for a method he finds himself implicitly guided by the natural scientific approach. It is not surprising therefore that his methodological goal becomes "much more modest: to broaden and liberalize accepted methods within our natural scientific approach" (p. 67). Being guided by the natural scientific approach, it makes sense to hear Howard say that "if humanistic approaches better represent the true nature of people then humanists should be able to demonstrate this superiority under conditions of controlled observation . . . according to the rules of evidence accepted by the model of research which the innovation attempts to supplant" (p. 68). Or that they have to "operationalize innovative research methodologies and evaluate their effectiveness relative to the incumbent techniques to determine the effectiveness of human scientific research approaches" (p. 69). Stated simply,