
The main part of this volume presents Husserl’s lectures for a course he gave in Göttingen in 1906/07, “Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge,” as they were preserved (almost completely) in manuscript form. The 355 pages of lectures are preceded by an “Editor’s Introduction” of 51 pages and supplemented by 144 pages of additional historical and materially relevant texts. Prominent among the supplementary texts are two items of a personal nature. The first is a draft of a letter from Husserl to H. Cornelius, dated September 28, 1906, clarifying Husserl’s anti-psychologism. The second consists of a set of three personal notebook entries (from 1906, 1907, and 1908) in which Husserl reflects upon his difficulty in formulating clearly the philosophical significance of his detailed analyses. The usual “Text-Critical Appendix” provides information concerning the manuscript material on which the publication is based. Finally, the volume contains a helpful index, divided into a subject index and an index of names. In all respects the volume maintains the high standards of scholarship that succeeding generations of dedicated scholars of the Husserl Archives at Louvain have led us to expect from the *Husserliana* series.

The introduction by Ulrich Melle situates the text in the development of Husserl’s professional life and thought, from his *Logical Investigations* to his *Ideas . . . I*, and provides a summary discussion of the main points and development of the lectures. In time, the lectures stand midway between those two publications. The course is also the first one Husserl gave as Ordinary Professor. But his appointment to that position had been opposed by his Göttingen colleagues, who thought his work lacked scholarly significance.

His diary entries show the extent to which Husserl was plagued by a crisis in his own self-understanding as a philosopher, as well as his determination to transcend that crisis. This lecture course is one of several attempts by Husserl to come to a clear and comprehensive grasp of the broader philosophical significance and systematic unity of his accumulating sheafs of diverse phenomenological analyses.

What plagues Husserl, a torment that accompanied him throughout his entire scholarly life, is a deeply felt lack of “harmonious unity,” of system and natural order in his constantly ramifying investigations. “The promised land of clarity,” in which “the actual accomplishment” is unified in a “general project,” evades his glance again and again (xiv).
The general theme within which Husserl attempts to unify his variegated investigations is that of a critique of theoretical reason as first philosophy. In that connection, this course represents:

an important step on the path from the descriptive-psychological clarification of pure logic in the *Logical Investigations* to the transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and of the correlates constituted in its acts in *Ideas I*. Here, for the first time, Husserl explicitly used the method of époque and phenomenological reduction to establish a theory of knowledge and a phenomenology radically free from prejudice and ultimately clarifying all knowledge (xix).

Hence, the two historically significant factors that stand out most prominently are that the lectures contain Husserl's first detailed articulation of the phenomenological reduction and that they present an early attempt by Husserl to integrate phenomenology within a systematic overview of philosophy. These two factors are themselves closely interrelated. Further, the relation of philosophical phenomenology to the science of psychology is a crucial factor in both considerations. Finally, the fundamental philosophical role of the theory of knowledge is the main key toward determining that relationship.

The lecture course as a whole consists of eight chapters, divided into three main sections:

I. The Idea of Pure Logic as a Formal Theory of Science
   Ch. 1, The Characteristics of Logic from the Point of Departure of the Exact Sciences
   Ch. 2, Pure Logic as Theoretical Science
   Ch. 3, Formal and Real Logic

II. Noetics, Theory of Knowledge, and Phenomenology
   Ch. 4, Noetics as the Doctrine of the Right of Knowledge
   Ch. 5, Theory of Knowledge as First Philosophy
   Ch. 6, Phenomenology as the Science of Pure Consciousness

III. The Forms of Objectivation
   Ch. 7, The Lower Forms of Objectivation
   Ch. 8, The Higher Forms of Objectivation

This general scheme allows Husserl to consolidate some of the results of his *Logical Investigations* and then to integrate them into a systematic approach to a metaphysically oriented philosophy of science. On Husserl's understanding, science in the full sense is a deductive system of propositions known to be true. All other aspects of scientific procedure are auxiliary to the establishment of such systems of knowledge. Such systems have a formal, a material, and a noetic dimension. Logic, as a formal and strictly mathematical discipline, has the peculiarity that its content is the