necessitate scrutiny beyond the scope of his thesis, Schneider reiterates his long-standing argument against the utopian expansiveness of the "Wilberrians" as well as suggests an existential basis for religion.

Finally, Schneider presents his contribution to existential therapy. Essentially, it consists of the attempt to help the patient integrate the contradictory, paradoxical extremes of everyday life. He summarizes:

The key dictums here have been (1) address the client's desire and capacity for (constrictive or expansive) integration; (2) align the therapeutic approach with this desire and capacity; and (3) invite clients into increasingly anxious domains of their experience (keeping fully aware of the first dictum), so as to enhance their capacity to constructively transform those domains. (p. 204)

Schneider's consideration of the paradoxical phenomena of constriction and expansion continues the existential tradition in psychotherapy. While one might wonder about the constrictive nature of the thesis itself as it reduces a vast array of descriptions (as well as psychoanalytic and psychological nosology) to the polarity, it provides a means of understanding the fear and dread experienced by troubled people in the context of the contradictions of everyday existence. Furthermore, it offers both a philosophic and psychotherapeutic means of understanding and being with individuals stymied or troubled by those contradictions.

Michael W. Barclay
Cotati, CA


In his preface, Samuel Ijsseling, director of the Husserl Archives at Louvain, provides an interesting account of the history of the material published here. As Edmund Husserl's assistant beginning in October 1928, Eugen Fink took an active part in Husserl's attempts to revise and expand his *Cartesian Meditations* and to prepare a new comprehensively systematic presentation of his phenomenological philosophy. This two-volume set includes Eugen Fink's extensive drafts submitted to Husserl for those projects, as well as Edmund Husserl's notations and supple-
ments to Fink's contributions. Prominent among the writings collected here is a draft of Part 1 of a sixth meditation, written by Fink in 1932 as a contribution to a projected coauthored version of the *Cartesian Meditations*, one that would be suitable for the German philosophical public of the time. Although that project never came to fruition, Fink's sixth meditation did circulate among a few phenomenologists and became publicly known by way of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's reference to it in the preface to his *Phenomenology of Perception*. Further, Fink submitted his text for his own habilitation at the University of Freiburg after the war, thus symbolically indicating his intention of continuing in the tradition of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy.

The sixth Cartesian meditation, Part 1, is entitled "The Idea of a Transcendental Methodology." It is Fink's attempt to articulate Husserl's distinctive method of transcendental phenomenology. Everyone knows that phenomenology is something one has to do actively, and not a doctrine to be learned by reading books. But, as continuing Husserliana volumes show clearly, Husserl himself came back again and again to such questions as just what is it that one does when one does phenomenology? What motivates the activities involved in phenomenology? How does one express the results of transcendental phenomenology and relate them to mundane concerns? What is the specifically philosophical significance of those results? Such questions, involving a phenomenology of phenomenology, are intrinsically essential to phenomenology's claim to provide a critically reflective approach to basic philosophical issues. Extrinsically, they became especially acute during Husserl's final years because of the opposing philosophical direction in which he saw Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler taking phenomenology. These published texts present a distinctive orientation toward such questions, containing as they do Fink's thoroughly informed elaborations and Husserl's detailed comments.

Fink divides the question of method nicely into eight subquestions, which provide titles for separate sections:

- Phenomenologizing as Reducing
- Phenomenologizing as Regressively Analyzing
- Phenomenologizing in "Constructive" Phenomenology
- Phenomenologizing as Theoretical Experience
- Phenomenologizing as Ideating
- Phenomenologizing as Predicating
- Phenomenologizing as Doing Science (*Verwissenschaftlichen*)
- "Phenomenology" as Transcendental Idealism

In another context, Eugen Fink published a discussion of the relation of transcendental phenomenology to neo-Kantian philosophy, which Hus-