The main-stream of Anglo-American psychology's failure to increase man's understanding of his functioning has been criticised not only by Russian psychologists like Rubinstein (1958), German psychologists like Zellinger (1970) and Holzkamp (1972), British psychologists like Bannister (1970a), psychiatrists like Ruesch (1967), and general systems theorists like Koestler (1967), but even by some Anglo-American colleagues like Carlson (1971), Schultz (1971), and Silverman (1971). In the present paper, we shall attempt to demonstrate that this failure is related to the way in which most Anglo-American psychologists structure their work. This paper thus represents another aspect of the psychology of the psychologist in line with the thinking of Thomae (1969), Bannister (1970b), Kaminski (1970), and Gouldner (1970). Other aspects of the psychology of the psychologist were discussed by one of us in earlier papers (Brandt, 1970a, 1971a & b) which dealt with the ways in which psychologists exclude themselves from their own field by developing theories which lead to paradoxes when applied to psychologists.

**HOW PSYCHOLOGISTS AVOID RELATING TO PEOPLE**

The psychologist's avoidance of contact with people—who are supposedly the objects of his investigations—expresses itself
in many different ways. When psychologists define psychology as "the science of behavior" they not only fail to define psychology as different from any other science—since all sciences study "the behavior of nature" (Kuhn, 1970)—but implicitly deny that they study human beings. The avoidance of people is obvious in experiments on flatworms and other animals from which conclusions are drawn about human functioning. This avoidance is probably most clearly expressed in Skinner's (1959) warning against "the flight to real people" (p.249).

Scientific research always consists of an object to be investigated, a design on the basis of which data are collected and analysed, conclusions drawn from the data, and usually a published report. The alienation of psychologists from themselves and others as real human beings permeates every step from the selection of issues to the evaluation of published reports. Even in clinical work, which may be expected to deal with specific individuals, alienation shows up in many ways.

The object of psychological research is, according to British, Russian, German, French, and other non-Anglo-American psychologists, the total person. The alienation from people shows up when psychologists choose as their objects animals, physiological processes (Bannister, 1968), or functions like memory which they isolate from the individuals in whom these functions occur. They frequently select processes for study which like the rote learning of nonsense syllables never occur in the lives of real people under ordinary circumstances.

The research design also frequently reflects the psychologist's alienation. Thus, the collection of data is, more often than not, carried out by people labeled "experimenters" but who obviously did not design and plan the experiment. Due to the introduction of these "experimenters" the psychologist has no contact at all with the people—if any—on whom the experiment is carried out. (When both the latter and the "experimenters" are university students the subsequently published reports can easily become confusing to the readers. One of us discussed the resulting petitio principii with respect to experimenter-effect research in some earlier papers [Brandt, 1970a, 1975].) Furthermore, data are often collected by means of questionnaires, inventories, and various kinds of scales. Since the psychologist typically does not answer any questions about the meaning of the statements on such forms, there is no dialogue between the