In his recent volume, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry*, Herbert Spiegelberg devotes a page and a half to an appraisal of Jung's phenomenology.¹ His conclusions are that while Jung came close to a phenomenological attitude he had no real link with phenomenological philosophy or its members.² Jung's phenomenology was, he says, merely a communi-


² We do know from Jung that he worked along with Ludwig Binswanger in 1907 on some association experiments, but this was long before Binswanger was influenced by Heidegger's hermeneutics.

The probability of Jung's exposure to Brentano is a more likely source of his leanings toward a phenomenological methodology. Antos C. Ran
curello, in a monograph on Brentano, *A Study of Franz Brentano*, (New York: Academic Press, 1968), pp. 127-8, mentions "... the agreement between his /Jung/ and Brentano's standpoint is limited to matters bearing upon general principles: specifically, the principles of mental functioning, self-actualization, individuation, and teleology." (127) Further he writes, "Both Adler and Jung probably knew of Brentano and had at least some general knowledge of his standpoint; what seems to be certain is the fact that they were not in any way influenced by him in developing their personalistic views." (128)

Quite possibly Jung may have learned something of Brentano from Freud, since he had been Brentano's student (1874-76) in Vienna. (6)
cative device used in response to its growing popularity. In support of this contention he cites changes in some of Jung’s titles and subtitles to include the word phenomenology.\(^3\)

Spiegelberg is doubtless correct in his general estimate of Jung’s relationship to phenomenology, but until a more detailed investigation of Jung’s unpublished papers is conducted a definitive statement is still lacking. What I would like to indicate here although not in any detailed way are some features of Jung’s thought which Spiegelberg did not mention in his overview. I would, however, like to be explicit in that I am making no claim that Jung was a phenomenologist in the strict sense of the term. For it is quite possible that a more exhaustive account will reveal that these points of contact with phenomenology are insignificant in the total context of Jung’s thought. Nevertheless, I think it worthwhile to make mention of a few of them.

What then is phenomenological about Jung’s work? In 1929 in a comparison of himself and Freud, he wrote, “A further difference seems to me to consist in this, that I try to free myself from all unconscious and uncritical assumptions about the world in general.”\(^4\) This and other comments similar to it would seem to indicate some exposure to the phenomenological ideal of a presuppositionless science. Or, if we take the point of departure as illustrative, we find that like Husserl Jung also wishes to begin with the “things themselves.” It is the phenomena as they appear to and in our consciousness that call for description and analysis. Spiegelberg quotes Jung as saying:

The methodological standpoint which I represent is exclusively phenomenological that is it is concerned with occurrences, events, experiences—in a word, with facts.\(^5\)

A third possibility exists in the fact that Brentano lived the last two years of his life in Zurich (1915-17) which provided Jung with an additional opportunity for contact. Whether a meeting actually was effected has yet to be established.

\(^3\) Spiegelberg (131). Changed from Zur Psychologie des Märchens to Zur Phänomenologie des Geistes in Märchen (1948). And the English subtitle in Aion (Collected Works, Vol. IX, Part 2) from the “Untersuchungen zur Symbolgeschichte” to “Researches on the Phenomenology of the Self,” to which Spiegelberg writes, “Jung specifically agreed.”


\(^5\) Spiegelberg, op. cit., 131.