The Husserlian project begins by establishing a critical distance between itself and latter nineteenth century science. Starting from the philosophy of arithmetic, disclosing psychologism in contemporary notions of logic, attempting "philosophy as a rigorous science", Husserl climaxes his work by relating the modern cultural crisis to science as it took shape in Galileo's and his successors' understanding of the relations among man, mathematics, and Nature.

Historically a like tension has related human and nature-oriented disciplines, if only in the latters' refusal to admit as science anything not in conformity with their own image. An example of this was the ruling out of court of mesmeric phenomena by Benjamin Franklin and others, because they were inexplicable in terms of magnetism, whose animal form they had been considered. Accompanying such exclusions, a variety of teleological agents, complementary to the newly postulated mechanisms, were proposed. These ranged from Blumenbach'snisus formativus or Bildungstrieb through Schopenhauer's "will as world and idea", to Nietzsche's "will to power" and Bergson's "elan vital." The same occurs in Freud's thought when he shifts from the extremely mechanistic account of his early "Scientific Project" to his later notion of an evolutionary sexual libido. And even though his own understanding of psychoanalysis sought to reconcile the difference between mechanism and purpose, his
principles of Eros and Thanatos remain ambiguously tendencies of nature and poles of individual experiencing. Freud's insistence on the autonomy of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis biology, along with his effort to utilize Lamarck for the self-understanding of psychoanalysis, indicate an effort on his part to realize an Aufhebung of the tension between biology and psychology in psychoanalysis. But this he did not live to accomplish, if indeed it is accomplishable. The tension between human and nature-centered science remains both as the condition and the problem of his project.

This tension can scarcely be avoided in psychiatric and neurological practice where the doctor, while informed in physics and chemistry, anatomy and physiology, is at the same time faced with human distress. Here the issues are as old and difficult as Job. In the implicit as well as explicit way the physician symbolizes the possible meanings of failure and suffering, he cannot avoid the issue of human freedom as it enters into his interpretation of what makes it possible for a person to become, and remain, a patient. For his own attitude, even beyond his wishes, is recognized as a therapeutic influence.

In many ways the problems of Husserlian phenomenology resemble those with which medicine has been concerned ever since Hippocrates. I shall spare you the texts, only reminding you that "phenomena" and "epoche" terms were familiar to the philosopher physicians of antiquity. The issues of phenomena, epoche, and intersubjectivity refer to problems of the medical attitude no less than Husserlian phenomenology, even though in a different way.

The eighteenth century marks a change in this tradition. This is evidenced in the appearance of newly-coined terms like "psychiatrist" and "biology" in the first years of the nineteenth century. Both represent the enterprise of new special sciences, as the shared world of sensory experience, like the earth itself, becomes increasingly divided up into separate domains of interest. Newton, through rendering the movements of heavenly bodies intelligible through mathematical understanding, disabused his age of its clinging belief in the authority of the pre-Galilean, pre-Copernican, world. From having been a unity apparent to the senses, the world is now replaced by mathematical equations and the ideal unity of science. At the same time, the everyday world