When I was invited to contribute a paper to an issue of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology that would be devoted to the thought of Erwin Straus, I unreflectively assumed that my three years of participation in his Lexington seminars constituted a solid foundation for such a project. Further strengthening this assumption was the realization that Dr. Straus' insights into and characterizations of human phenomena, first encountered in those seminar sessions and subsequently refreshed and deepened in the course of my own teaching, have frequently recurred to me while conducting seminars on personality theory and psychopathology. Hence, I accepted the invitation and set about the task of selecting a particular aspect of Dr. Straus' thought to thematize and discuss.

Having recently concluded a course in which Dr. Straus' characterizations of psychopathology were compared with those of other existential-phenomenological theorists, I decided to commit myself to an in-depth examination of the meanings of psychopathology as he had articulated them. At first glance, such a project seemed both intriguing and manageable. However, in my concrete efforts at implementing this commitment, I soon came to appreciate a number of formidable problems. First, Dr. Straus' characterizations of psychopathology are inextricably and dialectically interwoven with his whole philosophical an-
thropology. Second, while those of his writings that are addressed to specific psychopathological phenomena, i.e., Phenomenology of Hallucinations (1962), Disorders of Personal Time in Depressive States (1947), The Pathology of Compulsion (1938), and Pseudoreversibility of Catatonic Stupor (1955), all reprinted in his Phenomenological Psychology (1966), are unusually rich, they are relatively few and are typically limited to forms or aspects of psychotic living. Further, many additional references to the meanings of psychopathology are scattered throughout his other works. Finally, reflection has convinced me that a representation and discussion of Dr. Straus' explicit characterizations of psychopathological phenomena would miss his most important contribution to the task of working out a more adequate and genuinely psychological psychopathology.

As I have already suggested, this is not to imply that Dr. Straus' understandings and portrayals of such phenomena are of little or no value to psychologists. Indeed, his characterizations of compulsive living, his analyses of the various types of hallucinations, and his depictions of the transformed temporalities of depressive modes of being, are often both provocative and convincing. However, they are even more significant insofar as they demonstrate the actual, as well as the potential, fruitfulness of adopting a more adequate, phenomenologically achieved, understanding of human existence as a philosophical anthropological basis for psychology as well as for psychopathology. In other words, it is my contention that Dr. Straus' fundamental contribution to the psychologist's task of working out an adequate psychology and psychopathology lies in his repeated demonstrations of the inappropriateness of natural scientific characterizations of human existence, and in his alternative description, at least in its major themes and dimensions, of a phenomenologically achieved portrayal of the fundaments of the human situation. Hence, the interrelated purposes of the present paper will be: to describe the style of movement and method that Dr. Straus typically employed in his efforts to realize this portrayal; to set forth these major themes and dimensions of the human situation; to represent his own applications of this alternative philosophical anthropology for achieving an understanding of specific psychopathological phenomena; and to inquire into the more general implications of this grasp of the human situation for the project of a genuinely psychological psychopathology.