A first generation of Heidegger's students were quick to identify the importance for him of Aristotle's philosophy. They had sat in his lectures and seminars from the early twenties, first in Freiburg im-Breisgau, in Marburg, and again in Freiburg: they heard Heidegger's protracted discussions of Aristotle's texts. The title of one set of lectures, from 1921 give a sense of the direction of the reading: *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle: Introduction to Phenomenological Research* (GA 61, 1984). Aristotle's writings were to be read as a source for following through and radicalising the phenomenological innovations of Edmund Husserl (1856-1938). Heidegger himself, in the late essay 'On Time and Being' (1962), testifies to the importance for his earliest development of the gift, in 1907, of a study by Franz Brentano: *On the manifold senses of being for Aristotle* (1862). This preoccupation with the manifold senses of being, which must all the same be thought as a unity, can be linked to the differences between the unity of logos, as Rede, and its various modes of being said, as Gerede, which is structural to the development of the argument of *Being and Time* (1927). This distinction between Gerede and Rede informs the analysis of the differences between the tendency to fallenness into the world, and an authentic self-attestation of Dasein, in its ontical and ontological distinctiveness, as having a relation to its own being.

In this first generation of students, the work of Helena Weiss, Hans Georg Gadamer, Otto Poeggeler, and Hannah Arendt all attest to the challenge posed by Heidegger's writings. The task is to return to Aristotle, under the guidance of a retrieval of the question of the meaning of being, both to work through to an understanding of the unity of Aristotle's thinking, and to develop alternatives in the twentieth century to the dead ends of Cartesian dualism. By contrast, a second and a third generation of students have access to the famous early lectures and seminars only by second hand, by means of rumour, and in the outline of a critique of Aristotle, indicated, but not carried out in *Being and Time*. The proposal to destroy the history of ontology sits uneasily alongside this claim, from section 29, about Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: 'Contrary to the traditional orientation, according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we “learn in school”, this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another.' (SZ 138, MR 178). The destruction of Aristotelian ontology is to reveal an Aristotle who contributes to reposing the question of the meaning of being, and to an analysis of the everydayness of Dasein. This opens up a duplicity in Aristotle's texts, they are to be read against the grain, to release a hermeneutical component, in addition to the question concerning the unity, or meaning, articulating the multiplicity in being.
For students of Heidegger who post date the publication of these lectures and seminars, from Marburg, and from Freiburg, there is a proliferation of Aristotelian themes to be followed up. The publication in 1992 of the lectures on the *Sophist* (GA 20, 1992) is important, for it starts out with a long discussion of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the course of which Heidegger proposes Gewissen, conscience, as a translation of *phronesis*. This indicates there is to be a retrieval of Aristotle's ethics, as well as of his metaphysics. The rediscovery, and publication in 1989, of the outline written in 1922, ‘Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle’, reveals that even more of Aristotle's legacy is at stake in Heidegger's enquiries than a focus on intellectual virtue, on the communitarian values of the *Rhetoric*, and on the discussions, in the *Metaphysics*, of the manifold ways of saying being. Lines of discussion of this between Robert Bernasconi, Franco Volpi and Jacques Taminiaux, a truly international exchange, were already opening out in the late eighties and early nineties, with a focus on the role for Heidegger of Aristotle's distinctions between *poiesis* and *praxis*, and between *phronesis* and *sophia*. Bernasconi proposed a destruction of *phronesis*, and both Volpi and Taminiaux proposed readings of Heidegger as rewriting the relation between *poiesis* and praxis into the fabric of the argument of *Being and Time*, Volpi proposing an ontology of praxis, by contrast to that of *poiesis*, as a model for thinking Dasein, and Taminiaux reading the distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis* as models for the distinction between authentic and inauthentic Dasein.

With this new study by Walter Brogan, the stakes of the discussion are raised yet again, for he reads Heidegger's analyses of Aristotle from 1919 through to 1939, as a continuous series of responses, here focussed on interpretations of Aristotle on *physis* and on *aletheia*. Brogan's principal sources are the 1939 paper ‘On the emergence and concept of *physis* in Aristotle *Physics* b1’, published in *Wegmarken* in 1967, in conjunction with the 1931 lectures on *Metaphysics* Theta 1-3, on *dunamis* and *energeia* (GA 33, 1995), and the two sets of lectures, from 1924-25, *Logic: The Question of Truth* (GA 21, 1976), and from 1937-38, *Basic Questions of Philosophy* (GA 45, 1984), the latter mentioned by Brogan at the beginning of his chapter four, but oddly not included in his bibliography. Brogan argues that Heidegger's Aristotle moves on from the argument of the *Categories*, that being is that of which predication is possible, to a more refined view, in the *Metaphysics*, where a distinction is developed between a derivative, assertoric concept of truth, and a foundational, enabling ontological notion of truth. This sets up differences between an account of the truth of being in the *Categories*, and such an account for the *Metaphysics*, mapping on to the distinction given in *Being and Time* between discovery, Entdeckung, and the opening within which discovery occurs, Dasein as Erschlossenheit. Thus Dasein is Heidegger's term for specifying the conditions in which truth claims may successfully be made. The