This is a book written by philosophers who believe in the idea of Christian philosophy, in order to give some help to Christian theology. For someone like myself, who is doing Christian theology with a keen interest in the development of genuine Christian philosophy, this book deserves to be doubly welcomed. I appreciate, first of all, that there are so many outstanding philosophers who are consciously doing philosophy from a Christian perspective. These are people who are asserting that "there must be something uniquely or distinctively Christian" in their philosophies (Beilby, in "Introduction," 15). According to Beilby, a philosophy is Christian philosophy "when (1) the philosophy uses distinctively Christian insights into a philosophical question, (2) when a philosopher includes Christian revelation as an indispensable source, (3) when the basic issue being discussed cannot be comprehensively framed in a manner that is neutral to the Christian faith, and (4) when the whole system of Christian wisdom is compared to or contrasted with other competing philosophies" (15-16).

Second, I appreciate that these Christian philosophers are ready to give some help to Christian theologians, so that, following the suggestions of Alvin Plantinga, (1) they "seek to demonstrate the truthfulness of the Christian faith," (2) they "engage in philosophical theology" (I hope that it does not turn out to be a kind of natural theology), (3) they engage in "Christian philosophical criticism" of "the perspectives, assumptions, and research programs" of our culture, and (4) they are doing constructive or positive Christian philosophy (16-17). In short, they try to do philosophy "for faith and clarity," as the apt title of this book summarizes.

So basically I agree with the whole project of this book, and I am grateful for the following specific points. When Alan G. Padgett tries to construct a Christian worldview with both Christian theology and Christian philosophy, I basically agree with him. When Paul K. Moser speaks of the filial relationship between God and us created by God's grace as the fundamental basis of our epistemology, I am grateful and agree with him. It seems to me, however, we need some more emphasis on the content of the propositional truths about God. It is good to emphasize that "I subject my faulty, selfish will to God's perfect, loving will" (70) and that "we put the true God at the center of our lives, in terms of what and whom we value, love, trust, and obey." (73) But at the same time, "this calls for a revolution in our cognitive lives" as he himself asserts (73). It would be good if he had spelled out in detail what this revolution amounts to.

William Lane Craig courageously criticizes Wolfhart Pannenberg, Philip Clayton and F. LeRon Shults, arguing that they are in fact neo-Hegelians who do not regard creation as "outside" God. I would rather call their idea panentheism, as the editor puts it (18) and many others would say, rather than Craig's rather strong term "pantheism." Jay Wesley Richards does a good job in clarifying the doctrine of divine simplicity and showing us that "(...) much of its underlying motivation, and a good bit of its traditional contents, can still be defended" (157). Keith E. Yandell once again shows himself a good apologist using his analytic philosophy. Nicholas Wolterstorff convincingly argues that properly understood "love is not in tension with justice; love practices justice." (187). He does a very important job to bring the fundamentally biblical (but what others would call an Anselmian) idea that "God has the right to be honoured... God has the right to be obeyed" (197), which is almost discredited today, back to
its proper place. Hence he is right when he says: “We wrong God, deprive God of what he has a right to. God is the victim of our injustice” (197). As sometimes happens in his writings, however, in the last part he takes a metaphorical expression too literal; as a result, God really becomes “a victim.” Consequently, God is not regarded as impassible, as in the case in traditional theology. In this way, he changes traditional theological notions.

At this point, I am a bit puzzled. The book started with the promise that Christian philosophical inquiry can help Christian theology. In the process of argument, however, we are sometimes challenged and even demanded to change our theology. If it is a change that is faithful to the scripture, we should welcome it, as the Reformers did change their Roman Catholic theology into more biblical categories. I am sure that Wolterstorff is asking the same thing of us because he thinks that according to the scriptures God is passible. However, this is really a serious question to be discussed from a biblical, historical, and systematical theological perspective. I am not sure whether we can just change our traditional theological terminology in such a way.

Similarly, when we are confronted with the assertion that—with some caution—we can have a legitimate natural theology (35-44); with the assertion that if we can have a general ontology which includes even God, we can apply this general ontology to theology (48), we have worries. Is it not better to recognize general revelation, but not to allow it to develop into a natural theology, as John Calvin held? If one develops a general ontology in which God is included, then God is included in the great chain of being; and there can be a possibility of discussing analogia entis. I do not think that J. P. Moreland would do that, but the idea of a general ontology makes one worry about the future development of his type of Christian philosophy. Likewise, when David Clark tries to suggest a new way of embracing the doctrine of inerrancy, more or less in the line of Hans Frei with the help of speech act theory, we can see the problems of the radical literalistic interpretation of the scripture; however, what he is suggesting as good points of speech act theory are actually what the propositionalists are really saying all the time—but without risking to obscure the historicity and factuality of the events of the scriptures.

Even when William Hasker tries to find a way in which he can get rid of the traditional dualism of body and soul and at the same time to secure the continuity of the mind/soul in existence after the physical death and to confirm the union with a new body in the resurrection with his concept of emergent dualism(256-58), we are grateful that he recognizes—in a sense—the existence of a kind of soul, and that he clearly affirms the resurrection of the body; but we are curious about whether it is impossible to have Jesus’, Paul’s, or John’s idea of body and soul, which is quite different from Platonic and Cartesian dualism of body and soul, but also from Hasker’s emergent dualism of “ordinary physical matter” and “something new” (256). I know that Hasker suggests that his emergent dualism is the way in which we can understand the biblical image of human being. Here again, however, we need lots of discussions before we can readily agree with him. This also goes with Plantinga’s discussion of the compatibility of design and evolutionary theory.

In general, this book provides lots of things to think about. It is good, in this volume, to see more implications for Christian theology, mostly in relation to the question of the epistemic rights and the knowledge of God. We need to have more contributions for all aspects of theology, and we really want to have many more Christian scholars who “see everything from the