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*Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality* (NOKR) is an important contribution to the critique of naturalism and a positive case for theism on epistemic and metaphysical grounds. Smith sets out to show that no extant version of scientific naturalism offers an adequate metaphysical foundation for our knowledge of reality. NOKR involves detailed engagement with contemporary naturalized epistemology that may intimidate newcomers, but it can also provide an illuminating introduction to a literature that is highly complex and assist readers in forming an overview of work that is often treated in isolation from each other.

Essentially, two main problems arise with naturalism when it comes to epistemology, according to Smith. One is the problem of accounting for the mental in the form of intentionality, mental acts, our unmediated awareness of states of ourselves, and our capacities to form reliable concepts of reality. A phenomenological aspect is attached to this line of reasoning. We experience ourselves as subjects, enduring over time, apprehending ourselves as engaged in the world. This foundational self-awareness and our conceptual powers to form the needed frameworks for our lives is what makes the physical sciences possible. Insofar as naturalism entails the elimination of the mental ontologically, it cannot employ any of the essential mental powers to ground our knowledge = claims, including our claims to know of reality on the basis of the physical sciences. Over against eliminative physicalism, Smith seems quite right. Such a form of naturalism collides with a sturdy conviction in our common sense approach to cognition. What becomes less clear, however, is when naturalists, as such, make use of mental acts, conceptual and representational frameworks, albeit with the proviso that these are themselves physical states and processes. I believe that Smith is correct that the naturalists he addresses are unable to have both their mental acts and their physicalist ontology too, but to fully win this conclusion I suggest that Smith needed to provide more attention to the concept of what is physical. Why cannot intentional relations and mental acts be regarded as physical phenomena? Philosophers such as Galen Strawson and Noam Chomsky argue that we currently lack any clear, adequate concept of what counts as physical. If so, those of us who share Smith’s discontent with naturalism may have to settle for a somewhat qualified position: if by “physical” one means what the Churchlands, Dennett, or Kim classify as “physical,” then there are reasons for thinking that mental acts are not physical. And if physicalism does not recognize the robust reality of mental acts, then it is unsuccessful in its account of our knowledge of reality.
A second point that Smith makes is that theism, rather than naturalism, gives us a reasonable, successful foundation for us to trust our cognitive powers. A theistic world is one in which we may expect the fruitful, coordination of our experiential and conceptual powers as agents in the world. In chapter nine, Smith develops a positive account of our knowledge of reality, employing Husserl's phenomenological account of experience. Smith's position here gives ample space to how our interaction with the world involves experiential engagement and a “matching up” of our experience and reality. In my view, a naturalist who can show us that she can accommodate experiential engagement and such matching in a physicalist framework would be able to appropriate Smith's positive account. The key point of tension will come down to whether Smith is also correct that we need theism in order to explain why our cognitive skills and matching are indeed so successful.

_Nokr_ has received some negative criticism that I believe should be challenged. I address three charges: 1) Smith's reasoning is based on the premise that only non-physical entities could be intentional or have intentionality, 2) Smith overstates his conclusions especially when it comes to the theistic epistemological argument, and 3) _Nokr_ is a work of Christian apologetics and thus not a contribution to scholarly literature.

On the first charge, I think that it is uncharitable to think that Smith is first and foremost committed to a clear understanding of what counts as non-physical. His line of reasoning is more accurately seen as advancing a positive case for the need to recognize intentionality, mental acts, consciousness, experiential engagement as real and having a robust role in our knowledge of reality. It is then a secondary matter of whether intentionality, et al. is physical. Insofar as naturalists themselves do not (or cannot?) accommodate the reality and cognitive role of intentionality, et al., Smith's argument presents a genuine, important challenge to naturalism.

On the second point, _Nokr_ as a book may be vulnerable. More work could and should have come into play, perhaps even at the beginning of the book, on the metaphysics and epistemology of theism. But this may be just a shortcoming of a book, which should not carry the burden of covering all relevant arguments, and not a shortcoming of the position, articulated and defended by others. One related thesis—one that might have merited more attention than the theistic argument—is Smith's contention that a sound, phenomenologically grounded account of our knowledge of reality entails the truth of substance dualism. I believe that Smith is right. Our unmediated awareness of our experiential states and our awareness of change over time (as well as our ability to act over time) requires the reality of a substantial subject. And, when it comes to metaphysics, it is unreasonable to identify this subject with the brain,