
By "the first Aristotle" Dr. Berti means Aristotle during his stay in the Academy. His philosophy of this period is not to be found in the Corpus Aristotelicum, but it is generally agreed that it did exist. Since a considerable number of studies have appeared dealing with different parts or aspects of Aristotle's thought and writings of this period, Dr. Berti thinks the time has come to attempt a general reconstruction. This is the aim of the present work, written by an author who is both extremely well-read in his subject and not afraid of giving personal views and now and then somewhat unusual solutions. His results are the following.

From 367 to 357 Aristotle followed the propaedeutical course of mathematical studies prescribed in the Academy for philosophers-to-be. In the second half of this period, c. 360, he wrote his first work, the *Gryllos*. It was an attack on rhetoric in the spirit of the *Gorgias*. It must have been about that time, immediately after publishing the *Gryllos*, that Aristotle suddenly started teaching rhetoric in the Academy. This, no doubt, was an attempt to realize Plato's suggestion of a higher kind of rhetoric which was to serve truth.

Next follows the *Περὶ ἰδεῶν*, in which the theory of the Ideas was criticized. B. dates it to 357, i.e. at the end of the propaedeutical training. It was certainly written in the Academy, and before the *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*. The author emphasizes the agreement between the arguments on μέθεξις put forward in the first part of Plato's *Parmenides* and those of Aristotle, both in Π. Ἰδ. and in *Met.* A 9. He thinks that Plato took his own arguments about χωρίσμις quite seriously, and after the *Parm.* "went another way". In a sense, of course, this is true; but B. means by it that, most probably, Plato dropped the theory of the Ideas and developed that of "First Principles" instead.

Plato's doctrine of First Principles was expounded by Aristotle in the *Περὶ τὰς ἀληθείας*. This work is dated by B. quite near to Π. Ἰδ., either immediately before or after it. Obviously it must precede the Π. φιλοσοφίας, since in that work the Π. ταγ. is presupposed, and (in B.'s opinion) probably the Π. Ἰδ. as well.

The *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* takes a highly important place in the philosophy of "the first Aristotle". After an introduction on the meaning of the term σοφία (fr. 8), illustrated by the example of the Magi and of ancient Greek wisdom, the "first Aristotle" criticizes both the theory of the Ideas and of ideal Numbers (which means, according
to B., that the theory of First Principles was criticized); then, in the third book, he unfolds his own philosophy: on God, the world and the soul. It is truly a corrected Platonism that is contained in this work of the young Aristotle: in the fr. 13, 16 and 17 B. finds the concept of the Prime Mover as the final cause of the universe. The cosmos, though eternal, is of course dependent on Him, and so are the heavenly bodies, though ensouled and divine. B. rejects the identification of the soul with aether, which seems to follow from Cic. Tusc. I 22 and 66: this identification cannot possibly be due to Aristotle who was a spiritualist, it must come from Posidonius.

Fr. 33 (Cic. ND I 33) is explained in such a sense that Aristotle appears to have taught both the existence of a transcendent God who is νοῦς, and of a cosmic God who evidently was subordinated to the first. Thus, there are no difficulties. Essentially Aristotle believed in one God only: the Prime Mover, who is νοῦς, and who moves the universe by “attraction”, i.e. by being a final cause.

To this the author adds that Plato himself, when writing Laws X — which evidently was done not so long before 347— was impressed by this concept of God, so that he transformed his own “Idea of good” and the Demiurge of his Timaeus into a God who as a reasonable Soul is the cause of all motion in the cosmos. Though this God appears to be immanent in the world rather than transcendent, B. thinks that by this concept Plato as a theologian made a considerable progress, and certainly he did so under the influence of Aristotle.

Next follow the Eudemus and the ethical-political dialogues, such as II. δικαστικός and the Πολιτικός. As to the Eudemus, it should be borne in mind, first, that it was written under the impression of the death of a friend, second, that it had a popular character. Hence the rather strong mythical element in this dialogue; hence also the praise of the dead as being happy, more so than the living. This is due to the situation, not to a thoroughgoing pessimism about life.

Furthermore, according to B. it is not true that the doctrine of the soul in the Eudemus differs essentially from that in the De anima; on the contrary, they are essentially the same. For in the Eudemus the soul is “a kind of form” (εἴδος τι), and in the De anima the soul, while being “form”, is at the same time said to be οὐσία—which the author, undisturbed by the ambiguity of this term, translates by “substance”.

In fr. 5 the ἔκει θεάματα evidently do not mean the Platonic ideas, for Aristotle rejected them explicitly several years before. They do mean the transcendent and immutable God, whose existence