that Plato in his middle period knew of a distinction between absolute, knowable Being and absolute, unknowable Not-Being, while between these two lies something which is and is not at the same time, which participates both of Being and of Not-Being and which is the realm of doxa. T. quite justifiably quotes part of this text (476e7-477a5, on Not-Being’s being unknowable) as a parallel to B2, 6-7 (p. 39). Why has the sequel been omitted? Rep. 476e—the end, which shows some verbal reminiscences of Parmenides’ poem, demonstrates that Plato at that time whole-heartedly accepted the Parmenidean ontology 1). Apparently he did so until he (think of the Soph.) realized much later that it did not square with the Theory of Ideas. The conclusion of Rep. V contains an ontologico-epistemological theory of the sensible world which is an exact reproduction of what many scholars hold to be the view of Parmenides in the Doxa. Dr. Tarán should have pondered this passage before expounding his own radically different and in itself improbable interpretation of the second part of Parmenides’ poem and its relation to the first.

SOESTERBERG, Chr. Huygenslaan 26

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Mrs. Timpanaro’s works, though of course one may not always agree with her on certain points of detail, are always distinguished by high qualities. This is also the case with the present volume. After having dealt with “the masters” in vols. I and II (see the reviews by W. Wiersma, Mnemos. 1959, 83 f. and 1965, 420 f.), in this third volume she is concerned with the fragments and testimonies of the anonymi, who represent the collectivity of the Pythagorean School. The work is divided into five sections: A. The catalogue of Iamblichus, B. Anonymous Pythagoreans, C. Acousmata and Symbola, D. Fragments from Aristoxenus’ Πυθαγορικά αποφάσεις and Περί τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ βίου, and E. Pythagorean "resonances". Each of these sections, the second of which takes up almost half the volume, is preceded by an introduction. The texts are accompanied by an Italian translation and explanatory notes. There are three appendixes, the first of which deals with “a prob-

1) Cf. P. Friedländer, Platon I (Berlin 31964), 25-6; 351 n. 29 the beginning.
able Pythagorean proof of the irrationality of $\sqrt{2}$", the second with "a musical fragment of Aristotle" (fr. 47 Rose), and the third with the proem of Euclides' Κατακόμη καλώνος.

The first two sections are preceded by a valuable introduction on "Aristotle and the Pythagoreans". An excellent comment is made on the expression οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρεις, a formula which—far from having any disparaging meaning—is shown by many parallels to have been used as a technical-scientific term, indicating the School as a whole.

Of particular interest is the Postilla, added to this introduction. It is a critical reaction to recent publications of the Hungarian scholar A. Szabó on the earliest form of mathematical proof. Szabó argues that the oldest form of deductive proof is the indirect one (by reductio ad absurdum), and since the latter presupposes a knowledge of the principium identitatis and contradictionis, which were not known before Parmenides, it must have been the Eleatic form of reasoning which gave rise to the earliest scientific mathematical proof. Mrs. T. rejects this theory, and on good grounds.

Euclides IX 21-34 contains early Pythagorean proofs. Ten of them are direct proofs. They occur together with the indirect ones and do not appear to be so much later. On the contrary, they may have been primary, and the indirect proofs may have been thought out where direct proof was not possible. The Pythagoreans may quite well have found them intuitively, before Parmenides.

The large section on the anonymi for the greater part consists of texts of Aristotle (not only in Metaph. A 5 but throughout his works) and the commentators. But it carefully gives all existing evidence on early Pythagorean mathematics, from a text of Callimachus and fragments of Eudemus up to Proclus and scholia on Euclid. Mrs. T. comments on these texts with particular care and great competence.

At the end of this section she places Diogenes Laertius VIII 24-33 (Alexander Polyhistor's extract from the Πυθαγόρεικα ὑπομνήματα). She ascribes this text to the first half of the fourth century—since the contents are Presocratic and Platonic, and there is very little of a later hand in it. This is, I think, one of the points where we must disagree with Mrs. T.: the account of Alexander is clearly post-Platonic. Though of course there is a good deal of earlier doctrine in it, the whole "setting" is of a century later, as was pointed out by Festugière.

Very interesting again is the author's introduction to Aristoxenus. She rejects Wehrli's interpretation which implies that Aristoxenus' whole so-called Pythagorean ethics in fact are derived from Plato and Aristotle. Against this view, she maintains that Aristoxenus