figures. All I would say about such a conjecture is that it is, at best, of no help to the understanding of the literary work.

The main part of the book (Ch. III and IV) is devoted to the Antigone. Knox repeats the inveterate misunderstanding of the play (originating, it seems, with Hegel) as a clash between the champions of two equally justified positions, the loyalty to blood-relationship and the loyalty to the state. Of course, the family is important to Antigone, but essential to her heroism is her abiding by her conviction. Creon naturally argues that his edict is in the interest of the state, but it is made clear throughout that it is not and that it is in every respect wrong and arbitrary. This is also the chorus' opinion, even at v. 853 ff., where Knox sticks to the old misinterpretation as a 'severe censure' of Antigone. For this passage as well as for the general problem (and its history), cp. Lesky, Hermes 80 (1952), 91 ff. In order to establish that the family-state opposition is essential and that Creon's edict should be seen as a normal measure, Knox has recourse not to the play but to external, historical data, which, certainly, is bad method. The attempt, as far as I can see, fails from the historical point of view too.

Closely connected with the above interpretation is Knox' appreciation (equally mistaken, in my opinion) of Creon as someone who is in the heroic position, takes a heroic attitude, expresses himself heroically, but who "is in the end exposed as unheroic" (p. 62; my italics). Well, Creon is just no hero, indeed no one could ever be farther from 'heroic humanism'. Creon's utterances are generalities and commonplaces, the absolute and authoritarian wording only betraying their real character as χειρί γρηγορέω. His is a portrait rather of a nobody than of a hero: unfeeling, loveless, and rude, afraid of, and hostile to, anything emotional and human.

This study has greatly disappointed me in method, penetration and originality.

Two small studies on the Ph. and the OC conclude the book.


In 1912 K. Reinhardt put forward the theory that Democritus had played a conspicuous part in the development of Greek thought on the beginnings of human life on earth and that his views were reproduced in Diod. I, 7-8. For a time this theory met with general approval, but afterwards severe criticism set in. Nowadays the
prevailing opinion is that Diod. I, 7-8 has been patched up from various pre-Socratic sources. In the book under review the author tries to swing the pendulum again in the other direction.

In this scholarly book Cole, who is a disciple of E. Havelock, is engaged in tracing from scarce and scattered remnants a pragmatic, naturalist and evolutionist Greek “theory of cultural origins which was vastly more elaborate and subtle than anything which preceded or followed it” (131). He succeeds fairly well in showing that there was such a trend of thought, originating from pre-Socratic Ionian science. He is also able to show that Democritus contributed a good deal to it; not, however, that his was the master-mind behind it all. A systematic inquiry into the sources of the Atomistic theory of the origins of human culture, which is not included in this book, would perhaps have been helpful in defining more exactly the role of Democritus in shaping the naturalist theory of the birth of civilization.

Cole displays a thorough knowledge of the sources and of the relevant modern literature, including, as many readers of this review will be pleased to learn, books written in Dutch. Occasionally his detailed analysis of the sources will provoke contradiction. It also seems here and there that C. is straining the evidence in his desire to prove his contentions. I must confine myself to a few examples.

C. contends (102) that μοναρχία, the primitive rule of force in Polyb. VI, and the patriarchal δυναστεία of Plato, Laws 3, 680b, originate from the same source, i.e. Democritus. Plato, he thinks, kept the original term, but applied it to a completely different situation; Polybius stuck to the original idea, but used a different term. This is not impossible, but by no means certain. Moreover the use of μοναρχία for δυναστεία need not originate with Polybius; the pre-constitutional δυναστεία of Isocr. 12, 121 are the μοναρχίαι of par. 119.

According to C., Democritus thought that human communities developed like a kosmos (109 f.; 117 f.), which grows and flourishes until it can no longer absorb matter from outside (Democr. A 40 D.-K.). However, whereas according to Democritus a human individual is a kosmos in a way (B 34 D.-K.), there is no trace of his considering a human community as a kosmos, which keeps expanding as long as it lives. Such a dynamic view of human community, i.e. of the polis, would be astonishing in a thinker whose political ideas are fairly moderate and rather conventional. Moreover, if the idea expressed in Polyb. 6, 6, 4 ff., that man as the only being that possesses reason therefore will react differently from other beings, is to be traced back to Democritus, one would not expect him to