Father Calasanctius in an introductory chapter to his doctoral thesis 1). Although M. has consulted my thesis, in which this study is quoted several times 2), he ignores Calasanctius' study. As the latter's results widely differ from M.'s in some cases, it would have been interesting to see what use M. might have made of Calasanctius' interpretations.

It is not the appropriate place here to discuss which interpretation of the two is right, but I should like to mention some points where M. could have enriched his own book and might have changed his conclusions. P. 32 ff. Arist. Rhet. 1407a10ff. seems to contradict M.'s conclusion that an εἰκών is a subdivision of μεταφορά, for it rather suggests a kind of reciprocity between them. Moreover, μεταφορά is not only our 'metaphor', but also means 'transfer, act of transferring'. — P. 110 ff. In discussing Cic. de Orat. 3, 39, 157 M. does not consider the possibility that similitudo here denotes 'similarity' and not 'the stylistic figure of comparison'. In de Or. 3, 40, 161, at least, 'similarity' is the only acceptable explanation. If we accept this meaning in the first passage, the scope of Cicero's words changes considerably, and it will no longer be possible to infer that to Cicero metaphora is a subdivision of similitudo. — With this interpretation M.'s argument for the authenticity of Cicero's words still stands, because Quintilian closely adheres to these, provided that, with Calasanctius, Quintilian's definition (8, 6, 8-9) is translated as follows: 'Metaphora is a similarity which has been put in a shorter form. It differs from a comparison in this point, that this (similarity) is put next to the thing we wish to describe, whereas that (the metaphor) is put instead of it'. The upshot of all this would be that one finds a continuous line of thought from Aristotle to Cicero and Quintilian, according to which a comparison is not subordinate to a metaphor, or conversely.

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1) De Beeldspraak bij den Heiligen Basilius den Grote, met een inleiding over de opvattingen van de Griekse en Romeinse rhetoren aangaande beeldspraak (Nijmegen-Utrecht 1941).
2) Studies in Demetrius On Style (Amsterdam 1964), 88 ff.


Wyatt's approach to the problem of metrical lengthening is essentially different from that of his predecessors. As he states in his Introduction, he is not prepared to restrict himself either "by demanding a single explanation" nor by requiring of the explanation(s) proposed "that it (they) operate on the phonological level".

Mnemosyne, Vol. XXVI, Fasc. 3
This does not mean, as one might think, that we are to expect a patch-work of compromise between two heterogeneous points of view, the linguistic and the ‘metrical’. It soon becomes clear that the author regards linguistic factors as the primary causes of m.i., but these are to be taken in the widest sense of the term. They were of different types and — equally important — their realization depended on different conditions and was not merely determined “by metrical necessity”. Thus, on the one hand, the author refuses to admit as a fundamental explanation any argument which is solely based on requirements of versification: he rejects both Schulze’s rules (a good riddance indeed) and Witte’s “principle of paradigmatic similarity”, though he is willing to recognise metrical necessity and formulaic variation as contributory causes in a number of cases. On the other hand he points out that no single linguistic principle of explanation can cover all the facts. This applies to the views of Schwyzer (Aeolic doubling of sonants), of de Saussure—Meillet (law of three short syllables), of Whatmough (influence of laryngeals) and of Kurylowicz (survival of sentence-sandhi).

Because of what he calls its ‘flexibility’, Wyatt’s own method cannot be adequately illustrated—let alone discussed and criticised—in this review. The best one can do is to select a few more or less characteristic examples from the cases discussed (over 300) and to add that these are far from reflecting the author’s elaborate treatment. In ch. II-V this treatment is chiefly based on Wackernagel’s *Dehnungsgesetz* and here we meet with some old acquaintances (ἡφαίστης, ἡφαίστεις, etc.; Wackernagel, 37 f.). Many similar forms are accordingly explained by what is called ‘reanalysis of compounds’ resulting in false archaisms. The phenomenon must have originated at a time when lengthening in compounds had become optional (cf. ὑψημερῆς ἔρημης). In this way (and by assimilation of the vowel quality) ἐφρεσία was derived from *ὑπημερεσία, ὄφρεα etc. (and Ὄμεθίωνα) from *ὑπόφρεος (> ὀπόφρεος, Hdt.), ἡφιεθονται was modelled on θυμηγερέω and ὑμηγερής (on the -θ suffix there is an additional discussion), and so on. The same applies to ἀλεόωκατος, ἄγήρ, ὀνόμα, and the like. Still the *Dehnungsgesetz* clearly cannot account for ἀδάνακτος etc. Such forms are explained in different ways: ἀδάνακτος by resuming the old ἀδήβαντ-argument, ἀκάκατος and ἀπάκατος (Hes.) by analogical spreading, ἀμφασία on the analogy of ἀμβροσία, ἀνεφέλος by assuming remodelling on ἀγάνινος.

1) This section is preceded by a complicated reconstruction of the lines on which, according to W., compounds were formed, at successive stages, by prefixing the negative phoneme [n]; but see now R. S. P. Beekes, *The Development of the Proto-Indo-European Laryngeals in Greek* (The Hague-Paris, 1969, 98-113).