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J. B. Gould is the first modern scholar to undertake a reconstruction of Chrysippus' philosophy working from the (in my opinion, only sound) methodological principle that “unless the author of a cited fragment states explicitly in the body of the fragment that a given doctrine belongs to Chr., that it is to be found in one of his books, or that the words themselves are taken *verbatim* from Chr. it may not be admitted as evidence for any assertion about Chr.'s philosophical position” (p. i). In fact, previous accounts of Stoic philosophy (including the monographs dealing with Chr. only) blurred the distinctive contributions of Chr. and failed to bring to light the peculiar features of his thought as a result of the assumption that if an ancient author ascribed a doctrine to ‘the Stoics’ or to ‘Stoicism’, one could infer that the doctrine belonged to Chr. This was the opinion of such scholars as H. von Arnim, E. Bréhier, M. Pohlenz, O. Rieth, and L. Stein. G. strictly works from another methodological principle already adopted, it is true, by A. C. Pearson (*The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891), by H. von Arnim in composing the first (and only the first) volume of his *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1905), and defended by myself in my books on Panaetius (*Panaetius*, Amsterdam 1946; *Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta*, Leiden 1952 and 1962). As early as 1936 L. Edelstein (*The Philosophical System of Posidonius*, Amer. Journ. of Phil. 58, 286-325) explained some of the problems that have arisen from a failure to attend exclusively to the explicitly attested Posidonian fragments. It can be argued that such a procedure ought to be followed generally when dealing with philosophers whose works are no longer extant, but of whose works there exist in the writings of others numerous quotations and summaries.

Gould's book offers a well-substantiated picture of Chrysippus’ philosophy. The author works out an account of Chr.'s views in each of the major branches of philosophy.

In the field of *Logic* (pp. 45-91) G. makes it clear that Chr. developed and made more articulate the empiricist epistemology he learned in the school, and that, by dealing thoroughly with proposi-
tions and arguments, he made a distinctive contribution to Stoic philosophy. He points out that Chr.'s formulation of schemata for arguments containing compound propositions (to-day called the *modus ponens*, the *modus tollens*, and the disjunctive syllogism) constituted a brilliant supplement to Aristotelian Logic. Though it is by no means clear that Chr. was the first to formulate a logic of propositions, he was certainly the first Stoic to understand the import of this kind of logic.

The fundamental feature of Chrysippus' *Natural Philosophy* (pp. 92-160) is its dynamic monism. All the events that take place and all the individuals who come into being are the *manifestations* of the Divine Reason, Logos or Pneuma, penetrating and fructifying substance. This monism, G. points out, is consistently extended to psychology: the soul is reason alone; it has diverse functions and it can be disposed in various ways, but throughout it is one corporeal entity.

Chrysippus' *Moral Philosophy* (pp. 161-198) is built around his conceptions of the final end of life, virtue and passions. With respect to the relation of other things to the final good, Chr. seeks to steer between the Cynic view, which was that nothing is good except virtue, and the Peripatetic doctrine, which emphasized the value of natural goods. G. makes it clear that this attempt fails, because Chr. insisted that natural goods such as health, though 'preferred' (προτεραίους), do not contribute to happiness. This proved to be a difficult position indeed for a philosopher who maintained both that the final end of life was happiness and that the final end of life was to live in accordance with nature.

In a concluding chapter (pp. 199-209) G. attends to the question whether the dominant themes in Chrysippus' philosophy interlock with one another so as to form a coherent system of thought. He answers in the affirmative, though e.g. in none of the extant fragments of his moral philosophy Chr. broaches the subject of determinism (a result of his conceptions about providence and fate) versus freedom (a conviction, tacit though it be, that man himself is responsible for his emotions and his deeds). Nevertheless, in G.'s opinion, Chrysippus' philosophy, on the whole, must have been, if not thoroughly well-knit, comprehensive and attractive.

G. prefaces the philosophical expositions with two introductory chapters on the *Life of Chr. and his Reputation in Antiquity* (pp. 7-17) and on *Third Century Intellectual Currents* (pp. 18-44). Finally, there are an extensive (though not complete and entirely accurate) *Bibliography* (pp. 210-216) and a *General Index* (pp. 217-222).

On the whole G.'s explanations are clear, interesting, well-written and, very often, convincing. Within the scope of a review it is hardly