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Under the title Studies on the dream in Greek literature Dr. A. H. M. Kessels offers, first, an Introduction on previous theories and literature about dreams in Homer and on the special character of the Homeric poems and its consequences for the study of dreams, secondly in three chapters ("The dream in Homer", "The pattern of the Homeric dream-scene", "Conclusions"), a detailed analysis of dreams and dream-references in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, and finally, two more general "studies", entitled "Greek terminology for 'dream' and 'dreaming'", "The dream in simile and metaphor".—It would have helped the reader if the title of the book reflected more adequately the author’s scope and material.—

In this review I confine myself to focusing the attention of the reader on some Homeric utterances on dreams, on the interpretation of which we have not reached agreement, despite ample and pleasant discussions after finding out that we were working in the same field. Whether the ονειροπόλος in Il. I, 62-68 is to be considered as a skilled interpreter of other people's dreams, or as the dreamer by the inspiration of a god, intentionally lying down for a mantic sleep, seems to be left vague, unless we find in the fact that no dreams of others are mentioned here an indication for a "Traumseher" rather than for a "Traumdemeur", as Mr. Kessels does (p. 25 ff). To me both the term oneiropolos and the situation which he is supposed to clarify allow for no more than a mantis who is specialized in, who deals with dreams, when asked for a ritual advice, no matter whether those dreams are dreamt by himself, or by others (either involved in the situation or taken from mantic collections of terata and dreams).

I fail to see how Mr. Kessels' conclusion follows from his argumentation: a. "there is little point in calling the council together merely for the purpose of arriving at the decision to consult a seer": why not? Deliberations in Thebes about the cause of the pestilence also "merely" resulted in sending consultants to Delphi; b. "many of the Greeks must have come to the ονειροπόλος with their dreams": again I ask: why not?; c. no interpreters are con-

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sulted by Agamemnon and Achilleus: again: an argumentum e silentio only supports a conclusion gained from data found elsewhere; d. finally, why must the divine communication (a dream of himself or someone else) have taken place before the council took place? To conclude, to me the arguments are not strong enough to remove the "non liquet".

In Il. V, 148-151 an oneiropolos called Eurydamas appears, here on the Trojan side. His job may also here have been the sorting out of dream-material, produced by his own dreams or by those of others. The "sorting out" (ἐξρινατο) may also have consisted in testing the dream-material as to its ominous significance and prescribing apotropaic ritual. I understand the vv. 150-151 to mean: "Apparently the old man did not explain dreams when they went to war, since Diomedes killed them in battle" (cfr. p. 26 sqq). Here too it cannot be proved beyond doubt, even if we take ἐξρινατο to mean "to select dreams", that he selected his OWN dreams and not those of his sons or others. I agree with Mr. Kessels' understanding of the Homeric (ὑπο)χρινεσθαί as "to separate". The use of the middle voice indicates indeed that "the subject may be intimately connected with the verbal process, or (that) the process is thought to be happening in the direct sphere of the subject". However, this intimate connection with the subject could also apply to testing the dreams of his own sons on relevance. Besides, the Homeric use of the middle voice often obeys the demands of the metre rather than the rules of grammarians, as semantic differentiation of the voices is still a process on the move.

I have great difficulty in overlooking or minimalizing two other indications for some sort of official dream-interpretation in Homeric times. Firstly, ἀλλὰ ἀποσκλίνατι in Od. 19, 556 does affect me as much more than a "slight difficulty" against limiting the meaning of ὑποχρινεσθαί to "to give an opinion about something in answer to someone's question" (p. 91 sqq). The beggar agrees with the interpretation given by Odysseus in the dream itself, but only after trying to find a more satisfactory way of understanding the dream (ἀλλὰ ἀποσκλίνατι). Secondly, a clever piece of literary criticism is offered by Mr. Kessels' understanding of Penelope's geese and eagle dream (Od. 19, 535 sqq): Penelope invents the dream on the spot in order to offer the beggar—who she trusts more and more—some "harmless" insight into her feelings and predicament, without losing the possibility of dismissing the whole story as a deceitful dream. If this interpretation is correct,—and I for one am inclined to think it is,—one has to assume that the fic-