
In the history of ancient linguistics the *Syntax* of Apollonius Dyscolus (Ap.D.) is dominating because of its influence through Priscian and Byzantine scholars on Western thought. A reliable edition of this work is Uhlig's (1910), but a good translation was lacking until now, that of Buttmann (1877) rightly deserving Uhlig's contempt, and separate studies are almost non-existent. Therefore, one is grateful to Householder (H.) and Blank (B.) for resp. a reliable translation and a thorough monograph. Future students are advised to start with the latter book because it is the better introduction.

Almost identical to his Ph.D. thesis of 1980, B.'s study concentrates on the methodology of Ap.D. and on the key notions of καταλληλότης and πάθη. B. rightly stresses that Ap.D. adheres to Stoic philosophy of language and in this way his work is a source for our knowledge of this philosophy. Ap.D. starts from the view that originally exists a structural similarity between expressions and their corresponding meanings in the realm of πράγματα (νοητά). This similarity he calls καταλληλότης translated by B. as "regularity". Whereas the meanings (significata) retain their natural, correct order, their expressions have undergone many changes (πάθη), which have led to real or apparent solecisms. In his *Syntax* Ap.D. purports to explain these phenomena by arguing rationally. However, he does not aim at correcting apparent solecisms, for he keeps to the facts of language observed in predominantly poetical texts. This combination of observation (πάθησες) and argumentation (λόγος, ἀπόδειξις) B. relates to similar attitudes of some of Ap.' contemporaries, Galen and Ptolemy, the geographer. Thus *Syntax* is not meant as a systematic attempt to give all possible constructions of each part of speech but it provides a scheme of organisation under which any problem of syntax (traditional or detected by Ap.D. himself) could be treated and solved. The main aim of *Syntax* sometimes seems to get lost, and then secondary problems are introduced, but Ap.D. always returns to his main subject.

This final observation could have been followed by an exposition
of the structure of *Syntax* itself, but this was not necessary to B.'s argument. One expects such an exposition in H.'s introduction to his translation, but even there it is lacking. It should be there, for Uhlig's marginal notes and his *conspectus argumenti* (pp. 530-7) are tabulatory only, and the better exposition, L. Lange, *Das System der Syntax des Apollonios Dyskolos* (Göttingen 1852), is hard to come by.

The goal of H.'s translation "is to say in contemporary English exactly what the author said in Greek, but, in this case, without allowing him the knowledge of any linguistic theory more recent than his own" (p. 1), and this goal H. attains most times (in his introduction he gives a useful survey of various syntactic notions which are basic to us but not available to Ap.D.). The reader will be grateful that "exactly" often implies an exact paraphrase and re-ordering of the original sentences, for a really exact and literal rendering would often have been unreadable. Sometimes, however, post-Apollonian notions have slipped into the text), but on the whole these are used in the explanatory comments only. These are put within brackets in the translation itself, which fact does not always make for easy reading. They not only give modern equivalents of Apollonian terms and views but explain his ideas within his framework. Most of them are to the point, but in III 96 H. wrongly objects to the presence of ἀρίστος in a group of comparative forms. However, τάχιστος, which occurs at the end of this chapter, shows that the point is that superlatives, as well as comparatives, contain an inherent intensification. In III 23 the sentence is not "very awkwardly worded", provided one translates its second part as follows: "but if it takes part in the category of gender, case and number it is no longer admissible to construct it irregularly etc."

Errors of translation obscuring Ap.' thought are few, but in I 30 the problem is not "why interrogative words are found in only two parts of speech" (and not in more, one would add), but "why...in two parts of speech" (and not in one only). The use of *solas* in Priscian's translation will have led H. astray. At I 24 ἐπίστασες means "objection", and now Ap.' remark becomes intelligible. At III 3 the imaginary phrases* ἐαυτόν ὑβρισκα, -ας should be translated by "I hurt myself, you hurt yourself", for Ap.D. argues that if ἐαυτοὺς ὑβρίσαμεν ("we hurt ourselves") is acceptable, one would expect the other expressions as well, but they are not found. In III 56 Ap.D. derives ἐλληνιστὶ from ἐλληνιζω, not from ἐλληνίζειν, otherwise his whole argument about the status of the infinitive as verbs would be void).