This first-rate study is the first collection ever of testimonia concerning Pyrrho. We are offered the texts, an Italian translation, and a succinct but detailed commentary. The collection is a selection because, as Decleva Caizzi (henceforward D.) points out (12), later authors tend to use Pyrrho as a figure-head to whom Skeptic doctrine may be attributed (fortunately, however, quite a number of such texts are included). D. argues in favour of an historical approach: Pyrrho and the followers of Aenesidemus should not, as Wilamowitz used to put it, be placed "auf einer Fläche": there is no unbroken tradition from Pyrrho to Sextus. Accordingly, the remains of his immediate pupils have to be one's point of departure; among these, the fragments and testimonia of Timo of Phlius which refer to Pyrrho or derive from works devoted to him have pride of place. The fragments of Antigonus of Carystus and some small fragments of Eratosthenes are also important, as they are uncontaminated by later developments¹). In this way, important and interesting differences between Pyrrho and later Skepticism can be accounted for, although, as D. is careful to point out, we can have no guarantee that this really is what Pyrrho, who did not write, may have thought. According to Timo, and to Antigonus of Car. and Eratosthenes (note that Aristocles reflects much of this early material), Pyrrho did not argue that things cannot be known, but rather that, as they are, they are no more this than that, and that the χαίρωμενον reigns supreme and thus deceives mankind (T 1, T 53, T 63 A-C, T 64). So one has to practice 'total indifference' (T 14, 15 A, 36) and 'silence' (T 53). The later Skeptics, sensitive to the objection that this attitude makes life unlivable, argued that things in themselves are unclear, but that one should follow the phaenomena (Aenesidemus attributes this to Pyrrho, T 7, T 8; cf. also D., 237). But we do have the witness of Antigonus of Carystus and others that Pyrrho did not bother about appearances such as traffic, friends fallen into wells, or what men may think is right. This imperturbability is happiness, so Pyrrho can be a shining example to us all (Tim. fr. 67 Diels = T 61 A-D). In a noteworthy interpretation of the difficult Tim. fr. 68 Diels (T 62), D. (255 ff.) argues persuasively that Pyrrho knew or was said by Timo to know the truth which would render the life of man "fully equable"; to a later Skeptic, this would have been anathema. Remarkable is also

her interpretation of Pyrrho’s love of Homer and his indebtedness to Democritus (comm. to T 20, D. 171 ff.), i.e., not only to the latter’s epistemology, but also to his pessimism. One cannot, however, in the space available list all the riches of the commentary. D. certainly has put us in her debt.

