pletely internalize the good for persons. "Life without a festival is like a long road without an inn". But one should limit one's desires to things which are possible. According to Democritus acting justly leads to joy and happiness and since this is one's highest goal morality is compatible with self-interest.

Desire cannot be motivated by jealousy, and if it is, a good is not sought for its own sake, but because another person has something which one does not (yet) possess. If one has reached euthymia one expresses one's pity for others by promoting their good (fr. 96, 255, 282).

To sum up, Mr. Nill has written a fine and reliable monograph on a subject which may interest not only classical scholars but also moral philosophers.

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According to Griswold (Gr.) self-knowledge is "the main and unifying theme of the Phaedrus" (231). Its compass is very wide: it covers "knowledge of what he (to wit, Socrates) and others lack, knowledge of himself as a self-moved soul and as a certain character-type, knowledge of himself in terms of a larger whole, and knowledge of the limitations of knowledge" (136). "Philosophical knowledge is the same as understanding what one desires, and so self-knowledge" (67). The theme is found throughout the dialogue, even in the cicada myth and in the discussion of writing. All this is argued (in a sometimes strained way) in an analysis of the dialogue which is very thorough, often over-subtle, but always interesting.

The second main theme is rhetoric. It is linked with self-knowledge. "The self-qualification of the palinode arises out of the demand for self-knowledge in a metaphilosophical sense. The importance of the theme of rhetoric is established in the palinode, that is, in a myth about the soul and in close connection ... with the whole problem of a fallen soul's self-knowledge. And the praise of dialectic (particularly of dialogical rhetoric) will make sense ... in terms of Socrates' desire for self-knowledge as well of the difficulties, set out by the palinode, of attaining it. Thus the various

dramatic, structural, and thematic threads of the dialogue's unity harmonize with one another perfectly. Their complex interaction creates the *Phaedrus*’ difficult, but beautiful, dialectic of self-knowledge” (164 f., cp. 96, 98, 108, 137, 197, 231).

All this is tempting; but there is a rub. If we go with Gr., we are expected to accept a difference (based on poor linguistic grounds) between “gnostic” and “epistemic” knowledge (232). And in a crucial passage (200) it is said that “the palinode offers us a conception of self-knowledge fundamentally dependent on an everyday and doxic understanding of ourselves”. This mistakes the character of the myth. However blunted the recollection of the soul’s journey may be, what is remembered is a fundamental certainty, the base of our moral and intellectual existence (*Phdr.* 249e is very clear on this point). In contrast with this supposedly “doxic” understanding, rhetoric, being a techne, “objectifies the soul as well as logos. The tension between a mythically articulated self-knowledge and an epistemically articulated self-knowledge ... must strike us as an intimation of the by now familiar split between humanistic and scientific self-knowledge”. I think that Plato would have no use for C. P. Snow’s (never valid) disjunction. Then Gr. takes the existentialist road: “Representatives of the view that epistemic or technical knowledge reifies and distorts accounts of human nature, and that a pretechnical understanding of ourselves ... is the key to understanding man, would certainly include thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger” (a trinity?? coupling Sartre with Kierkegaard is, up to some point, possible; joining H. with K. is entirely objectionable). As “‘modern advocates of the scientific program’” appear, of course, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant. One might be satisfied by the statement that the *Phaedrus* takes a mediating position between those (false) disjunctions, were it not that as a modern counterpart of that dialogue Hegel is mentioned (elsewhere, p. 61, Gr. shows himself aware of the differences between Platonic and Hegelian dialectic).

Some interpretations of Gr.’s may be commented upon. At 228 d *et al.* he fails to taste the irony in Socrates’ exuberant forms of addressing Phaedrus; Ph. does, as is shown by his rather curt replies which are rightly commented upon by G. (26). 229 e: the Delphic adhortation to self-knowledge was engraved on the temple; so it was a γράμμα. “Socrates responds to the inscription by dedicating himself to spoken dialogue” (7). 230 d: the enthusiastic description of the beauty-spot is taken at face value (27); Thesleff’s