pretation of individual passages. This is all the more regrettable since many of B.'s observations deserve our attention.

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T(eodorsson) sets out a useful critical overview of what he deems to be the most representative scholarly attempts to make sense of what, according to Anaxag., is constitutive of the world (*Noûs excepted*). He is rightly critical of those who, on the not unambiguous authority of Aristotle, try to attribute to Anaxag. a universal principle of cosmic homoeomereity. He also is correct in pointing out that to credit Anaxag. with the view that things consist of particles some among which are, ultimately, pure minima, conflicts with the principle that 'all things are in each thing' or that 'there is a portion of everything in each thing'. The mass of things before cosmogony is a wholly homogeneous blend (75; in my view, this entails that the principle of homoeomereity is valid for the pre-cosmogonical stage). Now, the main problem as formulated by T. and as encountered, in various forms, in previous scholarship is how we have to interpret the items which according to the fragments are present in this primordial blend, viz. (1) the physical opposites (hot-cold etc.), (2) the elemental masses (aether, air, earth; I do not know that T.'s addition of water is prudent), and (3) the mysterious *σπέρματα πάνων χρημάτων*, only found in 59B4, where Anaxag. also speaks of *σπερμάτων ἀπείρων πλήθος οὐδὲν οὐκ ἔστων ἄλληλοις*. Or, more particularly, what are these 'seeds', how do they relate to the opposites and to the elemental masses, and what, again, is the relation between elemental masses and opposites?

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T. argues (65 ff.) that to Anaxag. opposites, elemental masses, and 'seeds' are all equally elementary and should not, in one way or another, be reduced to one another. His own suggestion is that the infinitely many 'seeds' represent, or correspond with, the infinitely many individual things to be perceived in the world of our experience, which are individual precisely because they are unlike one another (82). Or rather, the 'seeds' are the matrixes or formulas for the members of the total set of individual things, which are present in the primordial blend, and known to omniscient Noás (85). Being, according to T., neither wholly corporeal nor wholly incorporeal, they are prefigurations of the Aristotelian 'forms' (90; one wonders why T. does not bring in the Stoic σπέρματικοι λόγοι). This is an unhappy suggestion, based on a hyperinterpretation of 59B4 οὐδὲν ἐσιτότων ἀλλήλως: οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔοικε τὸ ἐτέρων τῷ ἐτέρῳ. True, an infinite set of totally dissimilar things suggests a set of dissimilar individuals. But in the formula quoted, Anaxag. does not say that “no two σπέρματα are exactly alike” (thus T., 82), but that ‘seeds’ are ‘wholly dissimilar’; τῶν ἄλλων in this context does not denote “sense things” (thus T., 82), but the physical opposites, and earth. In a world, not all individuals are wholly dissimilar: one hair much resembles another. Indeed, according to 59B4 things in the subliminally small world are exactly as they are in our own world. Aristotelian ‘forms’ are sortals, not designations of individuals, and so, presumably, would be their prefigurations. The ‘seeds’ are wholly dissimilar the way the anaxagorean opposites are; presumably, we should, with Aristotle and Cornford and others, think of kinds of ‘seeds’, and next assume such kinds to represent e.g. hair as totally dissimilar from flesh (59B10), just as the hot is totally dissimilar from the cold—this notwithstanding the fact that in the world the hot and the cold are not ‘cut off’ from one another (59B8), or the further fact that hair must contain an imperceptible portion of everything else, including flesh, and conversely, and that such an imperceptible portion of flesh (i.e. an imperceptible blend in which flesh predominates) is itself a ‘seed’. Total dissimilarity, in an anaxagorean context, means the preponderance of a in x as set off against the preponderance of b in y. The paradox, in my view, is that Anaxag. picks out wholly dissimilar ingredients (opposites, elemental masses, ‘seeds’) in a perfectly homogeneous primordial blend. In order to understand why he believes this to be justified we have to start a posteriori, that is to say from experience: ὅφις τῶν ἀδῆλων τὰ φαινόμενα (59B21a,