Rhetorik (Stuttgart 1979); S. IJsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict (The Hague 1976); G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition (Chapel Hill 1980). None of these works has been noticed by the authors, it seems.

2) See M. P. O. Morford, Ethopoiia and Character-assassination in the Conon of Demosthenes, Mn. IV 19 (1966), 244 for a different reason, which does not exclude the one I have given.


This is an important and useful book, though a bit difficult to use. The publisher was too stingy to print a decent Greek text; we must make do with a barely legible xerox of the CAG text of the De fato1 and continuously thumb elsewhere for Sharples’ important apparatus. This is the more to be regretted because the text as reconstructed (and translated) by S. is much superior to that of Thillet in the Budé series which came out one year later2) and his apparatus much fuller. The translation is both exact and readable; the very compressed introduction and commentary are crammed with information. S.’s comments on Alexander’s difficult monograph (a translation of the full title would be ‘On destiny and what is up to us’), however, are terse to a degree, and his cornucopia of references will send the conscientious student jogging through several libraries. But those in a position to work through this book at a slow pace will have learned much by the time they have finished. The problems concerned with Alex.’s critical treatment of determinism are firmly placed both in their historical context and in that of today’s discussions concerned with hard determinism, soft determinism, and libertarianism, S. arguing that Alexander’s position is libertarian. It also becomes clear to what extent Alex. had to construct an Aristotelian theory of fate. Students of Stoicism too have much to be grateful for. Alex.’s main opponent (never identified) is Stoic determinism, and S. in each separate case carefully considers to which extent his reports of Stoic views and arguments may have been distorted for polemical purposes; as a consequence, Alex.’s criticisms of the determinist view more often than not are not pertinent.

I append a few observations. Text: p. 169.5 Br.: either read γιγνόμενα ταύτα or τα ἔνικα του γιγνόμενα. 164.19 f. read γίνεσθαι τινα καὶ μὴ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην, καὶ μὴ τοῦ πάντως ἡ γενέσθαι
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τι αὐτῶν, ἢ μή, ἡ ἔστιν κατὰ. 169.21 read ἔστιν (‘it is possible’). To avoid wrong associations at 170.5, do not add ἦν (τοῦ), and translate: ‘in the things that come to be, you have both ‘according to nature’ and ‘contrary to nature’ (or, alternatively, add a κατά also before κατά). At 170.18 the part of the sentence preserved in the excerpt of Eus. P.E. VI ix 21 p. 331.13 Mras (ἐκ ἀσκήσεως καὶ ὑπὸ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀπὸ λόγων κριττόνων βελτισμένων), printed by Bruns in app. crit. and neglected by Thillet, is indispensable and not, pace S. (129), “almost certainly Eusebius’ paraphrase of what follows” (rather, it matches the rule for the exceptions to the fates of bodies in Ch. VI 170.14-6, and is consistent with the argument of Ch. XXVII). That it is lacking in the parallel account at Mant. XXV is not important, because there are numerous differences, both minor and major and both as to contents and as to formulation, between De fat. and Mant. XXV. At 176.2-3 S. rejects Moerbeke’s impossibile, hardly however a translator’s gloss; Thillet 18.14 adds ἥν (δυστατον); read δυστατον ἥν (δυστατον) κατὰ (principle of non-contradiction). Translation: Ch. II, too, belongs with the Introduction, the account ‘according to Aristotle’ only beginning at Ch. III. Ch. VI 170.25 πράγματα (assumed we do have to correct the text after the parallel ap. Mant. XXV 185.29) means ‘obstinate’, cf. Arist. E.N. VII 7 1150a32 f.; ibid. 171.4 κατὰ is adversative. Ch. X 176.25 πράγματα means ‘existing things’, not ‘facts’, cf. e.g. 187.5; 177.7-8 tr. ‘has the possibility of being true, but is not thereby necessarily true’; 177.9 γένηται tr. ‘is over’. Commentary (including the relevant sections of the introduction to which S. painstakingly refers in the comm.): Chs. I-II are set out according to the rules of the Neopyrrhonist argument from διαφωνία, the technical term itself occurring in a strategical position at the end of Ch. II, 166.13; cf. also the opening sections of the De mixtione and of the On Providence⁶). But Alex.’s conclusion is altogether different, viz. that the truth is merely hard to find; arguably, he clings to what Kant was to call the primacy of practical reason (cf. also Ch. XXI, which is not, pace S. 152, a tour de force). Ch. VI (128 ff. 22 ff.) should be studied in itself, that is to say should not be contaminated with the much different Mant. XXV. At 170.19 ff. I cannot find the illegitimate shift from natural species to human individuals⁶) argued by S., who partly follows Donini⁶). Alex. at De fat. Ch. VI deals with quasi-species of moral man and at 170.21-171.4 gives us a list of what are inter alia in the sense of Arist. E.N. bks. II-V, from which most of the terms he uses can be paralleled⁶). The individual