(There is no real preparation for this point in the brief general remarks on ‘characters’ (p. 69 ff.).) A good example is Socrates’ willingness to give in to Protagoras’ sensitivities (p. 122; 132); the relationship between character and speeches in the Symposium (p. 190); and the effect of the aggression of a Polus (p. 150; 154), a Callicles (p. 170 f.) or a Thrasymachus (p. 213).

As to setting, pertinent remarks can be found e.g. about the palaestra in the Charmides (p. 87 ff.); in particular, R points out the relevance of this environment and its seductive potential to the portrayal of Socrates as the embodiment of the characteristic that constitutes the central problem of the dialogue, namely sophrosyne, modesty and self-restraint, a feature that characterizes more of the early dialogues (cf. also the parallelism between Socrates and Eros in the Symposium, p. 200). Another felicitous interpretation of setting occurs in R’s reading of the Phaedrus, which centers around the complex analogies between Lysias and Socrates, rhetoric and philosophy, non-lover and genuine lover. Socrates’ role as “lover of Phaedrus” (in the best philosophical sense of the word) ties in with the locus amoenus, with its erotic associations (p. 245 ff.).

A book with many excellent ideas, but one that leaves a lot to be done.

WASHINGTON DC, Center for Hellenic Studies INEKE SLUITER


With this publication the Centro di Ricerche di Metafisica in Milan continues its series of Italian translations of important philosophical studies in ancient philosophy. The main goal of the series is to render these studies more accessible to Italian students.

This translation is based on the 1988 reprint of Julia Annas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics M-N, enlarged with material

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from other sources. Consequently, the book has a rather complex structure. The translation is prefaced with a general introduction by Reale and a full bibliography of Julia Annas. The main body of the book is divided into three parts. Part One contains ‘introductory material’ and consists of Annas’ Introduction as well as her important 1987 paper on the ontology of mathematical objects\(^1\). Part Two contains the translation of the commentary on *Metaph. M-N* with appendices. Part Three provides the Greek text of *Metaph. M-N* (following Jaeger’s OCT edition with corrections by Annas) facing an Italian translation by Reale. A bibliography with special attention for Italian translations and articles, an index nomenclum, a glossary of Greek words, and a detailed table of contents conclude the book.

In his introduction Reale positions Annas’ work squarely within the Anglo-Saxon analytical ‘paradigm’ of interpretation. For Reale, this means that she plays down the metaphysical import of Aristotle’s discussions of mathematics to an unacceptable extent. For instance, he emphasizes that the One and the Indefinite Dyad are not to be reduced to a non-technical type of one(ness) and two(ness). This reduction obscures the role which we know these principles played in the metaphysics of the Academy (p. 20, against Annas p. 78 n. 1).

One of Reale’s critical remarks is less fortunate. According to Annas, Aristotle’s reports on Plato suggest that Plato introduced the Intermediates in order to solve the so-called Uniqueness Problem (cf. *Metaph. 987 b 14-18*). She reconstructs the line of thought as follows. Forms are ‘one of a kind’. Because there is, e.g., only one Form number 2, the statement ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is not true of Forms. Hence mathematical numbers, a kind of Intermediates, are needed to explain such statements. Annas argues that there is no passage in Plato’s dialogues which confirms Aristotle’s suggestion. So, Annas suggests, either Aristotle merely alluded to this problem to be able to make sense of Plato, or Plato acknowledged the Uniqueness Problem only after writing the dialogues (p. 52-54). Reale objects that there can be no doubt that Plato believed in Intermediates while writing the *Republic*. For in *Rep. 511 d 2-5* Plato refers to δύ-νονα as being ‘between’ δόξα and νοός. The objects of δύ-νονα are not discussed because of the ‘doctrinal economy’ which, according to Reale, characterizes all dialogues (cf. *Rep. 533 c 7-534 a 8*). Nevertheless, these objects must be ‘intermediate’ between the Forms (the objects of νοός) and the sensible world (the objects of δόξα).