this by trying to trace the possible affiliation of Maimonides' scheme, which is unique, to various texts in Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazali, Abraham ibn Daud, and Porphyry. Here Wolfson tries to uncover the latent processes of Maimonides' reasoning—how Maimonides might have understood and deduced his classification from these thinkers, among whom the principal source is Aristotle. Wolfson's method, as he has characterised it, is hypothetico-deductive or the method of talmudic reasoning (pilpul) characteristic of the Lithuanian rabbinical academy (yeshivah) around the turn of the century when Wolfson came to the United States. The strength of this method is that it suggests possible interpretations of texts imaginatively; however, there is a tendency toward speculation which, if not carefully controlled, can lead to excess as occurred for example in the tendency to emend the masoretic text of the Hebrew bible by the more radical representatives of the higher criticism. Specifically, in our case, the more careful way would have been to examine the logical works of Alfarabi and Avempace, who served as the link of philosophy to Andalusia, which however still are for the most part in manuscript. Wolfson was a system builder, an architect of the vast humanistic scheme mentioned previously, and the kind of work required would necessarily have forced him to postpone the realization of his vision. He also may have thought that there was sufficient material available to back up his speculations. I should also add that many of these texts were discovered rather late in Wolfson's scholarly career. Those who follow in Wolfson's wake use his monumental knowledge in an attempt at achieving a more just appreciation of the thought of the Ancients and the Medievals based on a wider base of sources. But doesn't this fact merely emphasize the process of knowledge and its fluid character, its being subject to continuous reassessment? Wolfson remains and will remain an important link in the profound process of self understanding characterising the humanistic disciplines of the history of both philosophy and religion.

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This symposium comprises a dialogue about the place, meaning and attitude of Christianity in a world where enough Christians encounter religious pluralism to make the question of other religions a pressing one. It is some measure of the richness and diversity of approaches that no summary is possible. The special feature of the symposium is the presence of contributions from a Buddhist, a Hindu, a Jew and a

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Muslim, commenting on the Christian attempts to pose the question of pluralism.

The key opening paper is provided by Donald G. Dawe who begins by commenting on the double-nature of Christian faith: its capacity to release love and destructiveness simultaneously and alternately. This is a polite beginning because it rather implies that this is peculiar to Christianity rather than being inherent in any universal claim. It would appear that some theologians can be as bothered by the logic of universality as by the logic of particularity. It is very awkward that truth should claim to start somewhere and equally awkward that it should claim to go everywhere. At any rate, Professor Dawe then proceeds with equal politeness to distinguish between a truth which shines as a form of illumination to be picked up elsewhere and one which suggests there is a difference between light and darkness. Even more politely he despatches the erroneous (sorry, distorted) version of the covenant put about by Christian triumphalism on the ground that it sees the covenant as already in part realised, whereas the true covenant remains in the future, which is the most convenient place for religious 'truth' to reside these days. This has an added advantage since in that eschatological future there will be no 'religion', no religious institutions, no mediation, and no mediator, due to the universal presence of God.

This is the politest suggestion of all, because it assures people of other faiths that they only have to put up with Christianity in the period prior to the Kingdom of God. Actually this last point is all very orthodox since it utilises essentially Christian themes to establish the 'end and meaning of religion'. It is as if Barth had been stood on his head and made a vehicle for taking in all 'religions' along with Christianity, rather than expelling all religions, including Christianity, in the interests of faith. Jesus Christ is understood as a 'name' standing for a pattern of self-abnegation, encoding (ugh!) the motif of death and resurrection as the key to the new being. Other religions are potent variations on this motif, which in Christianity is signalised by the name of Jesus. Christianity dies to itself in accordance with this motif, and thereby achieves truth in the very act of relativisation.

The Buddhist commentator finds the anti-institutional emphasis of this highly congenial. He makes eirenic comments on the inferiority of the idea of superior wisdom. He points out that Christianity would have been much nicer if it had never been institutionalised or had never been accepted to the point where it was part of power relationships. Nice religion has no truck with power or with institutions. He suggests that wherever Buddhism is sufficiently unorganised it is an anticipation of the views of the liberal intelligentsia.

The Hindu commentator restates Professor Dawe's broad thesis about pluralism, and points out that Hinduism respects all prophets and sages who have come to guide humanity and values each tradition