BOEKBESPREKING

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch,
von HERMANN DIELS, sechste verbesserte Auflage,
herausgegeben von WALTER KRANZ, I—III; Berlin-
Grunewald, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1951—'52.

The fact that this work has been published again will be welcomed with satisfaction: the study of the Pre-Socratics, so extremely important for the history of Western Philosophy, is simply no longer conceivable without DIELS-KRANZ, and as the fifth edition had already been sold out before the war, the new edition had been looked eagerly forward to here and there for years already.

This edition is, however, for the greater part a reprint: apart from a short "Preface" ("Vorrede") the alterations are restricted to the "Nachträge" (Appendix). For this reason I will restrict myself to the latter (I) and to expressing a single wish as to the method of editing in later editions that are to be expected (II).

I. The Nachträge.

In general already the collecting and arranging of notes as these requires a great deal of time and care. Add to this that the three pages of the 1934 edition have been increased to thirty one in the present edition. They offer a real storehouse of data about the literature published during the last two decades, testimonies and fragments that have been found, corrections and additions, of which, generally speaking, due note should be taken with gratitude.

If, notwithstanding this, I submit some remarks here, it is not to be set down to a desire on my part to criticize, but it should be looked upon as an expression of my appreciation of what has been given. I have had to restrict myself to make a few random tests.

A. Literature.

Especially here one should be reasonable: on this point it is of course very easy to give additional material. With regard to Orphism however it is decidedly necessary to point to more than one vacancy. It is true, that D.K. I, 483, mentions a few publications that escaped my attention some years ago when finishing a study 1) of this subject viz. R. HERZOG (1937), O. SCHÜTZ (1938), A. KRÜGER (1938), W. NESTLE (1940), and A. OLIVIERI (1950). But considering the obscurity especially of this very material, one regrets the absence of other works, such as the thesis of A. KRÜGER (1934), and the studies of W. K. C. GUTHRIE (1935), J. HAUSSELEITER (1935), M. P. NILSSON (1935), J. HALLEY DES FONTAINES (1938), A. D. NOCK (1940),

1) This study is included in my Geschiedenis der Wijzegerepte, I. Inleiding en Geschiedenis der Wijzegerepte tot Platon en Aristoteles. Franeker, T. Wever, 1950 (History of the pre-Platonic Philosophy), to which work I would refer for the foundation of the following remarks.
D. M. LINFORTH (1941), and W. STAUCHACHER (1942). To this series a great many other works might be added concerned with the special currents in the Orphic movement.

B.
A similar remark holds for the finding of new testimonia and fragments. On this point, too, Orphism has not fared very favourably. For the gain remains restricted in D.K. 1c. to the addition of one fragment (PLATOON, Phaidros 252 B), whereas it would have been possible to give a long series of testimonia (EPIMENIDES fr. 11; EMPEDOKLES frs. 29 and 134; PLATOON, Symposium 189 AB — 193 D and Phaidros 245 E and 246 — 249 C, together with JOHANNES LAURENTIUS LYDUS, Liber de mensibus II, 8), all of which may be called directly important for the understanding of the trends in Orphism and for their appreciation in Antiquity.

C.
Among the added corrections I was struck by that in I, 496, 46 ff as regards PARMENIDÈS. Here KRANZ connects the "hoeneken esti sêma" again with "eon", unlike the previous edition where he followed FRANKEL on this point. This seems an improvement, also in my opinion. But there is one thing that has escaped also KRANZ: PARMENIDÈS, in agreement with the dualistic ontology of XENOPHANÈS, calls the transcendent the "identical" and considers the non-transcendent to be the changeable. His difference from XENOPHANÈS appears in the fact that he opposed the "being" (here the object) to the "non-being" (here the subject) both in the transcendent and in the non-transcendent. Owing to this oversight in this work, too, the thesis in PARMENIDÈS: "the identical is both thought and being" is interpreted as if PARMENIDÈS were identifying thought and being with one another! The consequences of this traditionalism are exceedingly serious. For if this interpretation were correct, PARMENIDÈS would have taught, that in his opinion being is identical with non-being, so that he would become a contradictory thinker whose view would be distinguishable from that of HÈRAKLEITOS only with the utmost difficulty, if at all (This conclusion was drawn by REINHARDT), whereas by the Ancients PARMENIDÈS was sharply opposed to HÈRAKLEITOS. And besides in this interpretation it does not become clear why with regard to "being" PARMENIDÈS landed in the dilemma: unlimited—limited (Gr. apeiron—peperasmenon), in which the internal struggle between non-mathematical objectivism and mathematical comes to light. Also in this way the connection noticeable in PARMENIDÈS with HIPPOON of Rhègion, KRATYLOS and EUTHYPHROON in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of language will fail to draw our attention. It is still worse that in this way the main line of development in the history of Greek Philosophy remains hidden to us. For only when it is seen how ANAXIMANDROS c.s., to whom, in this respect at least, also PARMENIDÈS belonged, began to call the object "the being", we can understand the meaning of PLATOON's innovation when behind this "being" (Gr. on) he posits the existence of a "real being" (Gr. ontoos on). Also in Modern Philosophy, for that matter, we come to a deadlock. For here a clear distinction is made between HÈRABART, a pupil of PARMENIDÈS, and HEGEL, who followed in the steps of HÈRAKLEITOS.

D.
In the non-corrective additions I was pleased to find (D.K. I, 502, 34) the importance of EURYTOS underlined. Indeed this Pythagorean deserves more attention than has up to now been given to him. And this not only