ome commentators\(^1\) have found difficulty in accommodating this passage to the general line of argument from 34e3 to 35d4, which is that desire, since it consists in the soul's remembering past replenishment, must be non-bodily. Why should Plato, already having indicated at 34e9-12 that desire is felt only when organic depletion is going on, clutter up the argument with an apparently irrelevant digression about the first occasion of depletion?

One possibility\(^2\) is that the first occasion of depletion is a special case of desire, upon which the argument from 35a6 to 35c2 is based. (The references at 35b1 to \(\delta \epsilon \pi \theta \nu \mu \omicron \omicron \nu \omega \nu\) and at b6 to \(\delta \delta \psi \omicron \omega \nu\) would thus be references to \(\delta \; \tau \omicron \; \pi \rho \omicron \omega \omicron \nu \omicron \nu\omicron \omicron \omicron\).) The difficulty then arises that, while Socrates and Protarchus are agreed at a6-10 that no one undergoing depletion for the first time can 'have hold of' replenishment by means of either sensation or memory, Socrates inconsistently asserts at b11-c1: \(\tau \eta \nu \; \psi \mu \chi \nu \nu \; \acute {\alpha} \rho \alpha \; \tau \eta \zeta \; \pi \lambda \rho \omicron \omega \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omega \omicron \omega \omicron\) \(\omicron \nu \mu \nu \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\; \delta \eta \lambda \omicron \omicron\; \acute {\omicron}\). Attempts have been made to explain away this inconsistency. Should we not read '\(\tau \eta \zeta \; \phi \upsilon \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\)' or '\(\tau \eta \zeta \; \acute {\alpha} \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\)' instead of '\(\tau \eta \zeta \; \pi \lambda \rho \omicron \omega \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\)' as the genitive implied on '\(\tau \eta \nu \; \omicron \nu \mu \nu \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron\)' at c1? Not, surely, without convicting Plato of 'an incredible negligence of expression',\(^4\) and disregarding the fact that 'there is no allusion in this context'\(^5\) to original organic equilibrium. A second

\(^1\) Notably Apelt in his commentary on the Philebus (note 53), the editors of A.E.Taylor's translation of the Philebus (Nelson, 1956, pp. 261-262), and Professor Hackforth in Plato's Examination of Pleasure (pp. 66-67).

\(^2\) Cannassed by Apelt and by the editors of Taylor's translation.

\(^3\) Apelt's 'ursprünglicher Gleichgewichtszustand' (loc. cit.) (and cf. Philebus, 31d4-6).

\(^4\) Hackforth, loc. cit.

\(^5\) Editors' note to Taylor's translation, loc. cit.
Another possibility is that only a6-10 has to do with the first occasion of depletion, while the rest of the argument is about desire in general. (Thus 'ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν' (b1) and 'τοῦ δυψόντος' (b6) would have the same reference as 'ὁ κενούμενος ἣμῶν' (a3), but a different reference from 'ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος' (a6).) If this approach is right, Plato can hardly be allowing the possibility of desire at the first depletion, because, if he were, a6-10 would merely state an unexplained, and therefore unilluminating exception to the general principle (established at b1-c1) that, whenever desire is felt, the soul 'has hold of' replenishment through memory.8 Rather, he must be assuming that desire

6 Offered by Taylor's editors, loc. cit.
7 Nothing turns upon 'πληρώσεως πώματος' (35a1), as Taylor's editors seem to think, since both verbs and nouns of filling regularly indicate the material with which the filling is done by partitive genitives. 'Πλήρωσες πώματος' can thus mean either 'replenishment with drink' (process) or, less commonly, 'repletion with drink' (state), depending upon the context. (The instrumental 'πληρώσεις διὰ πώμα' is an alternative to 'πληρώσεις πώματος' in both senses.)
8 b1-c1 is most naturally taken thus: (i) Anyone who feels desire desires not depletion, which he is undergoing, but [the contrary process of] replenishment (b1-5, with which cf. 34e13-35a5); (ii) Thus some part of the [person feeling desire] 'has hold of' replenishment (b6-8); (iii) This cannot be the body, because the body is undergoing depletion (b9-10); (iv) Therefore it must be the soul (b11), and (v) The soul must, obviously, 'have hold of' replenishment through memory (c1).
Hackforth (loc. cit.) accuses A.E.Taylor (Plato, p. 419) of taking 'κενούται γὰρ ποι' (b9) to mean 'that the reason why it is impossible for the body ἑφάπτεσθαι πληρώσεως is that the same thing cannot ἑφάπτεσθαι two opposites simultaneously'. The accusation is unwarranted, since Taylor says nothing of the sort in his paraphrase. Hackforth, however, seems to me to be half right, inasmuch as Plato would probably not have wanted to imply that, in general, the same thing cannot ἑφάπτεσθαι two opposites simultaneously. Why should it not? 'Ἐφάπτεσθαι' has to do, not with doing and undergoing (and cf. note 12, infra), but with people's 'grasp' on objects of cognition; and why, for instance, should one be unable κενώσεως καὶ πληρώσεως τῷ μνήμῃ ἑφάπτεσθαι ἅμα (as where one simul-