Introduction

Aristotle has at least three reasons for introducing a distinction between predication and inherence. One reason is that he wants to avoid a problem similar to that which can be found in Plato’s account of how many things come to have the same name. In a number of places (cf. Parm., 130 e - 131 a, 133 d; Phaedo, 102 b, 103 b-e, 104 a) Plato expresses the view that everything which participates in a form has the name (δομε) of the form. This view, however, overlooks the fact that many particulars of which Plato speaks do not in fact have the name of the form in which they are said to participate.
Though Socrates is said to participate in both man and justice, he has the name of man (ὁμοόνοος) but not that of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Why does Socrates take on the name of man but not that of justice? Aristotle tries to resolve a problem analogous to this when he distinguishes predication from inherence. The universals, man and justice, stand to Socrates as two universals which are related in some way to him, but Socrates has the name of man but not that of justice. Socrates is called ὁμοόνοος and δικαιος ("just" or "just man"), but not δικαιοσύνη. Aristotle’s explanation of the fact that the names of some universals can be applied, while the names of other universals cannot, to particulars to which these universals are related, is that only when a universal is *predicated of* a particular is it necessary that the particular have the name of the universal (cf. Cat. 5, 2a 19-33). By contrast, if a universal is *present in* a particular, the name of the universal is only rarely also the name of the particular in which it is present. If a universal is present in a particular, however, a variant of the name of the universal will usually be a name of the particular. We call a man a grammarian because grammar is present in him and brave because bravery is present in him (cf. Cat., 1, 1 a 12 ff.; 5, 2 a 19-33; 8, 10 a 28 - 10 b 12). But we call a man (a) man because man is predicated of the individual man, and we call his bravery bravery because bravery is predicated of the individual man’s bravery. (Because there are no indefinite articles in Greek it is possible for Aristotle to say that the same name, ὁμοόνοος, is applied both to man and to a particular man, as in ὁμοόνοος λογικός ἐστιν ("Man is rational") and Σωκράτης ὁμοόνοος ἐστιν ("Socrates is a man").) Aristotle includes in the first chapter of the Categories a distinction between synonymous things – things whose names are, in effect, the names of what is predicated of them, and paronymous things – things whose names are, in effect, variants of the names of what is present in them. The initial distinction between synonymous and paronymous things is not made in terms of the notions of predication and inherence, since these notions are introduced in part for the purpose of explaining why one and the same individual has some names which are, and others which are not, variants of the names of something else. The relevance of the first chapter of the Categories is thus established to the second chapter, in which the distinction between predication and inherence is made. (Aristotle’s account of equivocal things in the first chapter is meant only to help make clear his account of synonymous things.)

A second and more important reason Aristotle has for making a