The significance of Nietzsche for Derrida's philosophical project is readily apparent to any reader familiar with the texts of these two thinkers. While he has thus far refrained from a comprehensive examination of Nietzsche's thought, Derrida often avails himself of Nietzschean motifs, and Nietzsche is either named or implicated in virtually every work to which Derrida has appended his signature. The pervasiveness of Nietzsche's inscription in the Derridean text is attested to by a footnote subsequently added to his interview with J.-L. Houdebine and G. Scarpetta entitled "Positions." In the context of this footnote on historicism and truth, Derrida notes that "Nietzsche's name was not pronounced" during the interview and he adds that "on what we are speaking about at this very moment, as on everything else, Nietzsche is for me, as you know, a very important reference." Elsewhere, he is more specific as to the ways in which the Nietzschean text functions as an "important reference." In Of Grammatology, for example, he credits Nietzsche with contributing "a great deal to the liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos and the related concept of truth or the primary signified, in whatever sense that is understood [by his] radicalizing of the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation, difference [ . . . ]" And in Marges de la philosophie, in the context of locating the sources of Valéry, he provides the following list of themes which we should look for in Nietzsche: "the systematic mistrust of metaphysics as a whole, the formal approach to
philosophic discourse, the concept of the philosopher-artist, the rhetorical and philological question asked of the history of philosophy, the suspicion of the values of truth ('well applied convention'), of meaning and of being, of 'meaning of being', the attention to the economic phenomena of force and of difference of forces, and so forth."

While his references to Nietzsche are not always affirmative, more often than not Derrida allies himself with Nietzsche in his attempt to deconstruct the logocentric tendencies of metaphysical thinking. More specifically, Nietzsche frequently makes his appearance in the Derridean text as an alternative to the nostalgic longing for full presence that Derrida locates at the core of Western metaphysics. In his one "text" where offering an interpretation of Nietzsche is his explicit concern, I think that we can see again the Derridean strategy of providing Nietzsche as such an alternative. That text is *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, and I will suggest in what follows that *Spurs* be read as Derrida's attempt, on a number of levels which remain to be specified, to provide an alternative to the interpretations of Nietzsche hitherto offered and, in particular, as an alternative to the Heideggerian interpretation. It will become apparent in the following account, however, that the nature of this alternative is far from transparent, as Derrida's interpretation is not offered as either replacement or as refutation of these earlier interpretations. Instead, it provides a *supplement* to these earlier readings and, as is the case with other Derridean questions of supplementarity, there can be no question of choosing, for example, between Derrida's reading and Heidegger's. Heidegger's importance for the Derridean project cannot be overestimated, and that importance remains even here, where Derrida's reading of Nietzsche is an *apparent* opposition to the reading of Heidegger. The semblance of this "opposition" abates somewhat when we recognize that Derrida's strategy in his discussion of Nietzsche's styles is twofold. While he wants to make it clear that the question of style exceeds the Heideggerian reading, he at the same time wants to make it no less clear to his French compatriots that things are not so simple with Heidegger and that the Heideggerian defense of presence remains a "profound" and "powerful" problematic for interpretation. In our discussion of *Spurs*, therefore, we will try to keep the text situated between these two motifs, for there is a sense in which, with *Spurs*, Derrida is offering us another example of philosophical "undecidability," this time with respect to the adequacy of the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche and the success of Heidegger's attempted inclusion of Nietzsche within the history of Western metaphysics and the supposed extrication of himself from that same history.