The announced title of this lecture course for the summer semester of 1925, "History of the Concept of Time," reflects the titles of two earlier lectures given by Heidegger at significant turning points in his career. Heidegger's demonstration lecture at the beginning of his teaching career in 1915 was entitled "The Concept of Time in Historical Science"; it is concerned with that concept as it is developed in both historical and natural science. The more famous lecture given by Heidegger to the Marburg Theological Faculty on July 25, 1924 was entitled simply "The Concept of Time" and has been called by one who was there the 'Urform' of Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time (1927). Some of the concepts and theses sketched out in this germinal lecture are worked out in far greater detail, probably for the first time in the general form they were to assume in Being and Time, in the lecture course of 1925 presented here. The general thesis which emerges from this decade of deliberation on "the concept of time" is that it is to be drawn first and foremost not from natural or historical science but from the more basic dimension of 'human being' (earlier designated as the 'factic experience of life' but by 1924 designated as 'Dasein', literally 'being there' or, more idiomatically, 'being here and now') understood as the entity which experiences itself in its 'temporal particularity' (Jeweiligkeit) or, in the

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*History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, tr. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). The following Translator's Introduction was originally intended for publication together with this translation.
more existentialistic emphasis which this formulation assumes by 1927, the entity whose being is ‘in each instance mine’ (je meiniges; more abstractly, the basic character of Jemeinigkeit). The fundamental assertion “I am” which each of us can make about ourselves thus becomes the initial locus for understanding the concept of time, which now assumes the form of understanding the conceptual relations between being and time and evokes the need to re-examine the traditional concepts of time.

But the lecture course of 1925 falls far short of a re-examination of the traditional concepts of time, the task implied in its announced title and divided into three historical stages in the Second Part of the announced outline for the course (11). In fact, only the First Division of the First Part of that outline, “the preparatory description of the field (namely Dasein) in which the phenomenon of time becomes manifest,” is developed in any great detail. And so little is said of time itself that there is some indication, in Heidegger’s repeated anticipatory remarks on the subject, of a growing impatience among the students attending the course.

Heidegger chooses to introduce the organization of the themes projected for the course through the announced subtitle of the course, “Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of History and Nature.” In short, the course is to provide what is first needed “in order to be able to do a phenomenology of history and nature” (1). Why he does this is not made clear, and there is a certain opaqueness to the opening sections because of this seeming detour. To be sure, the distinction between history and nature and its immediate association with the two main groups of empirical sciences reflects Heidegger’s earlier concern, in the aforementioned demonstration lecture, with the concept of time in historical and natural science; indeed, time is here introduced as an ‘index’ (8) for distinguishing these scientific domains. But Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that a phenomenology of history and nature cannot remain enmeshed in the fact of science and what it has discovered, as the neo-Kantians of his day were inclined to leave the matter, but must disclose the reality of these domains precisely as they show themselves before scientific inquiry. This is the basic task of what Heidegger here calls a ‘productive logic’ (2), in the next semester a ‘philosophizing logic’ and finally, following Husserl, a ‘regional ontology’ which serves to found a particular empirical science and its domain. Thus ‘logic’, that is to say philosophy or ontology for Heidegger, leaps ahead of the sciences in order to draw or revise their fundamental concepts out of the matters themselves. Philosophy, that is, phenomenology, as the primal science must perform the same task for itself, disclosing new domains in the matters themselves, such as Dasein, in order thereby to dismantle and