In his 1913 introduction to the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, in the context of his claim that this work represents a breakthrough for the entire sphere of logic in general, Husserl indicates explicitly that the years 1886-1895 were crucial to this breakthrough and that Hume played a significant role therein. For this reason we shall cite at length the key passage.

As the reader can see, the studies of the author in these years of 1886-1895 confined themselves primarily to the, to be sure, very comprehensive but still limited areas of formal mathematics and formal logic. The dissociation from psychologism takes place first of all on the basis of studies in this area, although at the same time it occurs in the most general attention to the entire sphere even though it has not yet been taken up, to any appreciable degree, in actual research. This transformation was prepared by the study of Leibniz and the considerations occupying me ever anew of the sense both of the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact and also at the same time of Hume’s expositions concerning knowledge about “relations of ideas” and “matter [sic] of fact.” I became keenly aware of the contrast between this latter distinction and Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and this became important for the later positions which I took.
But just as Hume's outlook owes a debt to Locke and Berkeley, so we think both Locke and Berkeley have had an impact on Husserl, admittedly to a lesser degree than Hume during this early period. Let us pursue this point.

Until recently the resources for the study of Husserl's early period from 1886 to 1895 have been limited, especially for the English-speaking audience. This has begun to be remedied. However, the most authoritative sources are Bernhard Rang's edition of Husserl's Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910) and Ingrid Strohmeyer's edition of Husserl's Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie. To assay the influence of the British empiricists with whom we are concerned in this study we have hit upon two strategies: (1) to investigate the biographical data from this period; (2) to examine the context within which Husserl mentions explicitly Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Biographical data help us to fill in the background against which Husserl took the views manifest in the published writings of this period of 1886-1895. To cite the references to the British empiricists in context may aid us to at least intimate their impact on Husserl's early attempts to ground the a priori truths of mathematics and logic in a descriptive and yet empirical psychology.

In a letter to Marvin Farber Husserl commented on his early period leading up to the Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891). What is revealing is his comments on the British empiricists.

As a young beginner I naturally read much, including classics and contemporary literature of the 1870's to the 1890's. I liked the critical-skeptical point of view, since I myself did not see firm ground anywhere. I was always very far removed from Kantianism and German idealism. . . . I have repeatedly studied the English empiricists . . . . Really, my course was already marked out by the Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), and I could do nothing other than to proceed further. 

This marked interest in the British empiricists is confirmed by other biographical data.

During the years 1876-78 Berkeley was not only the first author Husserl studied in depth but also was defended by him against his fellow-students. Shortly later when he came under Brentano's influence in Vienna, Husserl testified to the interest Brentano awakened in Hume.

Most impressive was his activity in the unforgettable discussion groups. (I remember the following subjects: Hume's