Substantiality and Perceptual Coherence
Remarks on H.B. Veatch: "Two Logics"

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In his *Two Logics*, a book most instructive and highly remarkable in several respects, Professor Veatch advocates the right and autonomy of a "What-Logic" besides what he calls a "Relating-Logic. Logic is understood by him in a much broader and wider than the merely technical sense. Professor Veatch speaks of different "types of knowledge" (p. 11). One might render the wider meaning which he gives to the term "logic" by such expressions as cognitive style, direction and orientation of theoretical endeavor and interest which, in turn, is determined by the idea and general conception of knowledge, that is to say by the goal to be attained in the course, and by the means of, cognitive endeavors.

Thus understood, the What-Logic, which is the traditional Subject-Predicate Logic of Aristotelian provenience, proves to be in the service of a general conception according to which the aim of knowledge consists in stating what things are in themselves, in describing, and accounting for them in their own terms. It is this logic which is eminently appropriate to, and even indispensable for, all pursuits, both cognitive and other, in common daily life and, quite in general, in all attempts at cognitively dealing with human affairs, e.g., the understanding of historical personalities. In contrast, Relating-Logic, as it has

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1Henry B. Veatch, *Two Logics* (Evanston 1969). All references, both in the text and in the footnotes, without indication of a title, are to this book.
been formulated and developed in *Principia Mathematica*, is germane to the spirit and style of modern science, especially physics, and is guided throughout by the general conception of knowledge prevailing in modern science. Under that conception, the quest for the essence and nature of things, for what things are in themselves has to be relinquished altogether to be replaced by the search for the ways in which things function, behave under varying circumstances, in brief for the different manners in which they are related to one another. To be precise, the things here in question are not things in the ordinary sense of common experience but rather facts, events, happenings, data, and the like. As far as the relations are concerned, they are not grounded or founded in the things; they cannot be read off them, so to speak. Rather the relations have to be established, they have to be imposed upon the things, in whatever manner such establishing or imposing may be accounted for; in the latter respect, there is some divergence of opinion among the philosophers adhering to a Relating-Logic. In this sense one might say that the things are not so much but rather have to be related to one another, all such relating being performed and effectuated by the knowing subject, especially the scientist. For that reason it seems to us that what Professor Veatch calls Relating-Logic—a denomination he prefers to such expressions as “relational logic” or “contextual logic” (p. 112)—might still more properly be characterized as Correlating—Logic, a designation emphasizing that all relations and correlations are bestowed upon the things from without.

More is at stake in Professor Veatch’s discussion that a merely technical problem concerning logic, however broadly construed. In insisting upon the legitimacy and even necessity of a What-Logic he takes pains in pointing out the inadequacy of a Relating-Logic to the task of accounting for the theoretical and cognitive procedures used in the humanities and quite generally, in dealing with human affairs (chaps. I, XI, XII). Outside his professional activities, even the scientist in his daily life has to rely upon common-sense knowledge, whatever its limitations, and has to avail himself of a What-Logic as germane to common-sense knowledge, while the Relating-Logic and the corresponding specific orientation of modern science undoubtedly yields theoretical results of incomparably wider scope and yet fails in the cognitive tasks arising within, and concerning the common-sense world, that world in which all of us, including the scientists, are lead-