Genealogical Supplements:
A Reply of Sorts

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Both of my reviewers do me the honor of going beyond a "mere" reviewing, in developing self-standing essays that represent original contributions to the tale of the rise and fall, genesis and demise, of the book entitled Sein und Zeit (SZ), Being and Time. Not quite the makings of a Festschrift nor even the first signs of an "impact" or "influence" of that book-of-genesis of a famous book, these early "re-actions" at least manifest the impatience to get on with a story broken off in mid-genesis in order to bring the tale to its initial denouement in The Demise of Heidegger's "Being and Time," the proposed sequel volume now in progress. For SZ is, by its author's own admission, a failed project, the most celebrated fragment in recent memory, and not until the marks and testimony of that failure are fully exposed will the tale being told find its measure of finite closure.

Tom Sheehan's "leap across the genealogical divide" into the extant fragment entitled Sein und Zeit, Erste Hälfe, is truly impressive, certainly provocative, and at times, groundbreaking and original. Taking his cues from SZ §68d on "The Temporality of Discourse," Sheehan makes his own suggestive grammatical extrapolations into the particulars of the complex structure of tenses, "along with the other temporal phenomena of language, namely, 'aspects' [Aktionsarten] and 'temporal stages and levels' [Zeitstufen]" (SZ, 349), that Heidegger was clearly planning to unravel from the inherent temporality built into language itself. It is the only topic in the "First Half" of SZ that in the first
editions refers ahead to a specific chapter (would it have been entitled "Die Temporalität [tensorality] der Rede" or "Die Tempora der Rede"?) being planned for the never published Third Division ("Vgl. Abschnitt III, Kap. 2 dieser Abhandlung"). But by way of spelling out the full genealogical context, it should also be recalled that those special categories to be developed from an analysis of Dasein first were called tensors, tensorals (Temporalien, from the German Tempus, Tempora, grammatical tense[s]: cf. K, 404, 418, 505), \(^1\) shortly before they were termed existentials in the final draft of SZ, in keeping with the new guiding formal indication of "ex-sistence" taken in the strong sense of a dispossessive, expropriative exposure to one's finitude. Through the sharp ontological contrast between substance (which "has" its properties) and ex-sistence (which can never have, but is always "out toward" its possibilities), Heidegger more than once anticipates a new tensoral "modal logic" of the classical relations between actuality, possibility, and necessity that he expects to emerge from the intricate articulations of an originative ex-static temporality (SZ, 143, 38, 160). For example, under the modality of a return "back to the future," Sheehan himself details the complexities of the Heideggerian framework of "becoming" that alludes, without saying so overtly, to a radical breach with the classical anamnesis thesis, thus to a new sense of the apriori that radically transforms Pindar's protreptic one-liner from "Become what you are" to "Become what you are to be" (the futurally conative "to-be" was the guiding formal indication of the penultimate draft of SZ in SS 1925).

Sheehan launches his apriori tensor analysis from the allusion in SZ, 85 to an "apriori present perfect." But the analysis of the temporal-tensoral levels of presence and appresence interrelated by empowering relations of "making present" is already in full swing in the penultimate draft of SS 1925 by way of ontological strata expressed in the grammatical form of "present perfect" suffixes; perceiving and perceived find their static union and habitual fulfillment in the unifying state of perceivedness, but perceivedness for all its bodiliness or bodily presence of things is founded in the more immediate presence of the handiness of instruments, which in turn is founded in the presence of concernedness, which in turn points to the most tacit underlying presence sustaining the other presences, that of the world in its worldliness and its meaningfulness (K, 347f.). The diverse priorities of the present perfect apriori that in effect spell out the habits of our inhabitation find their culmination in the most rudimentary state or "stand," the familiar "Selbstverständlichkeit" of our understanding. Despite the interplay of presences out of a having-been that continues to