
Daniel Dahlstrom’s *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* is a meticulous investigation of Heidegger’s thinking about truth—the “decisive” yet, in Dahlstrom’s view, “little considered” dimension in the unfolding of Heidegger’s retrieval of the question of being—during his formative years in Marburg (1923–1928). This critical study of Heidegger’s early concept of truth (the title of the book is therefore slightly misleading) is the first of substance that tracks Heidegger’s thinking closely through the lecture courses of the 1920s and into *Being and Time*. Dahlstrom, however, is not in the business of providing an exhaustive assessment of the constellation of themes and authors that figured into Heidegger’s thinking leading into *Being and Time*, apart from a discussion of Lotze, Husserl, and Aristotle, other key figures in Heidegger’s confrontation with the history of philosophy are quietly left in the background. And not without reason, since Dahlstrom’s primary concern is the development of Heidegger’s concept of “existential” truth and his critique of the “logical prejudice” during his reign as the “hidden king” of German philosophy.

*Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* is a triptych. A first panel of three chapters provides an illuminating reading of Heidegger’s critique of the logical prejudice and its historical sources, as developed in two of Heidegger’s most brilliant lecture courses (*Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* and *Logic: The Question of Truth*). Each of these three chapters addresses, respectively, Heidegger’s critique of Lotze (placed against the backdrop of Heidegger’s early writings on logic), Heidegger’s complex relationship with Husserl’s phenomenology, and Heidegger’s hermeneutic retrieval of Aristotle’s concept of truth. A second panel (chapter 4) patiently reconstructs the argument for “existential truth,” mainly in the form of its presentation in *Being and Time*. A third panel (chapter 5) identifies a number of difficulties in Heidegger’s thinking by first responding to Ernst Tugendhat’s influential criticism of Heidegger’s concept of truth. After arguing against Tugendhat’s dismissal of Heidegger’s truth, Dahlstrom explores the ambiguity of “mediating”...
between existential and propositional truth that plagues, without entirely debilitating, Heidegger’s account.

There is much that is thought-provoking in Heidegger’s Concept of Truth. According to its central claim, Heidegger’s originality consists in diagnosing the ontological symptoms of the logical prejudice while at the same time uncovering a more original sense of truth as “the disclosedness of being-here” (Dahlstrom’s preferred translation of Dasein). Dahlstrom’s interpretation of Heidegger’s (early) concept of truth is, furthermore, judiciously developed in conjunction with an argument about the significance of Husserl’s phenomenology for Heidegger’s thinking. This dual focus on Heidegger’s concept of truth and his critique of Husserl provides the main points of reference for my consideration of Dahlstrom’s study.

In the 1925/26 lectures Logic: The Question of Truth, Heidegger affirms that “logic is the only science that, strictly speaking, treats of truth,” and as Dahlstrom remarks, the meaning of this statement is not entirely transparent, even in light of Heidegger’s earliest treatments of logic (9). In what sense, then, does Heidegger speak of logic as the only science that treats of truth?

Arguably, this claim is still as foreign to us today as when first advocated by Heidegger in the 1920s, given the widespread understanding of formal logic as the study of deduction and legitimate forms of inference. In this familiar view, issues surrounding the suitable uses of the predicates “true” and “false” are often excluded from the domain of formal logic, and even “meta-logical” investigations still remain beholden to the assumption that truth and falsity are predicates of judgments; only a judgment can strictly speaking be either true or false. Against this classical “prejudice,” Heidegger envisions a philosophical project that makes the question of truth—its possibility and meaning—central to the task of clarifying the essence of logic. Heidegger further distinguishes his proposed transcendental logic from its Kantian predecessor by formulating in these lectures a distinction between Sprache and Rede. Discourse (Rede) is offered as a translation of λόγος (“talking about something to someone”), whereas language (Sprache) refers to the “conceptual content of linguistic phenomena.” Emphasizing the ontological priority of logos (Rede) over language (Sprache), Heidegger informs his students, “this uncoveredness [of λόγος], that is to say, unconcealedness of the entity, we designate as truth.” Heidegger does not conceive of logic as separable from language, and given his interpretation of the original sense of logos as the “uncoveredness of some-